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P R E P A C E 
This study attexiipts to bridge a ohronological gap 
left by two previous studies o£ Australian ati.itudes to En^ '^land 
and, to a lesser extent, to the Llupire. Hall's "Australia and 
England" (1) nominally covered the years from lc'>50 to 1914. 
In fact Hall makes only brier reierence to the period after 1900. 
Serle's "Great Britain and Australia"(2) treats the years from 
1919 to 1939. The years covered by this study close the gap so 
that the three, together, contain a preliminary survey of Australian 
attitudes to the imperial conneotion from the time of responsible 
government to the Second Vvorld War, or the time when Australia 
formally accepted responsibility for its own foreign policy. 
The survey of attitudes in these studies is a 
preliminary survey. Hall's work was done between 1931 and 1933 
to which time very little detailed research m Australian nistory 
had been completed. Hall draws attention to this point and the 
consequent difficulty, presumably^ of interpreting his data obliged 
him to rest content vjith comj)iling a small mountain of expressed • 
attitudes'ana with a limited classification of this material. Serle, 
who also notes in his introduction the difficulties in this field 
because of the limited amount of monographic material, does atte.m]pt 
an assessment of economic attitudes, of political relations and of 
imraigration, but for the rest is concerned almost entirely with 
the compilation, description and classification of attitudes. 
The problem of assessing opinion does bristle with 
difficulties. 'Zven in the contemporary field where people may 
be directly observed, there is considerable debate as to what tested 
attitudes do express, and there have been vitriolic assessments of 
one worth of the techniques devised for assessing public opinion. 
(1) Hall H.L. : "Australia and England : A 3tudy in imperial 
Relations"(1934). 
(2) Serle G. : "Great Britain ana Australia''. Submitted to the A.1.1.A, 
for publication. Original doctoral thesis Bodlein 
Library, Oxford. 
ii. 
Beyond this preliminary question Is the more difficult problem 
of deciding the intensity of attitud«s and their importance in 
relation to behavlOHP and as determinants of government policies. 
It Is sometimes possible to show the direct point of contact 
between events and groups organised for a particular economic, 
social, religious or political end. It is much more difficult to 
decide the influence of public opinion, though all concede it a 
very real importance. If the problem is this difficult in the 
contemporary field, it will readily be conceded that it is much 
more difficult in earlier periods when the techniques cannot 
be applied. 
In dealing with some earlier periods there are, of 
course, certain advantages. If one assumes that in the framing of 
pcSL icies what is important is not the form of public opinion but 
the policy makers interpretation of opinion, what they took into 
consideration in moulding and applying their policy, then quite 
clearly for those periods for which we have access to the official 
documents and private correspondence, we have access to the 
evidence of opinion effect. The difficulty with the years covered 
by the thesis is that neither are all the documents available nor 
may the new techniques of opinion testing be used. For these 
reasons, this study must contain many weaknesses. Like the two 
previous studies in this field it cannot be regarded as more than 
a preliminary survey. 
But preliminary studies are not without their 
uses and the possibilities of this study can be most clearly 
stated by considering which of the questions which should be 
answered can be answered. The questions a study of this kind 
might be expected to answer are: 
(a) what were the expressed Australian attitudes to the 
imperial connection from 1900 to 1920? 
(b) are these attitudes classifiable according to social 
status, economic interest, religious interest, 
political Interest, cultural interests? 
(c) how far did the expressed attitudes reflect accurately 
public opinion? 
Ill 
(d) why were the expressed attitudes (and if possible) why 
was public opinion as it was? 
(e) in which ways did attitudes change? 
(f) vjhich attitudes affected government policies? 
(g) in which other ways did unofficial attitudes influence 
Australian-Imperial relations? 
(h) are there any discernible patterns in the change of 
attitudes? 
While all of these questions cannot be answered 
definitely a worthwhile beginning can be made. Yye are able to 
list the expressed attitudes and we are able to classify them. 
It is not possiole to say with precision how far they reflected, 
accurately, public opinion throughout the full period of time, 
but by taking certain incidents which provoked public action we 
can define the broad limits within which Australian-Imperial 
relations were to be conducted. ViJe can usually provide a plausible 
explanation of why expressed attitudes were as they were, and, 
though this is perhaps more dubious, we can at least advance 
tentative hypotheses to explain why public opinion was as it was. 
We can list the expressed changes in attitudes and subject to 
limitations vje can attempt to explain changes in public opinion. 
Until official documents become available the influence of expressed 
attitudes on government policy must remain partly uncertain, but 
it is possible to speculate from the inform-ation available and 
from subsequent action. We can make some assessment of the ways in 
which unofficial attitudes influenced Australian-Imperial relations. 
It is also possible to detect a pattern in the 
shifting balance of attitudes. And this is the second reason for 
selecting the years 1900 to 1919 for study . This was the period 
which saw the conversion of the self-governing section of the 
British Empire into the British Commonwealth; it saw at the same 
time, the evolution of Australia from a more or less uncoordinated 
set of advanced colonies into a relatively co-ordinated nation. 
The principal aim of this study is to assess the extent to wl±;,liL 
the changes in the form and conception of the Empire satisfied 
iv. 
the evolving national aspirat ions of Austra l ia . As far as possible 
tne findings on the other questions have been grouped about th is 
theme, 
m 
It would oversj^ llfy the study to attempt to 
reduce it to a single thesis, but the major strand is the search 
which occurred over these years for a middle course oetween the 
centrifugal pressures of national growth and regional interests 
and the centripetal forces of sentiment, security and economics. 
In Part I an attempt is made to define the limits within which 
this search was to oe conducted. It is argued that by 1900 the 
decision had been made to remain within the Em,oire. By taking 
specific crises which provoked an extensive public response, an 
effort is made to show that majority Australian public opinion 
favoured Ei.ipire membership, and favoured it to the extent that 
an Empire war wgs an Australian war not lor constitutional reasons, 
but because majority effective opinion favoured participation. 
It .uS argued, then, that by 1900 Australian nationalist values 
had been expressed which doxuinated both aomestic policy and 
relations with the Em,;;ire to 1914. It is maintained that by 1905, 
at the latest, tnese values had been accepted by a powerful and 
large majority of the comiaunity as the "settled policies" of 
Australia. They decided the accomiTiodation required of the imperial 
government if majority Australian opinion was to be satisfied with 
Empire evolution. 
Part II studias in detail the working out of 
the attempts to 1919 to find Ea.:^-.ire forms and methods of Empire 
co-operation satisfactory to Empire sentiment and to majority held 
nationalist values as defined. It begins with an analysis of Australia's 
position in the Empire in 1900 as expressed, in the Australia 
Constitution Bill and the British Government's reaction to the 
Bill, It then examines Australian-Imperial relations to 1914 in 
several of the m^ ajor fields - defence, economics, im,,:igration and 
consultation and co-operation. It concludes with an examination of t'iie 
impact of the war. No detailed study of Australian-Eritiah relations 
V. 
in the south west Pacific has been made not because the subject 
is unimportant but because it is a separate thesis in itself. 
Reference to this question, however, is included when it iirluenced 
significantly 'che pattern of Australian atLutudea to the imperial 
connection which this work attempts to trace. 
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- INTRODUCTION.-
From Empire to Commonwealth. 
1900 to 1921 saw the conversion of the self-
governing section of the British Empire into the British Common-
wealth. The process did not begin in 1900 nor was it complete by 
1921 but over these years the steps were taken which conceded to 
the self-governing colonies the principle of the right of equal 
status with Great Britain. In Latham* s opinion the modern British 
Empire which had emerged was "the greatest politidal endeavour 
that has ever been made to reconcile liberty with authority by 
interpreting liberty as autonomy and achieving unity of action In 
essentials by mutual assent to common policy."(1) 
The foundation for this coaverslon had been laid, 
gradually, for a century. The radical anti-imperialists, the 
Manchester School, the Colonial Reformers, the Liberal Imperialists, 
the Imperial Pederationists and the Chamberlain imperialists (2), 
as well as pressures from the colonies, had contributed in such a 
way that by 1900 the self-governing colonies had virtual control 
over their domestic affairs and had made limited and tentative 
advances beyond their own borders. Various legal limitations on 
their domestic authority still existed (3) and these legislative 
and judicial bonds were important. They were not so obviously 
important in Australia as in South Africa or Canada for after 1901 
neither Australian public opinion norpolitical opinion was much 
concerned with Empire legal forms unless they were irksome. These 
were only occasionally irksome. Their greater importance is in their 
positive value, evidence of continuing Empire unity in growing 
diversity. As such the executive, legislative and judicial bonds 
(1) Latham J.G. :"Australia and the British Commonwealth".(1929>p,3 
(2) For a valuable selection of documents tracing the development 
of this movement see :Bennett G. "The Concept of Empire 1774 -
1947." (1953) 
(3) See Keith A.B. :"Imperial Unity and the Dominions."(1915)Part 1. 
Keith A.B. :"Responsible Government in the Dominions". 
For an Australian assessment of the legal relations of Australia 
and the Empire in 1901 Quick and Garran :"The Annotated 
Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, 
For a differing interpretation from Keith's of the power of the 
Governors see Evatt H.V.:"The King and his Dominion Governors". 
?•»,* 
all left their imprint on Australian law and politics.(4) 
The concession to the self-governing colonies of 
control of their domestic affairs was the limit to which the 
British Government would admit Dominion authority in 1900. 
Chamberlain was prepared to make an explicit statement of this 
concession in that year. Discussing the Australian Constitution 
Bill, he stated 
"We have accepted without demur, and we will ask the 
House of Commons to accept every part of this Bill, 
every word, every phrase, which deals exclusively 
with the interests of Australia."(5) 
In fact limited concessions had also been made to the Dominion 
Governments in respect of matters on the borderline between the 
domestic and the imperial, notably immigration control and the 
negotiation of commercial treaties.(5) But it was not the 
intention of the Chamberlain government to concede to the Dominions 
any control over imperial matters. Chamberlain also, made it quite 
clear to the Australian delegates who attended the Australian 
Constitution Bill in London, "that the position of the Imperial 
Parliament is that of trustee for the Empire".(7), and that it 
could make no concessions in regard to those "powers intrusted 
to the Imperial Parliament and Government for the protection of 
those common interests and the discharge of those common duties 
which form the peculiar sphere of the central authority of the 
Empire"(8). 
(4) See Quick :"Legislative Powers of the Commonwealth and 
States of Australia"(1919) for a discussion 
of the impact of Privy Council decisions on 
Australian law, 
Scott E. :"Official History of Australia in the War 1914-18" 
(1936) for a discussion of the positive importance 
of the Governor-General. 
(5) Australia Constitution Bill, p 12. 
(6) See Part I^ Chapters II and iKfor details. 
(7) Australia Constitution Bill p.18. 
(8) Ibid p.150 
Yet by 1917 the position had so far altered that 
the Imperial War Conference passed its famous Resolution IX. Having 
stated that the readjustment of the Empire constitution should be 
deferred until after the war when it should be dealt with at a 
special Imperial Conference, the resolution continued: 
"They deem it their duty, however, to place on record their 
view that any such readjustment while thoroughly preserving 
all existing powers of self-government and complete control 
of domestic affairs, should be baaed upon a full recognition 
of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial 
Commonwealth, and of India as an important portion of tJb.e 
same, should recognise the right of the Dominions and India 
to an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign 
relations, and should provide effective arrangements for 
continuous consultation in all important matters of common 
Imperial concern, for such necessary concerted action, 
founded on consultation as the several governments may 
determine"(9). 
In Dawson's opinion 
"one could eaalliar build up a plausible 
and perhaps a true case to prove that 
every step in the subsequent constitut-
ional development of the imperial and 
foreign relations of the DoDiinions had 
been the natural outcome of this resolution"(10). 
It was only four years later that the treaty between Great Britain 
and Ireland used the term "British Commonwealth of Nations" and 
described the Irish Free State as a "co-equal member" of this 
Commonwealth, "which is a community of nations"(11). 
This transition from colonialism to dominionism 
meant that the British Empire had met, with qualified success, 
perhaps the major difficulty which has beset modern Empires. 
It had found a method of retaining in association the majority 
of the previously dependent colonies after these colonies had 
developed into separate nationhood. Like so much associated 
with the Empire and Commonwealth, the genius of the success rested 
in the combination of the non-doctrinaire simplicity of the general 
principle and the complexity of its ad hoc application. The consist-
ent principle was abdication or the sharing of authority. To 1900 
the abdication was in the main, in relation to domestic matters. 
(9) Quoted in Dawson :"The Development of Dominion Status." p.25 
(10)Ibid p.27 
(11)Latham : op.cit. p 9. 
After 1900 the principle was extended to "imperial" matters -
from trade treaties to matters of war and peace. It would be partly 
accurate but misleading, however, to see the success only in this 
principle. Of equal Importance was itseppllcation, the knowledge of 
when to withdraw and when to share, for irrespective of individual 
beliefs, the Empire was a political power which England in a free 
Commonwealth never would be and both Liberal and Unionist ministries 
sought to guard jealously even after 1900 their sole control over 
political treaties. Chamberlain was adamant on this point and 
Asquith, as late as 1911, stated that in relation to the conduct 
of foreign policy, the conclusion of treaties, the maintenance of 
peace and the declaration of war that "the responsibility of 
the Imperial Government,..could not be shared"(12). 
At the same time, it was accepted by British 
government leaders from about 1900 that the authority of the 
British government in these regards rested in the last resort 
on the acquiescence of the Dominions. Chamberlain remarked in 
connection with the Australia Constitution Bill that 
"we recognise fully the unwisdom - I had almost 
said the impossibility - of pressing views on 
great self-governing communities to which they 
are absolutely opposed"(13). 
The point had been appreciated before 1900, but it was driven 
home by the Boer War. (14) From this time under the pressure of 
dominion demands, international crises and Empire tradition the 
concessions were gradually granted which made the British Empire 
the British Commonwealth. By 1911, at the very time when Asquith 
was asserting that Britain could not share its responsibilities 
in regard to foreign policy, the Foreign Secretary, Earl Grey, 
declared that from that time the dominions must be consulted 
in the framing of a common foreign policy for the Empire in regard 
to those questions in which the self-governing dominions were 
concerned. 
(12) Quoted in Dawson : op.cit. p 11. 
(13) Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Bill p.18 
(14) Amery L.S. :"The Times History of the War in South Africa", 
(1905) Vol.Ill p.30. 
Pyrah :"Imperial Policy and South Africa 1902-10"(1955). 
Latham : op.cit. p 7. 
^. 
The general explanation of why this evolution 
retained Australia in Empire association as it developed to 
quasi-national status over these years has a disconcerting simplicity. 
It is probably adequate to point, on the one hand, to British 
withdrawal from domestic affairs and gradual agreement to share 
authority in regard to imperial matters, and on the other, to the 
security afforded by the British Navy, the whole being underwritten 
by the ties of sentiment, economics and common heritage. Yet,though 
this is generally correct, Australia's own developing traditions. 
Ideals and regional interests established more refined limits on 
the form of Empire evolution demanded, and with development of 
Australian nationalism, Australia did play a not insignificant role 
in helping to fashion the Empire pattern. 
PART I. 
THE DECISION TO REMAIN. 
1, Introduction. 
Surveying the balance of attitudes in 1900, it is 
cleai? that it weighed heavily in favour of Australia's continued 
active membership of the Empire. There were legacies of discontent 
and points of policy disagreement with Great Britain continued but 
the question of separation had ceased to be anissue of substance. 
The Hon.Braasey remarked in 1902, that "fifteen years ago(in 1887), 
it was an open question whether Australia would remain an integral 
portion of the British Empire or not", but by 1896"the idea that 
Australia was to become an independent Empire had given place to 
the universal conviction that Australia could better secure the 
well-being of her people, and could better wo^k out her destinies 
under the British flag"(l). B.R.Wise stated in 1900,"I certainly 
did not anticipate at that time (1888) that in so short a period of 
twelve years the then prevalent indifference on the part of Great 
Britain and suspicion on ours would have given place to the mutual 
confidence which is now so significant of the relations between 
the two countries"(2). 
Though there was a residue of republicanism in 
1900, mainly associated with the labour movement, the separation 
movements were a spent force. One ardent republican paper of the 
late 1880's, the "Boomerang", had •Virtually gone out of existence 
after Lane left the editorship in 1890(3). The other,the Bulletin, 
had modified its platform from republicanism to "alliance not 
dependence"(4). In 1900, the Bulletin still did not respect 
royalty (5), it still saw the conferring of honours as reactionary 
directed bribery (6), it feared and bitterly condemned British 
investment in Australia (7), indeed it aired irregularly the full 
range of criticism against the imperial connection which had earlier 
(1) Procs. Royal Colonial Institute 1901-2.Vol XXXIV p.6-7 
(2) "Bulletin'^ 5/5/1900. 
(3) See Gollan R.:"Radicalism and Socialism in Eastern Australia, 
1850-1910". (Unpublished thesis,University of London;1950) 
(4) "Bulletin" 10/8/1901 
(5) Ibid 24/2/1900 
(6) Ibid 19/5/1900 
(7) Ibid 2/6/1900 
7. 
been voiced by republicans. But it no longer pressed for an 
Independent republic and its occasional threat(8) of separation 
was more a gesture than a challenge. The Republican Union and the 
Republican League of the late 1880'a were "dead of anaemia"(9). 
The Australian Natives' Association, with a membership of 20,000 (10) 
in 1900, had changed its policy between 1887 and 1896 from a policy 
which had regarded separation as tenable (11) to a policy "devotedly 
loyal" (12). The Sydney Bally Telegraph which in 1889 had regarded' 
separation as regretable but inevitable saw good reason in 1900 
A 
to strengthen imperial ties (13) and the Chairman of its Board of 
Directors, Carey, played a leading role in organising a Bushmen's 
contingent for despatch to the Boer War(14). Queensland which in 
1888 had returned a "National" Party partly as the result of its 
anti-British election campaign was the first Australian government 
to offer troops for the Boer War in 1899; republican or separatist 
sentiments which had been expressed by both Free Trade and 
Protectionist leaders in New South Wales in 1889, now found no 
voice except from a few labour membet>a. 
Listing the forces of dissatisfaction in this way 
can give a misleading impression of the extent of the pressures 
for separation within Australia and so exaggerate the degree to 
which attitudes had changed. For Hancock, the "bold pronouncements 
of independence did not ring true even in the eighties, when the 
"Bulletin" and the Australian Natives' Association were revelling 
in their strenuous youth"(15). And Hancock could be substantially 
correct. While the extensive discussion of separation and the 
vigorous protests of the radical nationalists made separation 
(8) Bulletin 21/9/1901 
(9) Black G,: "The Origin and Growth of the Labour Movement". 
(10-)Procs. Royal Colonial Institute 1900-1901 p.66 
(11) Procs. Royal Colonial Institute 1902-3 p.6 
(12) Ibid 
(13) Cd 158, p.78 
(14) Johns's Notable Australians (1907) p.91 
(15) Hancock W.K. :"Australia". p.55 
f 
appear to be "an open question" in the 1880's it tended to conceal 
from observers the silent approval for continued membership of the 
Empire and to obscure the real problem which was the reconciliation 
of colonial nationalism with continued Empire membership. By 1900 
the reconciliation had been effected. It defined broadly the limits 
within which Australian-British imperial relations were to be 
shaped. 
• ^ . 
II. EMPIRE LOYALTY. 
Although it is impossible to define with precision 
Australian public opinion towards the Empire in 1900 and from 
1900-1914, it does appear that majority opinion favoured Empire 
membership and that it favoured it to the extent than an Empire 
war «as an Australian war not for constitutional reasons but 
because sentiment favoured participation. There are only three 
sources of evidence. The most effective is public reaction in 
times of Snpire crisis; of less value are expressions of loyalty; 
and there is the corroborative evidence frequently quoted, the 
statistics of the origins of the Australian population. Perhaps 
the evidence from these sources is not conclusive but it is 
conclusive in the pragmatic sense. It can bs shown that such 
expressions of loyalty and responses in Empire crises determined 
Australia's behaviour and were sufficiently powerful to pull 
governmoats and political parties into line where they might have 
wavered. 
In all three Empire wars (1) in which England was 
involved between 1880 and 1920, the Soudan War, the Boer War and 
the first World War, majority Australian opinion appears to have 
favoured Australian participation. The Soudan War was for Australia 
a slight excursion. Only 500 Australians went to the war and these 
all came from New South Wales. Yet in terms of Australia's relation 
with the Empire the event was not without its significance. Despite 
substaatial opposition from Parkes, Dalley was able to succeed in 
(1) The Boxer Rebellion incident is not included though on this 
occasion, also, there was some Australian participation. 
See C.Y.B. No.2, p.1097. 
Jebb notes that "This was no occasion for imperial co-operation. 
It was no case of defending a partner in the Empire against 
aggression or of upholding any common interest". 
Tstudles in Colonial Nationalism", p.126) 
lo , 
his efforts to despatch a contingent and the idea was taken up 
enthusiastically in all the colonies (2). Not only did conservative 
papers such as the Sydney Mail speak of the support (3), but the 
Bulletin, already displaying republican tendencies, and opposed 
to the campaign as an unjust war against Sudanese patriots (4), also 
witnessed the enthusiasm and conceded that it was evidence of 
Empire unity. 
".....the colonial enthusiasm marked first by 
the tender of military assistance, and second 
by its acceptance, is significant. It shows the 
existence and vigor of a sentiment which many 
doubted and some denied - the sense of the 
essential unity of the British Empire"(5). 
That there was a strong reaction in Australia to her own 
participation after 1885 is also significant and will be 
discussed later. The important point in terms of Empire loj/ralty 
is that when the issue was joined Australia had offered assistance 
and participated, if in a very limited fashion, in the campaign. 
It set early the pattern Australia was to follow towards Empire 
wars. 
Perhaps the Boer War illustrates most significantly 
the role of Australian sentiment towards the Empire and the 
effectiveness of public opinion in these matters. Certainly it 
was a minor war for Australia in con^arison to the First World 
War. Only 16,175 Australian troops were involvM and of these 
(2) See Coghlan : Op. clt p.31; Dilke : Op. clt p,177 
(3) Quoted in Brogden :"The Sudan Contingent", p.21 (1943). 
Brogden states that the attitude adopted by the Sydney Mail 
was typical of the press attitude. "In its ponderous leaders 
the weekly reminded its great county public that the contingent 
was not expected to win the Sudan War. The moral effect of the 
offer was the vital factor. The croaker who had prophesised 
the eventual disruption of the Empire and a growing desire 
for secession had been confounded". 
(4) Bulletin 28/2/85 
(5) Bulletin 21/2/85 
n 
the expenses of 6,068 were met by the Imperial government (6). 
On the other hand, intiareas in World War I there was no question 
of non-participation, both political parties vieing in their 
expressions of Empire loyalty, in the Boer War it does appear 
that public opinion played a role in modifying political behaviour. 
In New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and 
South Australia, one or more political parties modified or reversed 
their attitude to Australian participation in the Boer War between 
September-October,1899, when the despatch of Australian contingents 
was discussed, and December 1899-January 1900 when the question 
of despatching a second Australian contingent was discussed. Bythe 
time that the despatch of a second contingent was under discussion, 
the parliamentary opposition to Australian parti6i|)ation had so 
dwindled that in all the Australian parliaments only three members 
spoke against the motions. The belief that public opinion 
overwhelmingly -favoured Australian participation was one of the 
important factors responsible for this change in expressed attitudes. 
In Tasmania and West Australia there was no opposition within 
parliament to the despatch of the first contingents. 
The most extensive change of politidal behaviour 
occurred in New South Wales, In this state all three political 
parties changed or modified their expressed attitudes. The clearest 
understanding of the changes is to be obtained by tracing the 
developments leading up the Aeoision to approve the despatch of 
the first contingent. 
On July 26th.1899 a telegram was received by Reid 
from the Uitlanders Council, It read : 
"British inhabitants Transvaal have appealed to Queen for 
relief fromoppression and misgovernment. Uitlander Council, 
representing unenfranchised population, earnestly praJFing 
governments and legislatures your colonies by every means 
in power, promptly and vigorously to support appeal, and 
not cease efforts until settlement under British guarantee 
effected, securing for your fellow British subjects in 
Transvaal rights equal those enjoyed by Boer population. 
Kindly telegraph same effect to premiers Melbourne,Adelaide, 
Brisbane,Perth,Hobart"(7). 
(6) Commonwealth Year Book No.2 p.1096 
(7) New South Wales Parliamentary Debates, 
August-November,1899 p.1394 
u 
Reid communicated the substance of this telegram to the other 
premiers. The Queensland premier replied that 
"his Government would cordially support joining in prudent 
representations such as would express sympathy but not 
embarass the home Government, and that Queensland has 
already given proof of sympathy by offer of troops". 
The offer had been made by the Premier on July 10th. while the 
Parliament was in recess. Tasmania stated that "she was prepared 
to join in any representations". The Victorian Premier commented that 
"prior to the receipt of Mr. Reid's wire he had moved 
Governor to telegraph to Secretary of State as follows: 
'Popular opinion in Victoria fully recognises claim of 
Uitlanders to political rights on which Her Majesty's 
Government insists. Public meetings have been held in 
support. Numerous offers of assistance from colonial 
forces have been received' ". 
West Australia thought "all could do was express confidence in 
action of Imperial Government". South Australia asked "if Mr.Reid 
proposed taking any action."(8) 
Reid's attitude at this stage was expressed in 
his minute written on the telegram from Tasmania. 
"Put by for the present. I have come to the opinion that 
the sympathy of the Australian colonies with the legitimate 
desires of the British inhabitants of the Transvaal has 
already been made sufficiently manifest that any difficulty 
between the British people and the people of the Transvaal 
scarcely calls for displays of patriotism at this end of 
the world, the strength of the position being all on the 
side of Great Britain"(9). 
Reid did not change this attitude before his government was 
defeated on a vote of censure early in September. Between August 1st. 
and September 2nd, the South Australian Government sent seven 
telegrams to Reid, the general tone of which was that "something 
be done as a demonstration of Australian sympathy". Reid replied 
only to one telegram, the one #iich suggested that the Australian 
Squadron be offered to the Imperial Government for service outside 
Australian waters. Reid thought "South African trouble scarcely 
involve naval operations, and therefore an offer of the Australian 
Squadron would not seem called for"(10). 
(8) Ibid p.1395 
(9) Ibid p,1394 
(10^Ibid p,1395 
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Lyne, who replaced Reid as Premier, on the 
14th, September,1899, had a]so been tepid when in opposition in 
his attitude towards the sending of troops. 
"Of course, if men wish to go to the Transvaal, the 
Government cannot prevent them from going, but I feel 
called upon to say that public money will not be 
granted to assist in the sending of troops unless 
the House desires that it should be granted. I thiiik 
the House should have an opportunity to give an 
expression of opinion as to whether the taxpayer's 
money should be used for that purpose"(11), 
And as premier, he showed no signs of following a strong line of 
action during the early weeks of the parliamentary adjournment. 
Yet before the House met on 17th. October, Lyne arranged that 
the volunteers and permanent troop be prepared for immediate 
despatch and when the House met he moved as 
"a matter of urgei^ and pressing necessity, that the 
House should fortjivith consider the expediency of 
equipping and despatching a military force for service 
with the Imperial Army at Transvaal". 
He intimated that he would like Reid to second the motion as Gillies, 
leader of the Opposition, had done in Victoria, Reid interjected: 
",.,• since the honourable gentleman has mentioned my name, 
he will, perhaps, allow me to assure him, in order that 
he may use the right peroration that in this matter I 
shall give him my thorough support"(12). 
After three days debate, the amended mifcion (13) was carried by 
78 votes to 10. Of the ten who voted against the motion 7 were 
labour members. The problems are to explain the sudden urgency 
(11) Ibid p.1374 
(12) Ibid p.1379 
(13) "That this House desires to express its continued and unbounded 
loyalty to her gracious Majesty the Queen, and while regret-
ting the necessity for the Mar now in progress in South 
Africa, desires to express its sympathy with her Majesty's 
Government in the difficulties that have arisen through 
their endeavours to secure the social and political rights 
of free men for all British subjects whose lawful ow«upations 
have made them residents of Boer territory, and is of opinion 
that New South Wales should equip and despatch a military 
force for serviste with the Imperial army in South Africa". 
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of the matter, Reid's changed attitude, and the small Labour vote 
against participation. 
The sudden urgency of the matter is to some 
extent readily explained. Neither Reid (14) nor presumably Lyne(15) 
had anticipated that the British Government would accept the offer 
of troops. However, Chamberlain, aware of the value of «ars for 
cultivating Empire sentiment (16) determined to capitalise on the 
fact that colonial troops had volunteered to serve. Reid notes 
that Chamberlain "was evidently pleased with the offer and desired 
to encourage the spirit which prompted it"(17). The result was a 
telegram from the Secretary of War expressing "high appreciation 
of Her Majesty's Government for the patriotic spirit exhibited 
by the people of Australia in offering to serve in South Africa" 
and suggesting the type of units which would be most suitable. 
The telegram stated that the "troops were to embark before the 
31st.0ctober"(18). This telegram was received by the Governor 
of South Australia and circulated to the other colonies. It was 
received in New South Wales while the House was in adjournment. 
There were still doubts in the minds of both 
the Premier and Attorney-General Wise, As Wise put it, 
"the conviction was forced upon us that an emergency 
had arisen...which required us to decide upon our course 
of action. What hampered us most was the difficulty 
to discern the truth about the war, whether it was really 
just, whether the situation was serious, whether help 
was needed or was the acceptance of offers of assistance 
merely an empty compliment"(19). 
With Lyne's approval Wise cabled Milner, with whom he had been 
associated in a group formed by Arnold Toynbee in 1879 to discuss 
(14) Reid G,H. :"My Reminiscences"(1917) p.190 
(15) N.S.W. Parliamentary Debates, Aug.-Nov.1899, p.1374 
(16) See Harney :"Imperialism from an Australian Standpoint", 
Procs. Royal Colonial Institute 1904-5, p,116 
(17) Reid : Op. clt p.190 
(18) N.S.W. Parliamentary Debates, Aug.-Nov,1899, p,1375-6. 
(19) Lone Hand, Jan.1914,p.105. Quoted In Evatt H.V.'s "Australian 
Labour Leader",p.185 
political and social questions (20^. Milner replied that the war 
"might...be in a small degree a capitalist's war; but it is also 
much more. It involves the union or disruption of the Empire"(21). 
On this basis, writes Evatt, "Wise and Lyne felt justified in 
anticipating the approval of Parliament for the organisation of a 
New South Wales contingent"(22). 
This,however, would appear to be only part of the 
explanation. Of equal importance was the fact that by this time 
every other Australian colony had offered formal assistance. 
"It would be singular", said Lyne, "if the mother colony were to 
stand out"(23). Reid made the same point emphasising the importance 
of New South Wales troops being the first to arrive in South 
Africa (24). Lyne and Wise's behaviour in teLegramming Milner, and 
Reid's speech in support of the motion to send troops all indicate 
that there were still doubts in their minds as to the rights and 
wrongs of participation on this issue. Reid asked 
"is it right or wrong for an Australian colony to be 
represented in this war? I say at once that that is 
a debatable question. I have no sort of conteinpt 
or feeling for the man who takes a different view 
to myself^(25). 
It was two major considerations which altered the Behaviour of 
the N.S.W. Free Trade and Protectionist political leadership, 
the British Government's request for troops and the belief that the 
N.S.W. Government not only could not stand out, but must be first 
on the scene. It is improbable that this attitude would have been 
adopted if it was believed that the war was unpopular. The opposite 
was the belief, as the debate illustrates (26), and there is 
additional evidence in the reaction of various state iabour parties. 
(20) Headlam :"The Milner Papers,1897-99" p.12 
(21) "The Lone Hand", Jan.1914, p.104. Quoted in Evatt rOp.cit p.125 
(22) Evatt : Op.cit. p.125 
(23) N.S.W. Parliamentary Debates, Aug.-Nov.1899, p.1379 
(24) Ibid p.1380 
(25) Ibid p.1382 
(26) Ibid 
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It is not necessary to believe that every Labour 
politician who voted for participation at this stage did so only 
to save his electoral seat. This was the argument of the opponents 
to participation and it has been accepted by Evatt (27). He quotes 
the slip made by Holman, when in a moment of heat, he stated 
*., ,1 believe from the bottom of my heart that this is the most 
iniquitous, immoral war ever waged with any race. I hope that 
England may be defeated." Evatt goes on: 
"It was fairly plain that McGowen became so Intimidated 
by the criticism of Holman's speech that he and a 
number of other Labour members decided to prove their 
loyalty by voting for Lyne's resolution". 
This is a very contentious explanation. Before the debate proper 
occurred, and a day before Holman spoke a division was taken 
on the question of suspending standing orders to discuss the motion. 
The same labour members who voted for the motion favoured *i»e 
suspending standing orders; those who opposed the motion opposed 
the suspension. Moreover McGowen pointed out that on this 
question Labour members held different views (28) and that they 
were not being compelled to vote as a solid block. It is not 
unreasonable to assume that at least some, if not all, of those 
members who favoured the motion had determined to vote for it before 
Holman spoke. 
A more plausible explanation is offered by Coghlan. 
"Amongst the New South Wales parliamentary Labour Party there 
were many strong opponents of the policy of sending troops to 
South Africa; indeed it is probable that the malcontents were 
in the majority. The matter was brought up at a Caucus 
meeting and the discussion which took place convinced 
the party that open hostility to the war would be very 
prejudicial to a member's chance of re-election; it was 
therefore decided not to oppose the despatch of troops. 
A few members, however, felt so strongly about the war 
that they were not able to remain silent"(29). 
Coghlan's statement is possibly unjust in its implications to 
several of the Labour members. Macdonald,Sleath and possibly 
McGowen (30), appear to have been honest in their support for 
(27) Evatt : Op oit p.127 
(28) N.S.W. Pari.Debates,Aug-Nov.1899,p.1552 
(29) Coghlan :"Labour and Industry in Australia",Vol.IV, p.1960. 
(30) N.S.W. Pari.Debates Aug-Nov.1899,p.1554 
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intervention. Dacey, on the other hand, the only member of the 
radical "solid six" to favour the motion, argued a rather tortuous 
case (31), 
To appreciate the split labour vote, it is 
necessary to realise that state political labour was a sectional 
party whose effectiveness lay in its balance-of-power position 
for winning social remedial legislation. Its behaviour in relation 
to Australian participation in the Boer War paralleled its behaviour 
in the final stages of the federation movement. Realising the 
unpopularity of Labour's official attitude to federation, the 
Caucus resolved in March 1899 that "members of the party be 
allowed freedom of action in regard to the Commonwealth Bill"(32). 
The split which this decision represented was almost identical with 
the split on the Boer War question. The group who continued to 
oppose the Federation Bill were the "solid six", Holman,Hughes, 
Dacey,Edden,Thomson, and Thomas, and the other two Newcastle 
representatives Watkins and Griffith. The group who spoke or 
voted against participation in the Boer War, were identical, 
except that Dacey favoured the motion, and Ferguson and a recently 
elected member, Nielson, opposed Australian participation in the 
Boer War. Whatever the honest feeling of the ten Labour members who 
either favoured the Bill or abstained from expressing their views, 
it is reasonable to argue the party's motivation as a party was 
similar to its motivation on the federation question. It was not 
a national party, its members' attitutdef differed, and McGowen 
did not intend to jeopardise its effective position either by 
provoking a permanent split or by pressing as a party policy a 
possibly unpopular policy. It is also significant in this respect 
that the "solid six", despite the recriminations they heaped on 
McGowen (33) and despite their obviously intense feelings about 
(31) Ibid p.1574 
(32) Worker 15/7/1899 
(33) N.S.W.Pari.Debates, Aug-Nov.1899, p.1567 
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the question, were not prepared to threaten resignation, yet a 
short time previously they had done this very thing to force 
the conservative wing of the party to overthrow Reid. While the 
situation was considerably more complex than Evatt and Coghlan 
have allowed, yet it does appear that belief in the popularity 
of the war was one of the factors determining the New South Wales 
political Labour Party's behaviour. 
The most substantial evidence in support of this 
view, however, is contained in the debate on the motion to 
despatch a second contingent. On this occasion only four Labour 
members spoke. Two of these, Watkins and Ferguson, recanted(34). 
IBhey now argued that the reverses suffered by Britain in November, 
had altered radically the position. The other two Labour speakers, 
Holman and Thomas stood their ground. 
"Whatever arguments",said Holman,"were valid against the 
despatch of the first contingent - and I believe there 
were many arguments absolutely valid - those arguments 
hold good at the present time"(35). 
And Holman's ]Dgic was correct. The basis of the initial Labour 
opposition had been that the war was unjust. It was equally unjust 
whether Britain was winning or losing. But, presumably because 
participation was now a fait accompli and perhaps more because of 
the waves of Jingoism which members had observed (36), a strong 
silence characterised the majority of the previous Labour opponents 
to participation. Holman stated that he had "every reason to believe" 
that his opinion was "the opinion of an entirely unsupported 
Individual in this House"(37). He^  was wrong to the extent that 
(341 N.S.W.Parliamentary Debates,Vol,CII,p.3504 Ferguson;p.3528 
Watkins, 
(35) Ibid p.3520 
(36) e,g, Haynes : "we ought to consider whether it is expedient in 
the interests of the Empire to exhibit in this country that 
remarkable hysteria which has shown itself during the last 
few weeks in connection with these war matters". 
Ibid p.3507 
(37) Ibid p.3520 
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he had one vocal supporter. The pattern of political Labour's 
behaviour in New South Wales was duplicated in Victoria, Queensland 
and South Australia. 
In Victoria, the motion to despatch the first 
contingent was carried by 67-13. Of the thirteen, seven were 
Labour members, Bromley,Maloney,Murray,Sangster,Styles, Tucker and 
Hamilton. Four Labour members supported the motion (38). 
There was no division on the motion to despatch 
a second contingent, John Murray, the leader of the group opposing 
participation, arguing that "any opposition to the motion...would 
be perfectly useless"(3$). It was clear, however, that Murray 
still opposed the war and in 1901 he became an active member of 
the Anti-War League. He was the only one of the original seven still 
to speak strongly against participation. Maloney was the only other 
Labour speaker. An impassioned orator, who had dealt lengthily 
with the reasons for non-participation in October, Maloney still 
had doubts but concluded: 
"I should be sorry to see the English flag go down in 
any part of the world, and, though I wish we were 
fighting against a nation of something like equal 
strength, I am sure that I can join in wishing Godspeed 
to the boys who are leaving our shores"(40^. 
Significantly Maloney commented : 
"I recognise that the vast majority of the honourable 
members in the House and the vast majority of the 
people outside are in favour of the Bill"(41). 
It is not necessary,perhaps, to accept in its entirety Murray's 
bitjrer statement that "the instinct<| of humanity in the breasts 
of the majority of the Labour members was not strong enough to 
overcome the fear of their constituents' loyal and Imperial wrath"( 4^ 
But there do appear to be adequate grounds, again, for inferring 
that the belief in the popularity of the war had played a 
considerable role in modifying the expressed attitudes and behaviour 
(38) Victoria Parliamentary Debates, Vol.92, p.1790 
(39) Ibid, Vol.93, p.2864 
(40) Ibid p.2876 
(41) Ibid p.2875 
(42) Quoted in Evatt : Op.cit p.144 
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of a substantial section of the Victorian Labour Party. Their 
behaviour was paralleled by that of five of the six non-labour 
members who opposed the despatch of the first contingent. Of these 
only Higgins remained faithful to his first stand, continuing to 
(43) 
oppose the war both then and after he had entered federal politics. 
In Queensland, pditical labour, as the official 
opposition, made the issue a party issue. The executive had already 
made an offer of troops and asked the parliament to ratify its 
action. Already, however, the House was convinced that there was 
considerable popular support for Australian participation (44), 
Labour's initial strategy, therefore, was not to oppose the motion 
directly but to convert the debate into a no-confidence debate by 
moving the amendment 
"but disapproves of the action of the Government in making 
an offer of troops to serve with Her Majesty's army in 
South Africa, thus committing the colony to an indefinite 
and practically unlimited expenditure without the sanction 
of Parliament"(45). 
This amendment was debated from the 11th. to the 18th.October, 
virtually all Labour speakers punctiliously refraining from 
debating the rights and wrongs of participation, discussing only 
the constitutional validity of the government's action. The amend-
ment was defeated. Labour, with the exception of Keogh, voted 
solidly for it (46). 
Discussion of the motion, itself, did not commence 
until 11 p.m. on the final night of the debate. Once the motion 
was brought under discussion. Labour members spoke in uninterrupted 
succession from 11 p.m. to 3 p.m. against participation. No division 
was taken but Labour's official attitude had beeamade clear. 
(43) C.P.D. 14/1/1902 
(44) e.g. Q.P.D. Vol.LXXXII, p.380 
(45) Ibid p.407 
(46) Ibid p,479. Twenty-one Labour members voted for the motion. 
The voting was Aye : 28, Naes 39. 
^ f 
On December 20th. the motion was moved to despatch 
th second contingent. Dawson seconded the motion and was the only 
Labour speaker. He gave as his reason for reversing his attitude that 
"the struggle to-day is not a straggle between the Boers and 
Great Britain, urged on by a coterie of land-grabbers headed 
by Cecil Rhodes, but the struggle has reached such an acute 
stage that it is a matter of national existence - whether 
the prestige of the British Empire is to be sullied and 
to suffer humiliation in South Africa at the hands of its 
traditional enemies on the continent who, when they find 
her in difficulties, may make a dash for her possessions"(47). 
It was a plausible explanation if a little difficult to reconcile 
with Dawson's earlier statement, "I have absolutely no respect for 
the man in this colony who would volunteer his services and go over 
to the Transvaal"(48). Kingston put the position more succinctly 
on December 22nd. "In view of the present position of the Empire, we 
have waived our personal opinion, and joined in a patriotic attempt 
to help the old country"(49). It is not unreasonable to assume that 
once again the belief in the popularity of the war was a factor in 
modifying Labour's behaviour. 
In South Australia, the pattern again was repeated. 
In the debate on the first contingent, the vote was 18-10, nine of 
the ten being Labour members (50). Nine of the eleven Labour 
members in the House spoke against the motion; one voted against 
it who did not speak; one presumably was absent. The motion to 
despatch a second contingent was carried unanimously. Five Labour 
members who had previously opposed participation spoke. Their case 
was adequately and revealingly summarised by Price who had replaced 
Batchelor as leader of the parliamentary Labour Party in November. 
"Seeing that the circumstances had changed and bearing in 
mind the recent British reverses, %he thought it wise 
to exhibit practical sympathy with the mother land"(51), 
Throughout the debate. Labour members had referred to the strength 
(47) Q.P.D. Vol.LXXXIII, p.1473 
(48) Q.P.D. Vol.LXXXII, p.347 
(49) Q.P.D, Vol.LXXXIII, p,1554 
(50) South Australia Parliamentary Debates,1899,p,661 
(51) Ibid p.1075 
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of imperial sentiment and the fact that any member who opposed 
participation was branded as disloyal (52). 
It appears reasonably evident,then, that on the 
question of participation in the Boer War, the political assessment 
of public opinion played a role in modifying political behaviour. 
The other question is , was the political assessment of public 
opinion accurate. It is impossible to give a precise answer to 
this question but the weight if evidence would suggest that it was. 
The fact that there was not one politician who 
argued that there was any substantial opposition to Australian 
participation is Itself reasonable evidence. At the same time 
it must be pointed out that the election results do not lend 
unequivocal support to this view. In the whole of Australia, there 
were only four members of parliament who were still vocally opposed 
to Australian participation by the time that the elections occurred -
Holman and Thomas in New South Wales and Murray and Higgins in 
Victoria. Evatt has analysed the campaign against Holman in the 
1901 elections. Though Holman was forced to fight strenuously and 
did lose votes, he retained his seat (53). Thomas' seat of Alma 
was lost but Thomas> himself, was elected as the first federal 
member for Barrier. Murray retained his seat of Warrnambool, leaving 
the Labour Party and becoming Chief Secreta??y and Minister for 
Labour in the Irvine Ministry 1902-4. Higgins alone lost his seat 
of Geelong apparently directly because of his opposition to the 
war (54). Six months later,however, he was elected first federal 
member for the woBking class electorate of Northern Melbourne. 
There are scarcely sufficient cases to allow valid conclusions to 
(52) e.g. Ibid, Batchelor p,621 
(53) Evatt : Op. cit. The election figures were : 1898, Holman 1,115; 
Kelly 892, majority 223. 
1901, Holman 1299, Griman 1213, majority 86. 
(54) "Johns' Notable Australians"(1967) p.164 
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be drawn, but it does appear possible that in strong non-labour 
electorates the weight of opinion regarded opposition to Australian 
participation as sufficient to warrant a member's dismissal but 
that in solid working-class electorates this was not the case. 
It does not follow from this, of course, that the fact the strong 
Labour electorates returned leading opponents to participation 
meant that the majority view towards th Boer War in these electorates 
accorded with that of the opponents to partiG|)ation. There were 
two other possibilities, a prevalent indifference or approval for 
participation but not to the extent of allowing it to outweigh 
support for members sympathetic to working class aspirations. 
It would appear that one or other of these last 
possibilities is correct, for there is little evidence that the 
war was unpopular. Active opposition to it was limited to the 
handful of politicians who remained faithful to their original 
position, a few country papers such as Holman3:;3 Grenfell Vedette, 
the Worker (55), the Catholic Press (56), the Bulletin and the 
people who late in 1901 formed the Anti-War League in New South 
Wales, arguing £x>r the immediate ending of the war and the granting 
of self-government to the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. 
It was only possible to obtain 1,206 signatures to the Anti-War 
League's petition. While Holman did induce the New South Wales 
Labour Conference in 1902 to carry a resolution re-stating the 
Anti-War League's objectives, few members of the Victorian political 
Labour Party could be cajoled into signing the petition. It is 
significant that even at this late stage of the war, when eminent 
British Liberals were arguing for the same objectives as the 
Anti-War League, the Anti-War League's petition should have won 
such limited support. Moreover, it was still possible to whip 
up agitatiom against the leading opponents of the war. The Sydney 
Morning Herald attacked Professor Wood for writing to the 
(55) The Wbrker : 
(56) Quoted in Evatt : Op. cit 
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Manchester Guardian setting out the case of the Anti-War League. 
In the Herald's opinion Wood was "practically a civil servant and 
he is employed in a state which wisely prohibits its servants from 
taking an active part in politics"(57). It urged the University 
Senate to discipline Wood and the Senate was reported to have 
seriously considered the matter (58). However, as peace negotiations 
had begun the issue was not pursued. While there may have been,then, 
considerable indifference to the war, there was little direct 
hostility to it, and in determining the effectiveness of public 
opinion, the indifferent weigh little against the strongly positive. 
All the metropolitan dailies favoured the war as 
did the large part of the provincial press (59). The strongly 
nationalist Australian Natives' Association formed special war 
committees in all states and it too helped in the organisation of 
the Bushmen's contingents (60). Lynch has shown that a range of 
poets including Essex Evans and W.H.Robinson were strong advocates 
of Australian participation and her conclusion is that "the majority 
rallied to the cause and the poets of the time gave vent to the 
upsurge of Imperial sentiment"(61). 
The fact that there was no difficulty in filling 
the quota of troops is probably not evidence. The economy had been 
depressed since 1891 and, as usual, there had been a marked decline 
in marriages over the jpears of the depression. Though the figure 
was on the increase again by 1900 the ratio of marriages to populatin 
in the period 1896-1900 was still only 6.87 compared with 8.02 for 
the period 1881-1885 and as such was lower than any five year period 
from 1861 with the exception of the trough years of the depression 
(^ '^) Bulletin 3/5/1902 
(58) Ibid 17/5/1902 
(59) Jebb :"Studies in Colonial Nationalism". 
(60) Procs, R.C.I. 1905-6, p.7 
(61) Lynch K. : 
(Unpublished thesis. University of Queensland) 
Page 68 (Manuscript copy). 
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when it had dropped to 6,50 (62), Depression, the larger percentage 
of single men, adventure and the incentives which the South African 
government offered Australians to migrate to South Africa (63) are 
probably sufficient to explain why there was no difficulty filling 
the quotas. 
If the fact that quotas were filled is not 
significant in relation to Empire feeling, however, the fact that 
bushmen made up numbers of these troops is not without significance. 
It had been to bushmen that William Lane and the Bulletin had 
addressed themselves in the late 1880's in their claims for Austral-
ian nationality, and it was to the bushmen that the Bulletin still 
appealed in its anti-Boer war attacks In 1900, When the movements 
were made to organise the Bushmen's contingent the Bulletin claimed 
that 
"the bulk of the Australian bushmen, ready enough to fight 
in defence of Australia would know themselves disgraced 
if they permitted themselves to be exported to shoot Boers 
or any other race fighting for their own country - their 
Australia - against syndicates and politicians"(64). 
And the Bulletin proceeded to prddict a complete failure to fill 
the contingents. In fact there was an immediate excess of volunteers 
and the Bulletin was gradually obliged to explain this, first, as 
being because the contingents were being filled not by true 
bushmen but city men (65), and eventually to admit that they were 
bushmen wishing to escape from the poor conditions in the 
outback (66). The significant point is not siii5)ly that the bushmen 
volunteered but that the Bulletin on this question apparently had 
lost the pulse of its disciples of the late 1880's and early 
1890's(67). Not only was this so but it appears to have lost its 
public generally for over these years its circulation is reported 
(62) Coghlan :"The Seven Colonies of Australia,1901", p,528 
(63) Bulletin 18/8/1900 
(64) Ibid 6/1/1900 pp.6-7 
(65) Ibid 24/2/1900 
(66) Ibid 22/6/1900 
(67) See Gollan R. :"Radicalism and Socialism in Eastern Australia, 
1850-1910".(Unpublished thesis University of 
London). 
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to have dropped (68). Weighing the total evidence, then, it would 
seem a reasonable oonclusion that although there may have been 
some irldifference to the war, majority effective opinion overwhelm-
ingly favoured Australian participation. 
There was of course no single factor creating 
this approval but, in general, the attitude was created by a desire 
to help the Empire "right or wrong" as well as demonstrate Australia's 
growing national status. This combined motivation had been present 
in Dalley's efforts to make an offer of troops in the Sudan War. 
He stated on that occasion that 
"I felt that the time had arrived when we in liiese 
distant colonies might do something to help the 
Empire. I was not foolish enough to suppose that 
our aid was essential, hut I believed that it 
would be at least acceptable. I did not think that 
England required our help; but I indulged in the 
ambition that she would be pleased at our tendering 
it, I felt that a great opportunity had arrived of 
showing in the first place to England herself, and 
in the second to the world, what were the true 
relations of the colony to the Empire - that we 
were not a weight on the arms of England, and an 
encumbrance of her glory - that the colonies were 
not the impedimenta of her triumphant march, but 
that they would give substantial and valuable and 
immediate aid in moments of disaster and difficulty"(69)• 
It was along similar lines that many argued for participation in 
the Boer War, As Jebb put it: 
"some of the most wholehearted supporters of the 
sending of the contingents were nationalists who 
knew that the undertaking of respo:fesibility would 
develop national self-respect, and the respect of 
the authorities in London for Australian nationhood"(70)* 
This view was, in fact very commonly expressed. It was the type 
of stand taken by B.H. Wise who had been critical of Australia's 
(68) Jebb : "Studies in Colonial Nationalism".' 
In an effort to check Jebb's statement an approach was 
made to the Bulletin for their circulation figures over 
this period. Their policy is not to release circulation 
figures. 
(69) Reid G,H. :"My Reminiscences", pp.53-54 
(70> Jebb : Op. cit. p.27 
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participation in the Sudan campaign. In defence of his support 
for the Boer War, Wise argued, 
"a Federated Australia able to protect herself, and 
ready to play her proper part in the protection of 
the British Empire, by guarding British interests 
in the East, may be in a position, far sooner than 
anyone had dared to hope to make the alliance with 
the other free communities of the British Empire which 
was the political ideal of Sir Henry Parkes, from 
which you accuse me of having departed"(7l). 
A similar view was also advanced in the various state legislatures 
and in the federal House. 
But more general, perhaps, was the strong Empire, 
imperialist feeling. Professor Wood thought so. 
"The fact is that Australians supported the war, not because 
they thought it a just war, but simply because it was an 
Imperial war. Without any pretence of regard to -moral 
consideration, they dedlared themselves determined to support 
the British Government, right or wrong. The feeling prevalent 
at the time was expressed in homely phrase by Mr,Copeland, 
the present Agent-General for New South Wales in London. 
•The British bull dog',he said,'wanted to give its pups a 
taste of fight, and the pups wanted to show their love and 
loyalty I ' *^ (72) . 
Turner held a similar view - "It was the practical expression of 
a sentiment that the lion's whelps were ready at the slightest 
call to rally around the national Jlag"(73). And Coghlan,also, 
agreed with this version - "the rally to the flag was essentially 
prompted by a determination to support England whether right or 
wrong"(74), 
(71) Bulletin 5/5/1900 
(72) Daily Telegraph (Sydney) 29/5/1902 
(73) Turner H.G. :"A History of the Colony of Victoria",Vol.II 
(1904) p,343. 
(74) Coghlan t Op.cit. p.1960 
And see Essex Evans' poem "The Lion's Whelps", 
(Dec.1899) 
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The war did illustrate then, the extent of Empire 
loyalty and though it could have been qualified, if there had not 
been satisfaction with Britain, signlflicantly the support was there. 
The Great War, as the next illustration of Empire loyalty, was 
unequivocal Labour vieing with non-labour in their expressions of 
Empire loyalty, and the conscription issue was no denial of this (75). 
On both occasions, then, when the Empire went to war, there was 
quite clearly a preponderance of opinion which favoured such an 
action. 
Critical occasions such as these provide, without 
doubt the clearest illustration of public opinion. For the rest 
it is possible to accumulate monumental numbers of expressions of 
loyalty as such (76) which carry some weight but which without 
the acid test of action are of limited worth as evidence. An exceptior^ 
perhaps, is provided by the instance in 1911 when Fisher, then Prime 
Minister and visiting England for the Imperial Conference was 
reported by W.T. Stead in the Review of Reviews as having said: 
"Don't talk of Snpire. We are not an Empire. No end of 
mischief has arisen from the use of that word. We are a 
very loose association of five nations, each independent 
and each willing for the time to remain in fraternal and 
co-operative union with Great Britain and each other; but 
only on condition that if at any time or from any cause 
we decide to terminate that connection no one can say us nay, 
W e are independent, self-governing communities, 
untrammelled by laws, treaties, or Constitutions. We are free 
to take our own course in our own interests without anyone 
preventing us. 
There is no necessity for us to say we will or will not 
take part in England's wars. We recognise that our territory 
is subject to attack from England's enemies, and if threatened 
we would have to decide whether we would defend ourselves, 
or - if we thought the war unjust, and England's enemy in 
the right - we would haul down the Union Jack, hoist our own 
flag, and start on our own. 
We don't expect an attack, and we do not contemplate 
independence, because, except as a riddance of the risk of 
being attacked by England's foes, we would gain nothing 
if we were as Independent as any other sovereign State -
and we might lose much." 
cVoprf7~6~ 
(75) See Part lit, SoJfeion I. 
(76) e.g. See Hall H.L. : Op. cit. 
M 
The publication of these views provoked a substant-
ial outburst of criticism. Much of the criticism came from groups 
whom it could be anticipated would lead such criticism. Richard 
Arthur, M.L.A. for Middle Harbour and President of the Immigration 
League of Australia led the attack (77). The British Empire League, 
also, joined issue with an unanimous motion that 
"the British Empire League in Australia desires to protest 
emphatically against the disloyal sentiments reported by 
cable to-day as emanating from the Prime Minister of 
Australia in his interview with Mr.Stead. The sentiments, 
if correctly reported, absolutely misrepresent the feelings 
and opinions of the people of Australia, whose loyalty to the 
throne, and whose deep sense of the privileges and the future 
greatness of the British Empire, are stronger to-day than at 
any previous period of our history"(78). 
Mr, Watt, at the time Acting Premier of Victoria and for some time 
previously a leading member of the Australian Natives' Association, 
agreed that "what Mr. Fisher is credited with saying about the 
attitude of the Dominions towards the Empire as a whole does not 
represent the views or sentiments of the people of Australia"(79), 
The Acting Premier of Western Australia repeated this view (80) 
stating that 
"Mr. Fisher, in giving utterance to such sentiments, voices 
the opinion of a very small minority of the Australian 
people ... the people of Australia are proud of the fact 
that they are British subjects". 
The Victorian Employees' Federation lodged a protest (81) and the 
West Australian and the Sydney Morning Herald ran editorials 
protesting that Fisher i^ ust have been misreported. 
Even more illuminating, perhaps, was the reaction 
of labour members. O'Malley considered the report to be a 
fabrication and Hughes in a politically astute statement remarked 
(77) Sydney Morning Herald 25/7/1911: for biographical details 
Johns : "Who's Who in Australia''. 1922 
(78) Sydney Morning Herald 25/7/1911 
(79) Ibid 
(80) Ibid 26/7/1911 
(81) Ibid 
o?C? . 
that 
"Quite apart from the thBory of the thing, the facts are 
of course such that any departure from recognition 
of the common destiny and responsibility of the various 
members of the Empire as we know it would be not merely 
destructive of an idea, but fatal, if not to the existence, 
at least to the independence of some of them. As to the 
observation in the South African national press last week 
suggesting an attitude of neutrality by one of the parts 
of the Empire when other portions are involved in international 
warfare, I said then, and I think now, that such an attitude 
is incompatible with any form of alliance...1 have no doubt 
at all in my mind - because I know Mr. Fisher's views very 
well - that in what he said he was merely emphasising the 
other side of the idea which I have put forward, and, indeed, 
it needs emphasis I feel very sure that it will be found 
upon inquiry th||,t Mr.Fisher's views are quite other than 
those which the fragments cabled out from London would 
have us believe"(82). 
Mr, Fisher did, in fact, directly repudiate the report of Stead's 
when he reached Canada (83). 
It could not be argued, of course, that an incident 
such as this was complete proof but considered with the abundance 
of other evidence, there is sufficient proof that majority public 
opinion favoured Empire loyalty sufficiently to indicate a 
predisposition to stay within the Empire; and secondly, to make 
it clear that an Empire war was an Australian war not for constitut-
ional reasons but because opinion favoured participation. 
In terms, then, of relations with the Empire, the 
factors of common sentiment and common heritage heavily weighted 
Australia towards remaining in the Empire, at the public opinion 
level. At the same time, however, an Australian nationalist sentiment 
had been developing and in the reconciliation of the two, the limits 
to which Australian values were willing to be conceded were defined. 
(82) Sydney Morning Herald 25/7/1911 
(83) Ibid 31/7/1911 
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III. NATIONALIST LIMITS. 
To define the limits imposed by majority nationalist 
sentiments on the form and extent of Australian participation in 
the Empire from 1900 to 1919 is a rather more difficult problem 
tha"!! the definition of the limits imposed by the sentiment of Empire 
loyalty. Except for the conscription conflict, the type of crisis 
did not occur that tested critically the usually inarticulate body 
of public opinion. Nonetheless a reasonably convincing case can be 
made for the argument that there was a body of nationalist aspirat-
ions with imperial implications which had the support of the effective 
majority of the Australian electorate by 1907 at the latest>and that 
the freedom to pursue these aspirations determined broadly the 
independence^ within the Empire structure which dominant Australian 
opinion demanded. In that year Hackett, whom Deakin described as 
being in the tradition of the British philosophical radicals, expound-
ed the objectives of Australian nationalism. His definition was 
accepted by Deakin, the leader of the Protectionist Party and by 
Hughes, one of the most agressive as well as one of the most able 
Labour leaders. Australia, said Hackett 
"desires that there should be defence without militarism; 
hence her conception of the form in which the Commonwealth 
should ass:y: in the defence of the Empire; that there should 
be development of her country and employment for her people; 
hence her feeling towards protection; that there should be 
no infiltration of undesirable aliens and low-waged workers; 
hence her immigration restrictions. I may add that she requires 
that there should be equality of opportunity for all; hence 
the contributions of millions yearly by the state to the 
cause of education. And all these purposes it is impossible 
not to see she is prepared to urge forv;ard as national 
objects, with such light and means as she may find at her 
disposal". 
Hughes found himself "greatly surprised" that he was "almost 
entirely in accord with the lecturer" and stated that he "would 
say that Dr.Hackett had presented a fair and impartial statement 
of the opinions and ideals of -Australia". Deakin believed that 
in Hackett's "brief recital of the creed of Australia to-day", he 
had "unimpeachably and most accurately expressed" Australian 
aspirations (1). Ana there is no shortage of additional,corroborative 
(1) Procs.Royal Colonial Institute 190o-7, p.239ff 
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evidence m the legislation of Australia, in regard to Protection, 
New Protection, Defence, Imii.igration Restriction and social welfare 
legislation that such values were manifestly the majority supported 
values by this time (2). It was with the external implications of 
the pursuit of these objectives that Australia's-British relations 
were largely concerned from 1900 to 1914. But oefore considering 
in detail their consequences for the development of Australia's 
national status within the Empire, it is necessary to mention, 
briefly, several further influences stemming from the pre-Commonwealth 
period, which, also, continued to condition some of Australia's 
attitudes towards national development within the Empire structure. 
The separatist and near separatist movements within 
Australia in the late 1880's, although they did overlap, fall roughly 
into three categories. Least significant by this time, probably, 
were the remnants of the Australian version of the Manchester School, 
those who held the orthodox view that it was inevitable that as the 
colonies came to maturity they would break with the Mother Country. 
This was the view advanced by McMillan, Treasurer in the Parkes 
Ministry of 1889, the "representative of the importers" and the 
"leader of the commercial class" in Sydney (3). He was reported by 
Dilke in 1890 as having stated "not long ago that he bexieved that 
the present relations with the mother country might last twenty years, 
and would be succeeded, to his regret, by independence"(4). The 
Sydney Daily Telegraph took a similar stand on a more nationalist 
basis. Supporting the Mcllwraith's Ministry's request for a voice 
in the appointment of future governors, it argued that the whole 
question of imperial representation in Australia should be discussed 
so that "the more friendly and easy may be the separation v^ /hen it 
comes"(5). These views were not common to all Free Traders, though 
others did speak of separation (6), for the Free Trade party in 
(2) Greenwood G,:"National Development and Social Experimentation". 
Greenwood G.(ed.) :"Australia, a Social and Political 
History"(Angus and Robertson,1955). 
(3) Dilke : Op cit p.181 
(4) Ibid 
(5) Ibid p.204 
(6) See e.g. N.S.W.Parliamentary Debates,Legislative Assembly,1887-8, 
Vol.32 p.4785 
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New South Wales, as a party, never approximated to the orthodox 
Gladstone Liberals. In so far as this type of reasoning did exist, 
it represented a sentiment already dated in England and a sentiment 
which both European imperialism and the growth of Australian 
protection soon dated in Australia. In the late 1890's, the emphasis 
of the argument changed to support for continued Empire membership 
and the encouragement of either orthodox ;Pree trade or Empire free 
trade (7). McMillan, himself, later becam^ e president of the British 
Empire League and the Sydney Daily Telegraph became a consistent 
Empire advocate. The view of separation advanced by this group had 
never been hostile to England or the Empire, as such. It was simply 
the Australian version of "littie Englandism", brought to some final 
prominence in the late 1880's by its association with"the nationalist 
movement ana the general separation ferment at the time. It was 
drowned in the 1890's wave of jingoistic imperialism. 
The significance of the movement for the new 
century was that it left a residue of loyal Empire imperialists, 
who possessed no national policy towards the Empire. In the lederal 
arena, they collected under the aegis of the Free Trade banner and 
argued for the uncritical acceptance of British control of foreign 
policy and defence. But without a coherent policy of national 
development, and mortgaged to an increasingly unpopular fiscal policy, 
they caased by about 1907 to be a possibly effective political group. 
To that time, however, they did present a view which had considerable 
press support. 
Of greater moment, by the late 1880's, than the 
residue of Manchester School thinkers, was the discontent of the 
more militant nationalists. In essence, it was the expression of 
an uncertain, colonial nationalism's reaction to the dilemma created 
for the British Empire by the surge of European imperialism. The 
disinterei of the Gladstone Liberals and, to a lesser degree, the 
Salisbury Conservatives, in a forceful imperialism galled Australian 
expansionists and those sensitive to Australian weakness in a 
17) See Part II, Chapt.2 
Pacific being occupied by Germany and Prance, and in which Russia 
was thought to have designs; but the revived British imperialism, 
if it took tne form of closer Empire association might jeopardise 
freedoms already won, re-establish the ascendancy of the Anglo-
Australian and endanger the "social and political rights" of native 
born Australians. Projected into this dilemma in the late 1880's 
was the revived fear of Chinese Immigration and dissatisfaction with 
the British Government's unenthusiastic reaction to Australian fears; 
a similar dissatisfaction stemming from the British Government's 
apparent unwillingness to impress on the French Government, Australia's 
concern at the decision to transport French recidivistes to New 
Caledonia; and the opportunity, which the continued appointment of 
Governors by the Crown without consulting the colonial governments, 
gave political opportunists, such as Mcllwraith, to whip up discontent 
especially amongst the truculent of the Australian-Irish commBinity(8). 
The Australian reaction to this basic dilemma took 
one of three forms. A small but by no means unenlightened group of 
nationalists, which included Deakin, Service and Griffith,eschewed 
any suggestion of separation. Instead they tended to lend their 
weight to the idea of some kind of imperial federation in order to 
win for the self-governing colonies a voice in the making of Empire 
foreign policy. But imperial federation attracted little support in 
Australia at any time and lea^ support in the 1880's. Blackton has 
defined its ardent advocates in the 1880's as "the military clique, 
the expatriate lobby and the Anglo-Australian plutocracy of Victoria 
and Tasmania" and its main supporters in addition to these groups. 
(8) See Joyce R.B.: "Australian Interests in the South Pacific", 
(Unpublished thesis,University of Sydney). 
Grimshaw C.:"Australian, British and German Relations in 
New Guinea,1883-1885",(Unpublished thesis 
University of Sydney). 
McNaughtan I.D.:"The Case of Benjamin Kitt",(Journal of the 
Historical Society of Queensland,Vol.4,No.4) 
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as being among the pastoralists, graziers and planters of Queensland. 
The League was rirst established in Australia in Melbourne in 1885. 
It spread to Tasmania and established scattered branches in Queensland. 
Efforts failed to establish an organisation in New South Wales. It 
never gained the support of the metropolitan press with the exception 
of the Melbourne Australasian, which was not particularly enthusiastic 
seeing it as the only alternative to separation. The Sydney Morning 
Herald and the Ar^us were "sporadically kind" while the A£e and the 
Leader, the Sydney Daily Telegraph, the Brisbane Courier, the South 
Australia Register and the Hobart Mercury all opposed the idea in 
the 1880's (9). The radical nationalist Bulletin, the Republican, the 
Boomerang and labour groups bitterly opposed it (10). By 1889 the 
first slight wave of the movement had spent itself. The reception 
given to Dr.Parkin in Sydney in 1888, and in Canada, convinced the 
imperial federatlonists in London that there was no possibility of 
proceeding with any formal scheme of Imperial Federation. The League 
In Australia issued no publications between 1888 and 1895 when the 
revived British and Australian imperialism transfused some new life 
(9) See Blackton C.S.: "Australian Nationality and Nationalism : the 
Imperial Federationist Interlude,1885-1901". 
Historical Studies Nov.l95fi 
and Hall H.L. :"Australia and England : A Study in Imperial 
Relations"(1934) 
for a survey of press opinion. My own survey has shown their 
conclusions to be accurate. 
For Imperial Federation League documents see Imperial Federation 
League,Addresses etc.1885-1909,(Melbourne Public Library). 
(10) See Black G,: "Way I am a Republican"(1891). (Mitchell Library) 
Mansfield B. : "The Background of Radical Republicanism 
in the Eighteen Eighties". 
Historical Studies, Vol.5, No.20 
into the movement (11). Meanwhile the parent body had been dissolved 
in England in 1894, largely over a conflict in its ovm ranks on the 
issue of free trade and fempire preference. 
Undoubtedly part of the reason for the failure 
of the Imperial Federation League in Australia was the extensive 
apathy towards the League's essays m. planning projected Empire 
constitutions. This essential disinterest in constitutional forms 
remained a characteristic of majority expressed Australian opinion 
throughout the period to 1920. At the 1897 Colonial Conference, 
for example, when the political relations of the parts of the Empire 
were under discussion in the forlorn hope of estaolishing some kind 
of Imperial Federation all the colonial premiers, except Tasmania, 
resolved "that the present relations of the colonies to the Mother 
Country were extremely satisfactory"(12). Throughout the years to 
1914, the -Australian press, generally, argued for gradual Empire 
evolution without the straightj.acket of a formal statement of the 
relationship (13). Even in 1917 when the war had forced the Empire 
into an atypical degree of centralisation in the Imperial War Cabinet, 
expressed Australian opinion still opposed Lionel Curtis' revival 
of a projected imperial federation (14). But it was not only apathy 
which explains the lack of support for imperial federation in the 
late 1880's. There was in addition a vocal body of opinion positively 
opposed to the idea. The reasons for this opposition illuminate the 
character of the remaining two groups of separatists or near-separat-
ists. 
It was the proposal to establish an Imperial 
Federation League which led to the formal organisation of republican-
ism in New South Wales. In one sense this was ironical for the 
Imperial Federation League was recognising the existence of colonial 
(11) Imperial Federation League, President's Address, March,1900. 
(12) Quoted in Procs.Royal Colonial Institute, 1904-5,p.91 
(13) For detail see Part II, Ghapt,5 
(14) See Part IIt,Chapt.i» 
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nationalism and seeking a method of reconciling it with continued 
Empire membership. Mr.Justice Holroyd who moved the inaugural 
resolution stated that the League stood for two principles -
"A comprehensive scheme of international defence in which 
every member of the British Empire should bear a proportionate 
part; and the second is a voice for each member in controlling 
the external policy of the Empire''(15) . 
The assumptions behind these principles were that it was unrealistic 
to think either in terms of Australia being able to defend itself 
or to imagine, as was a common separatist argument, that merely by 
separating Australia would be safe from attack. At the same time, 
the Imperial Federationists were also arguing that the continuatioh 
of the British Empire as a unit demanded a re-organisation which 
would give to the self-governing colonies, adequate representation 
In the direction of that Empire as an international power. Though 
they discussed many proposals aimed at achieving this object, they 
never laid down a doctrinal scheme of imperial federation, and they 
had, at least, explored many cul-de-sacs and found that the Empire 
could not develop along such lanes. On the positive side, the 
expression of their principles by men such as Holroyd and Professor 
Morris WHUMr revealed a more realistic grasp of the logic of 
Australia's strength and position than had the views of the radical 
nationalists. This of course was the far-sighted Deakin's interest 
in the idea and particularly in the new century, the significance 
of the League in Australian-British relations is not to be lightly 
dismissed. Not only Deakin's presidential address to the League in 
1905, but also the continued friendly association of members of 
the League with the senior officers of the Dominion section of the 
Colonial Office kept before the attention of these officers the 
interest of an influential group of Australians in obtaining a voice 
in Empire foreign policy (16). But in the 1880's neither the 
(15) Imperial Federation League : Report of Inaugural Meeting,1885 p.4 
(16) See Part II, Chaps.IV and V. 
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republicans nor the radical wing of the Australian Natives' Associat-
ion were concerned with the basic principles of the Imperial 
Federation League. Therp attitude was determined primarily by a 
suspicion of the British Conservatives who had instituted the idea in 
England, and of the Australian conservatives who made up the body of 
supporters of the movement within Australia. 
Though organised republicanism in iTew South Wales 
was provoked by the Imperial federation movement, organised 
republicanism, in itself, was never strong. Republican Unions or 
Leagues were established in Queensland at Charters Towers, New South 
Wales, Victoria and South Australia. Their membership was not . 
large (17). Radical republicanism, however, had a significance and 
influence beyond the formal organisational level. It was an integral 
feature, of the militant labour movement as it developed after 1885. 
Indeed the fact that there were republican unions or leagues is 
probably less important than the fact that the two leading radical 
nationalist papers, the Bulletin and the Boomerang preached 
republicanism consistently. Read widely in the shearing camps and 
by the miners and supplemented by other radical papers (18), these 
journals gave republicanism a more pervasive force in the ranks of 
the semi-skilled workers, than the circulation lists of the 
Republican or the membership of the expressly republican organisations 
would suggest. 
There is considerable evidence of this. At the 
Intercolonial Trade Union Congress in 1888 three cheers were 
given for the "Federated Republic of Australia"(19); the Associated 
Rlverina YiJorkers had as point six of their programme "The complete 
political independence of the United Australian Commonwealth on 
a basis of pure democratic republicanism"(20); and the Australian 
Labour Federation, reported as having 15,000 adherents in 1890(21), 
(17) See Mansfield B. : Op cit. 
Gollan R. : "Radicalism and Socialism in Eastern Australia 
1350-1910",(Unpublished thesis. University 
of London). 
(18) e.g. Northern Miner; Charters Towers Eagle; Mundlc Miner. 
See Morris'on A.A. : "Liberalism in Queensland", (Unpuollshed thesis, 
University of Queensland). 
(19) Boomerang 3/3/1888 
(20) The Hummer,Wagga,25/4/1882 -quoted Gollan :0p cit p.183 
fei) Coghlan T.A':"La^o^3? and Industry in Australia" (Qxf/r.a, 1918) 
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was frankly republican to the extent of having made an Australian 
republican flag which the strikers over a thousand strong flew 
at Barcaldine camp in 1891. Republicanism in itself was largely a 
negative policy. Once incorporated, however, as part of a comprehens-
ive plan for laoour's future, as it was in Lane's schemes, it became 
one of the symbols of the left wing Utopia. 
The defeat of republicanism was implicit in the 
setback labour ideaxxcim suffered during the 1890 strikes and the 
subsequent depression. The increasing constitutionalism of the 
movement in both Queensland and New South Wales as it turned to 
political action, canvassing the support of the small farmer, the 
small employer and the lower middle class had a sobering influence(22). 
Moreover, the large conservative wing of trade unionism, reasserted 
itself. Further, the almost immediate split in the New South Wales 
labour movement on the fiscal issue and the establishment of political 
labour ir Q.ueensland as the official opposition kept the power of 
the former weak until 1895-6 and put the latter into a relatively 
ineffective position. At'the same time the militant centres of 
unionism, the mining and shearing centres, continued in general in 
a depressed condition until towards the end of the century (23). 
There was no strong revival of republicanism in 
the new century but the ideals which, though not new, had been 
co-ordinated and baptised in the first large class conflict in 
Australia did become ingrained in the fabric of labour thinking:-
isolationism, egalitarianism, anti-militarism, opposition to 
hereditary position, to titles, to pomp and ceremony. In the 
prosperous days from 1906 to 1913, they were increasingly pushed 
aside in the thinking of federal political Labour, at least, though 
(22) e.g. "At its inception the Labour Party at once associated 
itself with the demand for cheap land and this recsfived 
considerable support in country districts". 
LjVatson J.C.:"The Labour Movement"(Mitchell Library); and see 
Black G. "The Origin and Development of the Labour Movement"j. 
(23) See Coghlan : Op cit p.2019 ff 
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they remained strong in the militant centres of unionism. Conscription 
provoked them into full strength but by that time the Empire had 
evolved sufficiently for them not to be translated into repuolicanism, 
except amongst some radical Irish republicans (24). Nevertheless these 
continuing attitudes, while not denying Australia's willing participat-
ion in Empire wars, did contribute to defining the extent of this 
participation. 
It can be argued that radical republicanism 
associated with militant unionism did not, and could not, in itself 
constitute a grave threat to Australia's continued membership of the 
Empire. After the militant unions had shown their strength m the 
(25) 
1890's, opinion appears to have consolidated against their radicalism. 
To make republicanism, or at least separation, probable what was 
necessary was the support of at least the indigenous middle class. 
This was not directly forthcoming in the 1880's but there was a 
third group containing representatives of this class which regarded 
separation as at least "an open question". While their exact strength 
cannot be gauged, it is at least possible to observe the basis of 
their antagonism and this can perhaps be seen most clearly if in 
a slightly exaggerated form In the conflict between the radical wing 
of the Australian Natives' Association and the Imperial Federation 
League. 
In the eyes of the Australian Natives' Association, 
natlonal autonomy within the Empire t>teeH: demanded^Anglo-Australianism 
should give pride of place to Australianism and that Australia's 
imperial interests should be regarded as imperial interests and not 
as colonial aspects of British imperial interests. It was about the 
first of these objectives, that the Melbourne No.I Branch of the 
Association joined issue with the Imperial federation League. In one 
sense, this conflict between the League and this branch of the 
Australian Natives' Association can be read as the last faint stand 
of the Anglo-Australians before conceding victory to the native born 
or, at least, to the nationalist ideais for which they stood. The 
(24) See Part IlJ,Chap.i> 
(25) See Gollan : Op cit p.212 
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elaer members of the League could see that this was occurring. 
Garter, Mayor of Melbourne and first President stated: 
"I have been told that there is a section of the people 
of this country who do not believe in imperial federation 
and I have also been told that those unbelievers are young 
people.....we, their fathers, know perfectly well that 
they owe us everything they possess, even their existence 
and that in a few short years we shall leave them what 
little we have not already given them, and amongst that 
little we shall leave them as a sacred trust the traditions 
of our race, and we feel quite satisfied that they will be 
true to them"(26). 
But for Whitelaw, spokesman for the Australian 
Natives' Association, the idea of imperial federation endangered 
"the political and social rights" of the native-born Australians(27). 
F'or the Australian Natives' Association Australian federation was 
essential to guarantee these rights. Once this had "oeen achieved 
it is noticeable that the antagonism towards the League declines 
and also that an increasing number of the leaders of the Australian 
Natives' Association become active and im^^ortant members of the 
Iiiperial Federation League (28). 
The second objective of the ^^ o^up which the 
Australian Natives' Association typified, also, appeared possible d>f 
realisation by the end of the century. ITo doubt the fact that the 
Pacific had largely been occupied by the powers by 1890 partly 
explains this development since, although problems for Australian-
British relations in relation to the Pacific continued to exist, 
they do not appear to have loomed as momentous as they did in the 
1880's. More important, perhaps, was the surge of British imperialism 
in the 1890's accompanied by an active and symipathetic Colonial OfflG( 
administration under Joseph Chamberlain (30), Nonetheless, the 
possibility of Australia's regional Interests not being adequately 
safeguarded by Britain had been brought to the forefront and after 
the defeat of Russia by Japan m 1904-5, the revival of regional 
defence fears played once a^aln a substantial role in advancing 
Australia's national cohesion and Australia's national status within 
the Empire, 
T2'6l ImpeFial Federation League -^"inaugural Meeting 1885T"pTl 
(27) Ibid p,9 
(28) See Part II, Chap,5 
(29) See Joyce : Op cit 
(30) See Part II, Chap.I 
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It was the combination of the fears and aspirations 
outlined, the growth of the Australian economy, the naval challenge 
to Britain oy Germany, and the economic challenge to Britain by 
Germany and the United States which determined the oroad lines of 
Australia's national development within the Empire, 
^a 
PART II 
I. AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION. 
On the eve of the inauguration of the Australian 
Commonwealth, the position of Australia in the Empire was given 
unusually precise expression. It was one matter for Chamberlain 
to speak in general terms at the time of 1897 Colonial Conference 
of the "self-governing colonies (which) we no longer talk of 
as dependencies. We think and speak of them as part of ourselves, 
as part of the United Empire, united to us...,by ties of kindred, 
of religion, of history, and of language, and joined to us by 
the seas that formerly divided U3"(l). It was another matter to 
be required to give sanction in an imperial act to a constitution 
for Australia which expressly stated the form of the relationship 
between Australia and the Empire as the framers of the Australian 
constitution saw it, and as the majority of the voting electorate 
were willing to approve it. The debate and the reaction in 
Australia regarding the ratification of the Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Bill provided, probably, as sharply 
defined an illustration of Australia's place in the Empire as it 
is possible to obtain. "The Act", said Chamberlain "is one of 
great importance, because it defines the extent to which the 
paramountcy of Imperial legislation goes"(2). 
The relationship of Australia to England had 
always been, of course, an element in the federation movements in 
(1) Chamberlain : Speech at the Royal Colonial Institute Dinner 
3l3t.March,1897. 
"The Concept of Empire", p 317. 
(2) Commonwealth ofOustralia Constitution BillJ Reprint of the 
Debated in Parliament, the Official Correspondence with the 
Australian Delegates, and Other Papers. 
Authorised Edition. 
London, 1900. 
p.14, 
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Australia. Amongst (3) the radical group of the 1880's and earlier, 
it had been the possibility of obtaining separation through 
federation or anion which had been one of the exciting features 
of their plans for the millenium, Lang had set the tone in the 
1850's with his "Freedom and Independence for the Golden Lands 
of Australia"(4) and in the 1880's the Bulletin and the Boomerang 
had taken up the cry. The Bulletin believed that federation would 
"foster the new born spirit of independence and quicken the life-
blood of a new born autonomous state"(5). For the radical republican 
Boomerang "Protection and Federation (were) the twin steps towards 
complaJhe Nationality"(6), And the New South Wales Labour Electoral 
Leagues included as a plank in their first political programme of 
1891 the "Federation of the Australian Colonies on a National as 
opposed to an Imperial basis"(7). 
The defeat of labour in the 1890 strikes tempered 
this enthusiasm and the drafting of a federal constitution by 
the non-labour Federal Convention of 1891 converted the shaping 
federation movement into a very suspect business in the eyes of 
radicals both in Queensland and New South Wales. For the radicals 
in the New South Wales Political Labour Party, Fitzgerald, Rae 
and Black it was "nothing more than a cunningly veiled scheme 
of imperial federation"(8). In Queensland, J.G.Drake saw "the 
impulse that led to the assembling of the Convention of 1891 (as) 
Imperialistic rather than National"(9), These radical fears 
lingered in both states antil federation was achieved (10), After 
the movement had been put onto a popular footing, however, and the 
draft constitution "democratised", as well as because of the 
(3) Martin has examined the inteiest of Australian financial, 
commercial and pastoral groups in federation as a method 
of attempting to secure the confidence of the British 
investor, lost by the 1893 depression. 
See Historical Studies Vol.11, No.l. 
(4) Lang J.D. : "Freedom and Independence for the Golden Lands 
of Australia." (1857) 
(5) The Bulletin 2/2/1889 
(6) The BooaBrang 1/9/1888 
(7) New South Wales Labor Platform, 1891 - Point 12. 
(8) New South Wales Parliamentary Debates Vol.LXI p.2387 
(9) Queensland Parliamentary Debates, Vol.LVII P»32 
(10)GreaiL.:"The Queensland Attitude to Federation. 
UnpubUshed thesis^ Unlvfirsity Qf^<iSgenslana, 
CrrfaBfll 
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growing Australian acceptance of the Empire amongst labour 
groups, they were very much a minority Aspect 6f labour opinions. 
The Australian Natives' Association, which had 
played an important role in the organisation of the Federation 
Leagues, also had borne in mind the imperial connection in their 
advocacy of federation. It had been imperative for them, as we 
have seen, to establish Australian federation before contemplating 
any wider federation. And under the pressure of the movement for 
Australian federation, as well as bBcause of disinterest in imperial 
federation, the Imperial Federation League had withdrawn from the 
field. 
"During the fever of agitation for the federal union 
of Australia",said Holrojrd in 1900,"I deemed it wiser, 
and others whom I consulted were of the same opinion, 
to let the greater federation remain in the background 
and bide its time..,"(11). 
The withdrawal of the imperial federationists on 
the one hand, and the suspicion and indifference of the political 
tabour party (12) on the other hand, symbolised the predominance 
of the Australian liberal nationalist viewpoint which dominated at 
Conventions which drafted the Constitution that was presented to 
the British Parliament. It was the liberal nationalists #io took 
the case into the British camp and argued with Chamberlain the 
more or less precise position occupied by Australia in the Empire, 
For some years British governments and press had 
been encouraging the Australian colonies to federate. At the time 
of the New Guinea crisis, Derby had told the Agents-General for 
New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia that "it would 
inevitably happen that requests of individual colonies would be 
ignored"(13). Gladstone had been of the same mind. 
"If the Australian colonies would combine into some kind 
of political union, we should at all eventd have much 
better means of approaching the subject. They would present 
to us some substantial responsibility for whatever they 
might undertake"(14). 
(li; Imperial Federation League,Presidential Address,Mr.Justice 
Holroyd - March,1900, pp 3-4/ 
(12) The N.S.W.Political Labour Party put up a "solid ten"candidates 
for the election of representatives for the 1897 Convention. 
None were elected. Queensland did not participate. 
(13) Quoted in Melbourne A.C.V,:"The Relation between Australia 
and New Guinea up to the Establishment of British Rule in 
1888". (Journal of the Royal Historical Society (1927) ), 
pp 310-11. 
(14) Gladstone to Derby,May 19,1883 (Knapland P.:"Gladstone's 
Foreign Policy" p.104) 
l^ 
The challenge was met at the Intercolonial Conference of that 
year when it was agreed to create a Federal Council of Australasia 
and a draft bill was prepared for submission to the British • 
Government (15). New South Wales drew the teeth of the Council 
by refusing to participate. 
Parkes' revival of the question of federation in 
1889 provoked an extensive British press response. 
"Not only the London daily papers, but the great provincial 
journals from Southamptin to Aberdeen, and most of the 
economic and official publications discussed the great 
Australian question."(16) 
A survey of sixty-five of these publications reveals that they all 
favoured Australian federation. The substantial section of the press 
which favoured imperial federation saw Parkes' action as bringing 
"the federation of the Empire within the range of paactical 
politics"(17). The section of the press opposed to imperial federat-
ion argued that "if a federated Australia comes it will not be 
a step in the direction of Imperial Federation, aa Imperial 
Federation is now understood"(18), Not one of these journals, 
however, failed to wish success to the proposal for federation. 
In 1894 at the Ottawa Colonial Conference, at 
which all the Australian colonies except West Australia were 
represented, the importance of federation was brought again to 
the attention of the visiting Australian Ministers, The Canadian 
representatives soke of the "want of unanimity of our Australian 
friends" and "the unfortunate fact that they were not in 
Confederation", Lord Jersey 
"observed to the Colonial Offlee,(that) 
the Australians would return from the Conference impressed 
with the neaessity of uniting their Colonies under one 
Government, as in Gandda, so as to be able to deal 
effectively with these commercial questions"(19). 
(15) Report of the Proceedings of the Inter-Colonial Convention, 
1883, pp 17-21. 
(16) "United Australia, Public Opinion in England as expressed in 
the Leading Journals o f the United Kingdom". 
N.S.W. Government Printer,1890, p.V. 
(1*7) Pall Mall Gazette 4/11/1889. (Ibid p.8) 
(18) The Star (London) 4/11/1889. (Ibid p.16) 
(19) Jebb R.: "The Imperial Conference",Vol.I,(1911) p.191 
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And at the 1897 Colonial Conference, Chamberlain displayed a keen 
interest in^enthusiasm for the coming federation. He handed to 
Reid a memo suggesting amendments to the Adelaide Convention 
Draft Bill which the imperial government would like to see 
incorporated. A sympathetic background had long been established 
for the presentation of a federation bill.(20). 
Australia was popular in Liberal and Unionist 
English circles in 1900 (2lX and, also, according to Deakin it was 
popular amongst the general public (22). Its participation in the 
Boer War was applauded and the achievement of the Federation Bill 
was favourably commented on by both political parties as well as 
by the envious Irish representatives in the House (23). The situation 
was propitious for winning concessions. "We all of us", said 
Chamberlain,"rejoice at this proposal"(24). Australia's right to 
frame her own constitution relating to her own domestic affairs 
was conceded. But there was a problem. 
"Whenever the Bill", said Chamberlain,"touches the 
Interests of the Empire as a whole, or the interests 
of Her Majesty's subjects, or of Her Majesty's 
possessions outside Australia, the Imperial Parliament 
occupies a position of trust which it is not the desire 
of the Empire, and which I do not believe for a moment 
it is the desire of Australia, that we should fulfil in 
any perfunctory or formal manner"(25). 
The particular clauses to which Chamberlain referred were 
"first, the fisheries in Australian waters, beyond the 
territorial limits of Australia; secondly copyright; 
thirdly, legislation dealing with the people of any race 
not being natives of either of the States (I think that 
has in view legislation in regard to Asiatics); fourthly, 
'external affairs',a phrase of great breadth and vague-
ness, which, unless interpreted and controlled by some 
other provision, might easily, it will be seen, give rise 
to serious difficulties; and fifthly, the relations with 
the islands of the Pacific, which also involves,of course, 
many questions in which foreign nations are concerned"(26). 
(20) Cd 188. 
(21)"Australia Constitution Bill" - see House of Commons and House 
of Lords Debates, pp 7-116. 
(22) Deakin : "The Federal Story", p.158. 
(23) "Australia Constitution Bill" 
(24) Ibid p.8 
(25) Ibid 
(26) Ibid pp.11-12 
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Deakin states that "slips of the tongue" by the 
British officers indicated that originally it was intended to 
propose several major amendments in relation to these clauses: 
"There was evidence that the powers conferred upon the 
Federation by Section 51 would have been curtailed if 
possible by the omission of XXIX External Affairs; 
XXX The Relations of the Commonwealth with the islands 
of the Pacific; XXXVIII of delegated powers at present 
exercisable only by the British Parliament; and possibly 
X Fisheries in Australian Waters beyond territorial 
limits." 
But fearing that such an action "might arouse the whole of the 
colonies against its proposals" these amendments were dropped(27), 
The substantial amendment which was proposed and about which the 
debate raged related to Clause 74. It defined the restrictions on 
appeals to the Privy Council. 
Since the text of the various forms of Clause 74 
is crucial to the argument it will be necessary to detail the 
various forms which it took during the debate. As presented in 
the Australian Draft Cpnstitution it read: 
"No appeal shall be permitted to the Queen in Council in 
any matter involving the interpretation of this Constitution 
or of the Constitution of a State, unless the public 
interests of some part of Her Majesty's Dominions, other 
than the Commonwealth or a State, are involved. 
Except as provided in this section, this Constitution 
shall not Impair any right which the Queen may be 
pleased to exercise, by virtue of Her Royal abrogative, 
to grant special leave of appeal from the High Court 
to Her Majesty in Council, But the Parliament may make 
laws limiting the matters in which such leave may be 
asked." 
Chamberlain removed this clause completely before the first reading 
of the Bill and added to covering clause 5, which defined the 
operation of the constitution and laws, 
"Notwithstanding anything in the Constitution set forth 
in the schedule to this Act, the prerogative of Her Majesty 
to grant special leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council 
may be exercised with respect to any judgment or order 
of the High Court of the Commonwealth or of the Supreme 
Court of any State." 
In presenting the Bill at the second reading stage. 
(27) Deakin : Op cit p.134 
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Chamberlain removed the addition to Clause 5, and put forward a 
new version of Clause 74. It now read: 
"No questions howsoever arising as to the limits inter 
se of'.the Constitutional powers of the Commonwealth 
and those of any State or States ar as to the limits 
inter se of the Constitutional powers of any two or 
more States shall be capable of final decision except 
by the High Court, and no appeal shall be permitted 
to the Queen in Council from any decision of the 
High Court on any such question unless by the consent 
of the Executive Government or Governments concerned, 
to be signified in writing by the Governor General 
in the case of the Commonwealth and by the Governor 
in the case of any State. 
Except as provided in this section, this Constitution 
shall not impair any right which the Queen may be i 
pleased to exercise by virtue of Her Royal prerogative 
to grant special leave of appeal to Her Majesty in 
Council, The Parliament may make laws limiting the 
matters in which such leave may be asked: provided 
that any proposed laws containing any such limitation 
shall be reserved bv the Governor General for Her 
Majesty's pleasure." 
Then, when the House went into Committee to consider 
the Bill, the third and final amended form was proposed, 
"No appeal shall be permitted to the Queen in Council 
from a decision of the High Court upon any question 
howsoever arising as to the limits inter se of the 
Constitutional powers of the Commonwealth and those 
of any State or States, or as to the limits inter se 
of the Constitutional powers of any two or more States 
unless the High Court shall certify that the question 
is one which ought to be determined by Her Majesty in 
Council. 
The High Court may so certify, if satisfied, that 
for any special reason the certificate should be 
granted, and thereupon an appeal shall lie to Her 
Majesty in Council on the question without further 
leave. 
Except as provided in this section, this Constitution 
shall not impair any right which the Queen may be 
pleased to exercise by virtue of Her Royal prerogative 
to grant special leave of appeal from the High Court 
to Her Majesty in Council, The Parliament may make laws 
limiting the matters inwhich such leave may be askedt 
but proposed laws containing any such limitation shall 
be reserved by the Governor General for Her Majesty's 
pleasure." 
Australian expressed attitudes to the debate 
on Clause 74 brought out clearly the divergent emphasis in 1901 
in the views of radical and ardent liberal nationalists, on the 
one hand, and of the professional and business organisations and 
the body of the metropolitan press, on the other, on this rather 
esoteric point of Empire association. Viewed more broadly, however, 
the history behind this chain of amendments can be seen to 
illustrate both the Imperialist UnionistJa attitude towards the 
Empire in 1900 as typified by Chamberlain, and the Australian 
liberal nationalist approach to the Empire as typified by Deakin, 
So 
The Deakin approach became the dominant approach by 1906 and though 
there were developments it remained the dominant approach to the 
Empire until 1913, Labour in office made some shifts in emphasis, 
but Australia's official policy towards the Empire was bi-partisan 
by 1906 and appeared to have considerable popular support. 
The most succinct statement of Chamberlain's 
objections to the original Clause 74 are contained in a telegram 
from him to the Governors of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, 
South Australia and Tasmania. 
"(1) the term "public interests" is so vague and indefinite 
aa to leave uncertainty in a matter where precision is 
of first importance, and increased litigation, due to 
applications for leave to appeal and the multiplication 
of arguable points on appeal, will be the result. 
(2) A most important link of Empire would be seriously 
impaired, and the consequences would be far-reaching 
in allowing divergency to spring up where in the general 
interests unity and uniformity is most desirable. 
(3) It can scarcely be to the interesta of Australia that 
in important questions as to boundaries between powers of 
Commonwealth and States the final decision should not 
lie with highest tribunal of Empire, beyond suspicion 
of local bias or predilection, 
f4) Important questions may arise as to operation of 
Commonwealth Laws on British shipping, or generally as 
to whether such laws are ultra vires, which the Imperial 
Parliament can scarcely allow to be concluded by decision 
of Australian High Court. 
(5) Commonwealth legislation on such subjects as fisheries 
may seriously affect the interests of subjects of other 
parts of the Empire, and in such matters Parliament could 
not expect them to submit to be deprived of appeal to an 
Imperial Court, 
(6) Banks and other financial and commepcial institutions 
having large interests in Australia entertain very strong 
feeling against the limitation, and weighty representations 
have been made on the subject to Her Majesty's Government, 
(7) Her Majesty's Government feel that the actual restrict-
ion, and the power claimed to make further restriction 
equivalent to practical abolition of appeal, would be 
specially inopportune at the moment when they are considering 
terms of a Bill for enhancing the dignity and promoting 
the efficiency of the Judicial Committee by practically 
amalgamating it with the House of Lords, and providing for 
adequate permanent representation of the great Colonies in a 
new Court which it is proposed to create. Should Australian 
appeals be practically withdrawn, the new Court would be 
deprived of a large part of its value as providing a new 
sphere for co-operation between Colonies and Mother Country, 
and givfcng effect to some extent to ardent desire for closer 
relations now happily existing both in Mother Country and 
Colonies."(28) 
(28) Ibid p.156 
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It was on these grounds that, against the intense 
opposition of the Australian delegates. Chamberlain removed the 
clause entirely and left intact the right of appeal as it existed 
in the states. Yet having piloted this through the first reading, 
he then introduced another amendment which was so satisfactory to 
Deakin, Barton and Kingston that, once alone, "they seized each 
others hands and danced hand in hand in a ring around the centre 
of the room to express their jubilation"(29). What had been at issue? 
Certainly the legal ambiguity of the draft clause 
did clutter the issue very considerably. Even amongst expert legal 
opinion there was no agreement as to its meaning. Whilie the imperial 
Attorney-General argued that the phrase "public interests" was 
one of "extreme vagueness",(30), Haldane Q.C.,M,P,, saw it as 
protecting imperial interests more adequately than the second 
amendment (31). While Griffith argued that under the draft clause 
the right of appeal to the Privy Council from the State courts 
on constitutional questions was retained (32), Chamberlain could 
"only say it is not as clear to me as it might be that the original 
Bill did allow of such an appeal"(33) and in Quick and Garran's 
opinion : 
"There was certainly no intention on the part of the 
Convention to limit the clause to appeals from the 
High Court, the general words 'no appeals shall be 
permitted' being understood to Include appeals from 
all courts. State or federal"(34). 
When the question was taken up by the layman the legal subtleties 
taaded to be forgotten and the problem to equate itself into 
appeal versus no appeal (35). But though the legal problem was- therg 
the legal issue cannot be regarded as the primary issue in the 
conflict between Chamberlain and the delegates. Three points were 
at issue - Chamberlain's intention to concede the minimum amount 
(29) Deakin : "The Federal Story", p.155 
(30> "Australia Constitution Bill", p.69 
(31) Ibid p.65 
(32) Quick and Garran : Op cit p.754 
(33) "Australia Constitution Bill", p.63 
(34) Quick and Garran : Op cit p,754 
(35) e,g. Cd 158,No.15 Dibbs,Want & McLaurin to Colonial Office. 
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which could be conceded while retaining maximum Australian 
goodwill; his intention to leave no doubt both of his personal 
dominance and through him of British predominance; and his intention 
to salvage as muoh-as possible for a possible imperial federation. 
The intention of the Australian delegates was to concede nothing 
of the Bill and to assert as far as possible their equality of 
status with England. 
Clause 74 had been selected several years before 
the draft was submitted as the testing ground for Chamberlain's 
imperialism against Australian liberal natiSnalism, When the 
Australian premiers were in London for the 1897 Jubilee, Chamberlain 
had handed a memo to Reid, as senior premier, of the amendments to 
the draft proposals of the Adelaide Federation Convention which 
the British Government thought desirable. 
"I especially called (Reid's) attention to the probability 
that the Imperial Parliament would think it its duty to 
interfere if there were any limitations of the right 
of appeal"(36). 
This attitude had been provoked by the Adelaide Federation Convent-
ion's draft of Clause 74, Following the precedent of the 1891 
Convention, it had decided virtually to abolish appeals "as of 
right". Appeals from the State Courts direct to the Privy Council 
were to be abolished altogether; there was to be no appeal "as of 
right" from the High Court to the Privy Council; and the Queen's 
right to grant leave of appeal was to be limited to certain 
specified cases (37). Reifl handed Chamberlain's memo to the 
Drafting Committee and at the 1898 Convention, Clause 74 was one 
Quick and Garran 
of the most lengthily debated clauses (38) . (^ tgwwwx'Sfftxhgct^ y^ WTaw 
have summarised these 
aMHxa lengthy and complicated debates this way: 
"Everyone wanted a federal court of appeal; everyone did n&t 
wish to abolish the appeal to the Privy Council, and yet no 
one wished to multiply appeals. The cumulative right of appeal, 
first to the High Court and then to the Privy Councll:5:,juMbqpais 
»wx«wiBxai«fe<iAxJgaxTaw3:tt|giT would increase the delay and the 
cost of litigation, The^eraative right of appeal, either to 
the High Court or the Privy Council, would leave two final 
tribunals. The opinions of the Convention wavered aa one or other 
aspect of this difficulty became more prominent."(39) 
(36)"Australia Convention Bill"- House of Commons Debates p,16, 
(37) Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, 
Adelaide,1897 pp 968-89; '*" 
(38) Quick and Garran : Op cit p.748 (^ ) 
(Sai Quiok and Garran : Op clt p,736 
Si 
Ghamborigin'a object WBa t^ p-aedify this doolaion. The final form of-
clause was virtually as it was submitted be the draft bill. It was 
the limit ?ftiich the majority of members would concede in the way 
of appeals "as of right" to the Privy Council. Despite Griffith's 
later argument that the Clause allowed appeals "as of right" except 
in the case of appeals from the High Court, there is little doubt 
that Quick and Garran are correct when they state that the 
majority Convention vote meant that on constitutional questions, 
whether state or federal, "the High Court should be the sole, 
as well as the final, court of appeal"(40^. There is no doubt 
either, that this is the manner in which Chamberlain and his legal 
advisers interpreted the question (41). Chamberlain's object was 
to modify the Australian decision. 
Chamberlain's manoeuvrings were an object lesson 
in statescraft. His principle, as Deakin described it, was "divide 
and conquer"(42). He began with the knowledge that West Australia 
was rift between the commercial and agricultural interests #iiKh 
dominated the legislature and the goldfields which were pressing 
for separation within West Australia (43), The legislature wished 
for special favourable terms of admission to Australian federation 
and their representative, Parker, sought to use the fact that 
once Chamberlain made one significant amendment to the Bill, 
"there is no reason why it should not also be amended 
in the minor matter which I have mentioned as affecting 
West Australia"(44), 
The East Goldfields Reform League and Albany and District Separation 
League on the other hand, favoured the Bill as it stood. Their 
slogan was "separation for federation"(45). Chamberlain had no 
difficulty in splitting Parker from the hard core of delegates(46)« 
(40) Quick and Garran : Op cit p.754 
(42) Deakin : Op cit Chapt,XX. ' 
(43) Secretary Goldfields Reform League to Colonial Office 15/3/10OC 
Cd 158, p,30. Minutes of Proceedings of Conference of 
Australian Delegates at Colonial Office, Cd 158, p.36 
(44) Ibid 
(45) "Manifesto of East Goldfields Reform League Af W.A." This 
petition contained 18,000 adult male signatures. Cd 158. p 30. 
Albany and District Separation League -petition contained 
^ V28,000 signatures. Cd 158 
JWj Fff^ r CTDwi^questioning of Parker, Cd 15ir,p38 ff. \No.36 
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Dickson, the Queensland delegate, a commercial man, 
was already opposed to limiting appeals to the Privy Council. 
He was bolstered in his support by Griffith. Why Griffith changed 
his attitude towards appeals between 1891 when he favoured their 
total abolition (47), and 1899 when he became one of their strongest 
supporters, is uncertain.(48) Several speculations are possible. 
In 1891 Griffith was a politician. In 1899 he was Chief Justice 
of Queensland and Lieut-Governor. As Lieut-Governor, he acted 
as Governor in the early months of 1900 during Lamington's 
absence. As a jurist in 1900 his attitude to Clause 74 agreed 
with the legal opinion of all Australian Chief Justices and by the 
law associations (49). As acting governor his view accorded 
with the view of Lamington, an ardent and voaal Empire advocate(50), 
This may be sufficient to explain Griffith's 
changed attitude. Viewed more broadly, however, there had been a 
pronounced change of attitude amongst Queeniand non-labour 
political leadership and financial groups towards England. 
Mcllwraith in his imperialising hey-day had regarded the British 
Government and Colonial Office with scorn, 
"A pomposite grandmotherly^ old wreck,,,tottering with an 
open handbag and a cotton umbrella towards an open grave" 
was the Bulletin's assessment of his opinion of the Mother Country,(51] 
Yet this had not prevented visiting England regularly and arranging 
large loans. The theoretical distinction between business and 
government in "Laisser-faire" thinking, however, had by the late 
1890's been replaced by an official imperialism of which economic 
imperialism was a component(52), This and the reaction of British 
investors towards Australia after the strikes of 1890 and the 
(ffl) Deakin : Op cit p,142 
(48) Vockler's biography does not discuss this question, 
(4$) Cd 158, No,58, No,72, No.75. i 
51 
!sa) Quoted in Dilke : Op clt p.204; see a.similar view in 
quotations in Dignan:"Mcllwraith", unpublished thesis 
University of Queensland. 
(50) Lamington's open support for the Chamberlain view was criticised 
by British Liberal members. See Australia Constitution Bill. 
House of Commons Debates p.31.. 
(52) See Halevy :"lmperialism and the Rule of Democracy". 
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1893 depression, and the greater cohesion of non-labour interests 
under the threat of developing labour, made Queensland very 
susceptible to Chamberlain's views and adamant in their resistance 
to further threats to Australian status, on the British stock 
exchange (53). 
New Zealand was the third area interested both in 
leaving the way open for amendment of the Bill and in preserving 
the full right of appeal to the Privy Council. Aa Reeves, the 
Agent-General representing New Zealand summarised New Zealand's 
case, it stood to lose if it stayed out and "in the opinion of 
a great many of our people" stood to lose if New Zealand joined 
Australasian Federation. On the one hand. Reeves argued, if New 
Zealand stayed out it would jeopardise its trade of £2,500,000 
per year with Australia which "to a small country like New Zealand 
is a matter of considerable moment"; but, on the other hand, 
"numbers of New Zealanders" argued that Australian and New Zealand 
interests were not sufficiently identical to warrant New Zealand 
joining Australia. It was New Zealand's interest to encourage 
delay in the ratification of the bill, to give their ideas an 
opportunity to crystalise. But if New Zealand did not enter the 
federation, it was important to New Zealand that the full right 
of appeal should be retained, for the resolution of possible 
collision between Australia and New Zealand in their day to day 
business association (54). 
With the governments of two colonies and of New 
Zealand supporting him. Chamberlain was in a formidable potion 
in his challenge to the delegates. This position was strengthened 
by the impressive array of Australian financial, legal, pastoral 
and commercial interests and press opinion which lined up behind 
his view, both at the Federation Convention and again in 1900. 
The organised groups which expressed strong approval for not 
(53) See Part II, Chapter A. 
(54) Minutes of Proceedings of Conference of Aust.Delegates and 
Colonial Office April 5th.1900, Cd 158, No.21 
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restricting the right of appeal were the Commercial Banking 
Company of Sydney, the City Bank of Sydney, the Savings Bank 
and the Bank of New South Wales (55) as well as all other 
banking coii5)anies trading in Victoria and New South Wales (56) • 
the Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works, the Incorporated 
Institute of Accountants of Victoria, the Victorian Division of 
the Society of Accountants and Auditors Incorporated, England, 
the Accountants and Clerks Association Limited, the Cambrian 
Society of Victoria, "fifteen or twenty" Victoriam Insurance 
companies, the Victorian Chamber of Manufacturers, the Society 
of Notaries of Victoria, the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce,the 
Melbourne Chamber of Mines, the Geelong Chamber of Commerce, the 
Melbourne Wool Brokers' Association, the Federal Institute of 
Accountants, the Victorian Licensed Victuallers' Association, 
Victorian Employers' Union, the Pastoralists' Association of 
Victoria and the Southern Rlverina, the Council of Geelong and 
Western District Agricultural and Horticultural Society of Victoria, 
the Royal Agricultural Society of Victoria and the Ballarat 
Agricultural Society; the Australasian Federal League (in South 
Australia) and the Australasian National League, also of South 
Australia (57). 
Direct petitions, as such, are aonspicuously 
absent from West Australia, Queensland and Tasmania but this is 
explicable by the fact that West Australia and Queensland were in 
the distinctive position in regard to Federation already outlined 
anjfl that Tasmanlan political and fiinancial interests were 
following Victoria, The governments in each of these states were 
(55) Cd 158, No.8 
(56) Melbourne Federal Convention Debates p,3 
(57) Cd 158, No.51 
"^1 
in favour of the Chamberlain view and the continued support of 
Deakin, Barton and Diiiliuftn by Fysh, the Tasmanlan delegate was 
against his government's recommendation (58). Moreover metropolitan 
press opinion in these states, and indeed in all states was 
generally overwhelmingly against the delegates. The Free Trade 
Sydney Daily Telegraph described the Australian form of Clause 74 
as "wantonly sniping off the prerogative of the Crown"(59). All the 
leading Queensland papers, Lamington reported to Chamberlain, 
favoured his amendment (60). Not only the Argus and the AustralasiaM 
which were Victoria's leading conservative papers, but, also, the 
liberal and nationalistic Age and Leader were against the view 
of the Australian delegation (61). The West Australian strongly 
favoured the Chamberlain position (62) as did the Tasmanlan press 
which was most critical of the Australian delegates (63) and 
agitated for their recall.(64) 
This was a formidable array of opinion. Against it 
was aligned the South Australian Register (65) reputedly a 
Conservative Free Trade Journal, but under the editorship and part 
Sydney Morning Herald(66) 
ownership of the strongly nationalist Sowden, the pro-federation/,the 
Bulletin (SOT), the Work¥r and labour groups generally(68) . The 
~" (70) 
Australian Natives' Association (68),Sir John Downer and the 
71 
redoubtable SJrmon also supported the delegates {SA). The governments 
in Victoria, South Australia and New South Wales took the ambiguous 
stand of preferring the Bill as it stood, but preferring amendment 
to postponement (74). 
(58) Deakin : Op cit p.146 
(59) Beauchamp to Chamberlain - Cd 158, p,78 
(60) Lamington to Chamberlain, Cd 158, p.79 
(61) Madden to Chamberlain, Cd 158, p.79 
(62) Onslow to Chamberlain Cd 158, p.81 
(63) Cd 158, p.82 
(64) Deakin : Op cit 
(65) Onslow to Chamberlain Cd 158, p.81 
(66) Sydney Morning Herald e,g,10/5/1900; 14/5/1900 
(67) Bulletin e,g, 4/4/1900; 12/5/1900 
(68) Abolition of appeals to the Privy Council part of Labour's 
general policy. See 
(69) Deakin : Op cit, p.156 
(70) Sydney Morning Herald 11/5/1900 
(71) See e.g. Symon to Colonial Office, Cd 158, p.73 
(72) "Australia Constitution Bill", p,157 
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With this body of Australian sagp0f*t behind 
Chamberlain, part of vihich he had himself induced into expression(73) 
and with the dissension in the views of the Australian colonies. 
Chamberlain was in a particularly effective position to beat 
down the opposition df the hard core of the delegates. Why having 
marshalled his forces and won his point apparently with the approval 
of majority expressed Australian opinion, did he then propose his 
second amendment, an amendment which was intensely unpopular 
amongst the very groups, whose support he had previously utilised? 
The South Australian Government, despite Kingston's objections, 
declared that it could no longer support the Bill; the Queensland 
Government stated that the difference was so significant that it 
would have to submit the amended Bill to parliament. The governments 
of West Australia, Tasmania and New Zealand strongly attacked the 
new amendment. (74) 
Once again, the question of legal interpretation 
had cluttered the issue. Griffith and some other Australian legal 
authorities believed that this amendment restricted the right of 
appeal more than the original Australian form of the clause (75). 
Since neither Chamberlain nor his legal advisers interpreted the 
initial clause as Griffith did, they were obviously out-of-step 
with each other from the beginning. The more extensive complaint, 
however, was that the new amendment weakened the distinction between 
the executive and judiciary, giving the final determination on 
the right of appeal against the High Court decision to the executive 
government and governments concerned. This was opposed not only 
by jurists but by business groups suspicious of Australian 
governments (76). Chamberlain and his advisers clearly had not 
foreseen this antagonism towards executive government. 
(73) For example, after the Chief Justices of N.S.W.,Queensland 
and South Australia had indicated their approval of Chamberlairfs 
view he cabled Madden, Chief Justice of South Aust. for his 
opinion. Madden agreed with Chamberlain but "should have 
preferred not to interfere in the matter". Cd 158,No.72,pp.75-6 
(74) Deakin : Op cit p.156 
(75) Quick and Garran : Op cit 
(76) Oe«v<.U ; Op c^x 
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But though Chamberlain sought to meet these 
new protests, he had no intention of meeting them to the extent 
he had originally proposed when he had removed Clause 74. He had 
no objection, and neither did the Australian delegates, to 
transferring the authority to grant the right to appeal on 
constitutional inter se questions against High Court decisions 
from the executive governments to the High Court itself. This was, 
in effect, the difference between the second and final amendments. 
But, though prepared to make this administrative adjustment. 
Chamberlain had determined that an Australian court was to have 
tfee initial right of decision on inter se constitutional questions 
and Itiat an Australian authority was to determine whether there 
should be an appeal to the Privy Council against such decisions. 
Though all the Australian governments accepted the fiaal amendment, 
it was with reluctance that Queensland did so and West Australia 
expressly stated tliat it ^11 wanted the existing right of appeal(77). 
Despite the eventual acceptance of a compromise by all parties,then, 
the problem remains of explaini^ ag why Chamberlain changed his 
attitude after he had won the victory, and won it in a manner 
favourable to such extensive and influential Australian opinion. 
The extent to which Chamberlain's personal pride 
intruded into his initial decision to reject Clause 74 cannot be 
definitely assessed. In the opinion of his biographer, Garvin, 
"This was no case of Chamberlain against Australia. 
He would have been the last man to undertake a 
controversy of that nature"(78). 
Deakin was not of the same opinion. 
"The note struck by the delegates required to be apologetic 
and the statement an appeal so as to disguise as much 
as possible the greatness of the demand which was being 
made upon the British Parliament by dependencies which 
asked that their own dra&ght of the constitution under 
the Empire should be accepted practically without criticism 
or consideration and their legislative independence 
recognized as amply as was that of the United States after 
their separation. Chamberlain felt and resented the 
i^lications of such a request. He said to Henniker Heaton 
that if the delegates thought they were going to get their 
(77)"Australia Constitution Bill",p.83 
(78) Garvin J.L.:"The Life of Joseph Chamberlain",Vol.Ill p.560 
Bill without some amendment, he would tell them that 
'he'd see them damned first' and meant what he said. 
Apart from the merits of the amendments he was resolved 
to demonstrate the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament 
and his own too by insisting upon some alteration however 
small"(79). 
The evidence would appear to support Deakin's 
interpretation, but it need not be construed in mean terms. Behind 
Chamberlain's strategy was his intention of illustrating the 
superior quality of the British government, a verification by 
example of British might through ability to remain in loco parentis 
to the self-governing ^mmmm^mm. First, he demonstaated that he 
could out-manoeuvre the delegates and hav e his way, without 
qualifications if he wished. The demonstration complete, tactfully 
and with grace (80), he conceded to the delegates sufficient of 
their demands to send them into a fandango. But he still retained 
the position of leadership he had established and he had extended 
considerably the right of appeal compared with the original 
Australian provision. 
"The effect of this understanding will be that Clause 74 will be 
exactly reversed; that whereas, in the original clause, appeal 
was to cease in all cases except where the public interests of 
some pertion of Her Majesty's dominions outside Australia were 
concerned, in the clause as we now propose to insert it the 
appeal will be in every case, except in the case where 
Australian interests alone are concerned"(81). 
Chamberlain was being hard-headed. It is more than 
reasonable to assume that he appreciated the power that Kingston 
and Deakin, in particular, would weild in the new commonwealth (82); 
it is reasonable to assume that in view of the history of 
Australian nationalism and specifically of Clause 74, he appreciated 
that when the war fever wore off, a strengthened Australian 
nationalism would continue; it is, perhaps, even reasonable to 
assume that for all Chamberlain's own business background and 
interest he appreciated that the group who had petitioned him most 
(79) Deakin : op.cit p,137 
(80) For details* see"Au3tralia Constitution Bill"- Correspondence 
Deakin : Op. cit 
(81) "Australia Constitution Bill", House of Commons Debates p.39 
(82) Campbell-Bannerman made this point in the debate. 
See Garrln : Op. cit p.565 
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strongly were singularly interested parties. Not only the case 
of the delegates, but the barrage of cables which the Best 
Australian goldfields and, particularly, Symon levelled at him, 
at Selborne and at the British press represented another view of 
Empire. Symon wired Selborne: 
"Earnestly impress amendment create powerful bitter party, 
never rest till wrong righted; may split Australians, 
must endanger attachment England. Commonwealth Bill 
intact new bond Empire".(83) 
Johns, who is not given to adulation of militant nationalists, 
maintains that Symon 
"so efficiently fought the battle and the enemies of 
the Clause in Australia and in Britain that the 
opposition was foiled and the clause passed the 
Imperial Parliament with slight and quite acceptable 
amendments"(84). 
Finally, there are some grounds for assuming that with Australia 
so popular in Britain because of its achievements in the Boer 
War, there was a possibility that the Opposition would make 
political capital out of his treatment of the Australian Bill. 
Deakin has advanced this argument 
",..it appears.,.that his sudden r^aewal of policy...was 
due in part to the prospect of an immediate election at 
which an Opposition with any vigour could have made 
excellent use of the public differences between hljgiself 
and the delegates, taking them to be prophetic of future 
troubles in Australia such as had led up to strife in 
South Africa. This would have been easy for them especially 
during the public enthusiasm everywhere felt for Australia 
because of their brilliant service in the war..."(85). 
Less directly Garvin makes the same admission. 
"Sympathetic interpretation of overseas opinion had been 
so far his pleasure and his strength. It was utterly 
disagreeable to have to fight men like Barton, Deakin 
and Kingston. And to have to do it during the South 
African War when the services of the Australian contingent 
at the front were felt by him not only aa part of his 
pride but part of his life. A struggle against the Opposition 
at home and against half Australia or perhaps more - to 
what good could this come?" (86) 
As well as demonstrating to the delegates England's 
qualification for remaining in loco parentis to the self-governing 
(83) Symon to Selborne Cd.l58 p,74 
(84) Johns J. : "An Australian Biographical Dictionary"(1934) p,350 
(85) Deakin : Op. clt p.159 
(86) Garvin i Op.cit p.565 
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dominions. Chamberlain had a positive interest. He wished to 
further the federation of the Empire. On a more grandiose level, 
he had dreamt a little earlier of a federation of the Anglo-Saxon 
and Teutonic peoples (86). In fact, despite the disparate waves 
of imperialism which characterised, very strongly, the years 
after 1895 prospects of great federations were markedly on 
the decline. The 1897 Colonial Conference, despite the Jubilee 
Celebrations which accompanied it, gave little promise of 
leading to Empire federation. Jebb states that between 1897 and 
1902, Chamberlain passed through a crisis in his attitude to the 
Empire. He came to believe as a result"of his official experience 
that there was no real hope of a permanent Imperial union unless 
mutual preference and trade could be established"(87), 
Against this background. Chamberlain thought of 
the Australia Constitution Bill as it related to Imperial 
Federation, and was intent on salvaging what could be salvaged. 
The Privy Council he saw as the most promising field. He had 
taken from the Colonial Office pigeon-holes and elaborated a 
scheme for extending the "permanent and effective" representation 
of the "great colonies" on the Judicial Committee and of amalgamating 
the Judicial Committee with the House of Lords. Such a scheme had 
also been recommended by leading Liberals. 
",...It would be very unfortunate",said Chamberlain,"if 
Australia should choose this moment to take &?om the 
Imperial Tribune the cognizance of the class of cases 
of greatest importance and often of greatest difficulty"(88)• 
Finally, and most imprtantly in this regard, he argued that 
"if the Bill were passed in its present form, while it 
would mark a step in advance as far as the Federation 
of Australia is concerned, it would be a retrograde 
measure so far as it effects the larger question of 
Imperial Federation"(89). 
Despite this positive interest, however. Chamberlain under the 
(86) Halevy : "Imperialism and the Role of Democracy". 
(87) Jebb : "The Imperial Conference", VoU, p.340 
(88) "Australia Constitution Bill", p.152 
(89) Ibid p,155 
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pressure of the forces outlined, decided to hand back enough 
of what had originally been taken from the Australian Constitution 
to satisfy the delegates. But he still left the possibility of 
a wider range of direct appeals to the Privy Council than the 
Australian Federal Conventions had originally intended. 
Bennett has categorised all phases in the development 
of the Empire concept under general titles except that marked 
by Chamberlain's presence at the Colonial Office. This he has 
described simply as the "Chamberlain Era"(90). It was not a 
great period in the construction of effective Empire forms. 
It was a great period in the construction of Empire sentiment, 
necessary to remove the bar of British indifference and colonial 
suspicion so that the conversion to the new Empire could be made. 
The Australian Constitution presented a difficult problem to 
Chamberlain, Intent as he was both on encouraging the growth of 
Empire unity and according adequate recognition to colonial 
nationalism. It is significant that, when the negotiations were 
complete, Deakin should write of Chamberlain 
"the whola credit of conducting the negotiations to a 
successful conclusion is his, with the additional 
satisfaction of being done so with dignity, consistency, 
and tact"(91). 
His handling of the Australia Constitution Bill illustrated both 
Co loAia ( 
his adroit methods and his views of British-domialo-a relations 
in all their subtlety. 
Opposed to Chamberlain was Deakin. If-tn pluralistic 
societies, one man can encapsulate the dominant nationalist trends, 
Deakin did this in Australia. The Edinbiifeh Review said in 1911, in 
(90) Bennett G. : "The Concept of Empire, 1774-1947". 
(91) Deakin : Op cit p.159 
l"t. 
an article by a critic of Deakin: 
"It is almost impossible to over-state Mr, Deakin's 
dominance in matters of Federal policy. Though he 
was never backed by a majority of his own, and was 
twice persuaded into coalitions with men who had 
bitterly attacked him, it was always his policy that 
Parliament was undeavouring to carry out. Except J?he 
principle of con5>ul3ion in military training, which 
he accepted at first half-heartedly,tjhe principles 
of all-important legislation during the whole period 
were of his preaching, and many of the more essential 
detailBf were of his devising. His alliance with 
Mr.Reid in 1904, no less than his understanding with 
Labour in 1906, was based on the acceptance of his 
programme by his allies. Even the Labour-dominated 
Parliament of 1910 occupied itself mainly with 
securing results at which he had always aimed; so 
that when he, as leader of the Opposition, attacked 
the Labour Bills, the most effective reply was usually 
to quote from recent speeches of his own. 
Difficult,therefore, as it is to critize 
in5)attially an eminent living politician with a 
particularly lovable personality, the task can be 
avoided ohly at the expense of leaving Australia's recent 
history unexplained and almost incomprehensible...The 
Australian people, growing into a sober and determined 
manhood mainly through the wisdom and forethought of 
Alfred Deakin's administration, have accepted in all 
essentials the national policy he framed"(92). 
It is not a detraction from the immensely important role of 
Deakin in the early years of the Commonwealth to argue that 
this contemporary document does over-emphasise Deakin's singular 
claim to the pdLlcies pursued. Certainly, he played a vital role 
in conceiving methods of converting ideals into practicable 
policies 4nd in implementing them. But the principles behind the 
policies of White Australia and its corollary European immigration, 
of Protection, and its corollaries Empire preference and New 
Protection, of Australian controlled national defence and of 
an empire organisation consonant with the nationals tatus of 
the 3elf-governing drom^niona, were principles already implicit 
in the prevailing Australian nationalism. Deakin comprehended 
and articulated the dominant themes of Australian nationalism. 
An educated and sensitive family-background; 
a boyhood spent in the changing liberal atmosphere of Victoria 
when the lower house was demonstrating its dominance over the 
upper house; a youth spent in close association with Syme; an 
official delegate to England and offered a title while he was still 
(92) Quoted in Murdoch W,:"Alfred Deakin", op. cit. p.208-9 
L^. 
under thirty, Deakin was as capable an exponent of the less 
tangible features of Australian nationalism which were to prevail 
as he was of the Australian policies about which Australian-
British relations were to revolve. The phrase "independent Australian 
Briton" was Deakin's. He gave a specific illustration of what this 
meant as early as the 1887 Colonial Conference. When told by 
Bright that Australia should separate, Deakin replied that Australians 
"were attached to the Mother Country" and when Bright "rejoined that 
i 
we proved this by taxing our parent's goods....I replied that this i 
was because, instead of treating us as her children she only put 
us on the same footing, in her markets, as her enemies and rivals," 
Basically egalitarian, Deakin was,too, opposed to titles. "Titles 
do not grow out of a man or woman - they are stuck on from the 
outside, and upon the outside are always artificial and ridiculous". 
He refused all honours including membership of the Privy Council (93), 
a principle Labour ad4pted but to which not all Labour members 
adhnred. But the dignity of the conception was a refined part of 
the shaping nationalist code. 
Deakin was the real leader of the Australian 
delegation which attended the Bill. Reading Deakin's own memoirs 
in conjunction with the Australian delegates' memoranda it is quite 
clear that the legal detail of Clause 74 though believed important, 
was subsidiary to the principle of having the Bill accepted as it 
stood. The delegates stated in their memo to the Colonial Office: 
"at the outset the Delegates desire to once more affirm 
their conviction that the real question involved is 
only incidentally one of a legal character The 
substantial issue which it has been the first duty of 
the Delegates to submit, and which they again, with all 
deference, press upon the best attention of Her Majesty's 
Ministers, is that the Bill as prepared is the Australian 
Constitution in a double sense, since it is not only 
Australian by origin, but by the deliberate endorsement 
of Parliaments and peoples"(94). 
On this basic principle, the Australian liberal nationalist viewpoint 
went domi before the experienced imperial viewpoint. 
(93) Keith : "Responsible Government in the Dominions",Vol.2 p.1024 
(94) "Australia Constitution Bill". H 0«..KW^»> £.^y.'.t* Ni<w^ 
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In terms of Australia, however, the liberal national-
ist conception of Australia's status within the Empire was largely 
victorious. It had dominated at the Federal Conventions(95). There 
the view had been advanced that allowing the right of appeal from 
the High Court to the Privy Council "is allowing undue weight to 
wealth"(96) and that the "Privy Council appeal is really an 
anachronism and an absurdity"(97). Against this position had been 
arrayed the formidable group of business and legal organisations 
arguing that limiting appeals challenged Empire unity and that they 
jeopardised business and English investment. Martin has shown the 
interest from 1893-1896 of pastoralists, bankers and insurance 
bodies in federation as an anticipated way of re-establishing 
British confidence in the Australian market(98). The same groups 
restated the same arguments from 1897 to 1900 in relation to the 
Privy Council (99). Allowing appeals, said Carruthers 
"will be some guarantee to the people within the 
Commonwealth and a greater guarantee to the people 
outside the Commonwealth, who have large business 
transactions with Australia that will go on increasing 
and increasing many fold when federation is accomplished, 
that their interests will not be sacrificed when, if 
they are engaged in dispute, and recourse has to be had 
from the lower courts to the final Court of Appeal in 
England, the decision ultimately will be according to 
the uniform law of the Empire"(100). 
But this opinion neither carried at the Conference nor completely 
in London. The final clause was a compromise between the three 
sets of interests, legal, financial and liberal nationalist. 
In view of the weight of opposition to the stand 
taken by the delegates, it might reasonably be questioned whether 
they were representing majority Australian sentiment. Perhaps at 
the time they were not. Imperial sentiment was strong in Australia 
while the Boer War raged. More probably, to quote Blackton out of 
context "a large but unestimated body of Australians continued to 
bend to its labor, its sport, and its beer, deaf to propagandist 
and cynical of politicians in good Australian style"(101). But in 
(95) Labour was not represented.Its pen opposed the appeal to the 
Privy Council. 
(96) Melbourne Federation Debates p.431 (Symon) p.341(Isaacs). 
(97) Ibid p.347 (93) Martin A.W. : Op. cit. 
(99) See p. (101) Blackton : Op.cit, p.13 ^ 
(lOO)Melb.Fed.Debates p,325.And see Adel,Debates p,969ff. 
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the broader analysis, in terms of the values, imperial and 
nationalist implicit in the argument it can be argued that the 
hard core of delegates were expressing the basic and dominant 
shaping nationalism. 
The Australia Constitution Bill did not, nor was 
it Intended, to declare Australia an Independent nation. 
"By the preamble the Commonwealth is declared to be 
•Under the Crown'; it is constitutionally a subordinate, 
and not an independent sovereign community or state"(102). 
But the framers of the constitution held high hopes. The "High 
Court must gradually grow in strength"(103) and "is going to be 
a body....of imposing power and weight"(104). 
Discussing the title "Commonwealth", Quick and 
Garran wrote in 1901: 
"Although this word is capable of conveying the idea of 
a nation, like the American Commonwealth, it does not, 
in its application to Australia, aspire to convey the 
meaning except in a restricted and potential sense. 
At the same time it is distinctly intended to signify 
that the newly-organised political society, forming 
a conspicuously integral part of the British empire, 
is entitled to a more dignified status and recognition 
in the international arena than that assigned to the 
most distinguished of the colonies or to the most 
powerful of the provinces out of which it has been 
constructed"(105). 
The background of Australian economic and social 
conditions scarcely gave warranty for this optimism. The economy 
was chastened (106). The radical national balladist Lawson, had 
sung a depressing and backward looking melody in the 1890's (107) 
(102) Quick and Garran ; Op. cit p.367 
(103) Melbourne Convention Debates p.347 
(104) Ibid p,341 
(105) Quick and Garran : Op. cit p.312 
(106) Fitzpatrick : "The British Empire in Australia". 
(107) See in "The Days When the World Was Wide". 
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and the verse published by the Bulletin in 1900 was a verse of 
disillusionment (108). In painting, writes Bernard Smith 
"There was a turning inward, a search for subjective beauty; 
a period of myth-making had begun. It was without doubt 
a symptom of the retardation of Australia's own national 
development. Federation had been obtained, but the reality 
did not embrace the ideal"(109). 
But then it probably never does. More reasonably 
it might be argued that the'eighties had been the marshalling and, 
to some extent, the creative period of Australian nationalist ideals 
and so of the attitudes which were to dominate in Australian -
Imperial relations. The first decade and a half of the Commonwealth 
period was the time when the effort was made to reduce the Ideals 
to workable size. It was by no means a static period and nationalism, 
as we will see, did become more mature. But in terms of nationalist 
conceptions it was a creative period only in the practical sense 
and not idealogically. With the exception of the left wing 
socialists, there was no new idealogical conflict within Australia 
or with Britain. The major sources of conflict and co-operation 
were built around the efforts to implement the Ideals already 
discussed. Their relatively successful implementation was both 
assisted by and helped in the conversion of the Empire into the 
Commonwealth and in advancing Australia's status in the Empire 
beyond the position defined in the Australia Constitution Bill 
and more subtly in the Chamberlain-Deakin conflict. 
(108) e,g, Proletaria - "From pole to pole of Poverty 
We stumble through the years 
Bulletin With hazy lanterned Memory 
8/12/1900. And Hope-that-never-nears". 
(109) Smith B. :"Place, Taste and Tradition"(1945),p,163 
See Palmer V.C. :"The Legend of the Nineties" for a similar 
argument. 
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II. ECONOMICS and PREFERENCE. 
Australian-British economic relations from 190C to 
1914 illustrate the developing national nature of Australia's 
economic policy and demonstrate that this policy was able to be 
accommodated within the British Empire largely because Britain 
had withdrawn from interference in the fiscal policies of the self-
governing colonies. The economic relations indicate also the limits 
imposed by majority supported economic policies, both in Australia 
and Britain, on the type of Empire economic organisation possible. 
And they bring out clearly the strength of Australian sentiment 
in favour of reinforcing Empire economic ties. Finally, the economic 
relations demonstrate that, despite both the British Government's 
withdrawal from the fiscal affairs of the self-governing colonies 
and 
and the preponderance of sentimental/economic argument within 
Australia for strengthening economic relations, these ties were in 
fact loosened, if not weakened, over this period. 
In economics, as to a degree defence and immigratin, 
the pattern of Empire evolution while satisfactory to retain Australia 
in Empire association was not adequate to lead to the strengthening 
of relations. Perhaps this was no more than the inevitable centri-
fugal pressure of growth. But by 1914 Australia was relatively much 
less dependent on British capital, proportionately to the total 
British trade with Australia had declined significantly, there was 
extsnsive Australian criticism of imports from Britain and the «arly 
hopes of the advocates of mutual preference had not been realised. 
Despite these developments, Britain in 1914, still occupied the 
predominant position in relation to the Australian economy and 
there was little likelihood of any other country usurping her place. 
Australian-British economic relations had one 
further significance for Australian attitudes to the imperial 
connection. The growth and prosperity of the Australian economy, 
particularly after 1906 and the subsequent ability of Australia 
to redeem some loans as well as to finance, increasingly, its own 
lo 
development from its own resources helped temporarily to erase the 
slight residue of ill-feeling against British economic interests in 
Australia and to re-establish Australian stocks in the British 
market. At the same time the economic prosperity provided the 
economic basis for the pursuit of bi-partisan policies with imperial 
implications, in particular policies of deftoce and encouragement 
to immigration. As such it underwrote Australia's nationalist 
aspirations and contributed to advancing Australia's national status 
withiti the Empire. 
Protection, as conceived and implemented in 
Australia, sought to be a national policy. The radical nationalist 
Bulletin had thought of it this way in the late 1880's (1) and the 
Boomerang, as we have noted, saw "protection and federation as the 
twin steps towards complete nationality"(2). Deakin, too, thought 
of tariff protection in national terms. 
"We protect ourselves from armed ^ression; why not protect 
ourselves from ^ression by commercial means? We protect 
piirselves against undesirable aliens; why not protect 
ourselves againsjf the production of the undesirable alien's 
labour?"(3) 
And the implementation of the policy by the Deakin Protectionists 
was in the broadest possible terms. Protection was to provide 
revenue for government, protection for local secondary industries, 
employment for the urban worker, and as New Protection it also 
sought to assure to the worker a share of the benefits accruing to 
secondary industry from the tariffs. 
The free trader saw protection as g sectional 
policy. The Australian free trader could not favour absolute free 
t]iade for as Senator Harney pointed out the Braddon clause meant that 
the free trader had "to start with this concession to his opponent, 
that a substantial customs revenue is essential. Accordingly," Harney 
(1) Bulletin 2/2/1889 
(2) Boomerang 2/9/1888 
(3) Quoted in Murdoch :"Alfred Deakin" 
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continued, 
"the distinction between the parties does not lie in the 
fact of duties or of no duties, but in the character of 
the duties, Thus the protectionist penalises what he would 
shut out, the free trader what he knows must come in. 
The protectionist frames his tariff to aid the manufacturer, 
the free trader to help the Treasurer; and as the 
protectionist has to fill -both the factory and the Treasury 
parse, the former being much the deeper, it follows that 
his tariff results in infinitely greater taxation. Their 
ideals also differ. The eyes of the one are turned upon the 
town, his hopes resting upon its smoking chimney stacks; 
the other sadly surveys the broad acres of his country, 
reading blighted prospects in its neglected pastures and 
its vast mineral resources, still but partially explored"(4). 
But the growth of city population and the strength of organised 
labour determined that if protection did not consider, equally, all 
sections of the community it at least gained majority support. 
By 1906 it is true to say that protection had become the settled 
policy of Australia. 
There was no question of the implementation of 
protection leading to any desire to break with the mother country. 
On the one hand, Britain had long conceded to the self-governing 
colonies the right to determine their own fiscal policies. As early 
as 1859 the general principle was expressed and though there were 
heated disputes from 1869 to 1873 between Australia and Great 
Britain, regarding the continuing restrictions preventing the 
colonies imposing discriminating duties on imports, this question, 
too, was resolved with the withdrawal of the relevant imperial act 
in 1898 (5). Of the remaining restraints two became issues of some 
moment after 1901 - control of merchant shipping and the question 
of the right of the dominions to withdraw from commercial treaties -
but neither was in the least likely to jeopardise Australia's Empire 
membership. On the other hand, there were positive reasons for 
wishing to remain within the Empire, In addition to the arguments 
of sentiment, Britain provided the major markets for Australian 
(4) Procs. Royal Colonial Institute 1904-5, p.100 
(5) Keith :"Imperial Unity and the Dominions". 
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primary products and was almost the sole source of capital available 
to Australia. 
But if there was no question of any agitation for 
withdrawal on economic grounds, the success of protection did 
determine that only an economic relationship which allowed Australia 
protect adequately her secondary industries would be satisfactory 
to the majority of the people. This virtually precluded the 
possibility of imperial federation or of the more limited 1890's 
proposals by the Chamberlain imperialists for an imperial zollverein. 
A system of imperial preference was the only possible type of economic 
co-operation. 
To 1903 there appears to have been little widespread 
support for imperial preference within Australia. On the one hand, 
until about this time Australian politics were bedevilled by the 
fiscal controversy; on the other, the issue only looked like becoming 
one of possible realisation after Chamberlain's campaign in 1903 
for tariff reform in England. 
The question of imperial preference was first 
raised definitely amongst the representatives of the self-governing 
dominions at the 1887 Colonial Conference. On this occasion, Griffith, 
Deakin, Service and Downer, Premier of South Aastralia, had all 
intimated that they would favour some scheme of imperial preference. 
The movement was however in its very early stages, Jebb quotes Service 
to "show how rudimentary the consideration of the problem hitherto 
had been"(6). Service had stated: 
"I must confess that a remark which fell from Sir Samuel 
Gri|;f,ith the first or second day after we came here, awakened 
a new set of ideas in my mind; and that was that it was not 
necessary that all the component parts of the Empire should 
have the same tariff in order to carry out this idea; that 
is to say, that if you place a differential duty as between 
the Imperial products and the foreign products it would not 
matter what the precise local tariff happened to be. I never 
looked at the matter in that light before, but I must say 
it appears to me at present that there is a great deal in 
that point." 
(6) Jebb R. : "The Imperial Conference", Vol.1 (1911) p.75 
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And while Deakin believed it would be "a powerful agent in uniting 
us together" and that Victoria would agree to some scheme of 
preference, nonetheless, he believed that "until a very great change 
indeed comes over the manner of regarding fiscal questions in this 
country.,,...it is almost idle for us to raise the issue"(7). 
Inqserial preference was next discussed at the 1894 
Ottawa Conference, at which all Australian colonies with the exception 
of Western Australia were represented. This conference passed a 
resolution favouring the extension of Empire trade, and recommending 
that "until the Mother Country can see her way to enter into customs 
arrangements with her colonies", such colonies, as wished to should 
enter into trade agreements giving more favoured treatment to each 
other than was accorded foreign countries. The motion also recorded 
the C onf er enc e's 
"belief in the advisability of a customs arrangement between 
Great Britain and her colonies by which trade may be placed 
on a more favourable footing than that which is carried on 
with foreign countries"(8). 
The representatives of all the Australian colonies approved the 
first two of these recommendations; Queensland and New South 
Wales opposed the third. As Jebb remarked this conference at least 
gave "some idea of the limits within which a system of inter-
colonial reciprocity might be established as a nucleus of imperial 
preference"(9). Equally as clearly it indicated the substantial 
disagre^nent in the views of the Australian Colonies. 
Between this time and 1903, there was little 
further development of the movement within Australia, At the 1897 
Colonial Conference the premiers did agree to investigate the 
possibility of unilateral preference being accorded Great Britain 
from the colonies as a method "of improving the trade relations 
(7) Ibid 
(8) Ibid p.188 
(9) Ibid p.191 
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between the Mother Country and the Colonies"(10). By 1902,however, 
largely because Australian energies had been taken up with federation, 
Australia's official position was still not explicitly defined. 
At the Colonial Conference of that year, Canada was prepared to 
recommend the continuance of the existing preferential tariff of 
1 
33-^, New Zealand offered a general preference of 10^ reduction of 
3 
the existing duty on manufactured goods, and Cape Colony and Natal 
offered a preference of 25^ on dutiable goods. Australia's "preferent-
ial treatment (was) not yet defined as to nature or «xtent"(ll). 
It was Chamberlain's advocacy of mutual preference 
in 1903 which appeared radically to alter the situation. For the 
first time, it seemed that the basic change might be made in 
Britain's fiscal policy which would enable a policy of mutual 
preference to be shaped. The. Chamberlain-Balfour proposals of May -
June 1903 provoked extensive Australian press and political reference, 
in a debate which continaed until the British Liberal government 
"banged,barred, and bolted"(12) the door against mutual preference 
at the 1907 Imperial Conference. 
Australia's attitudes to the Chamberlain proposals 
ranged the full scale from total rejection to ardent support, with 
the addition of a substantial weight of indifference. In general 
the free traders opposed the proposals and the protectiSnists support-
ed them. Political and Trades Hall labour, still anxious in 1903 to 
prevent the fiscal controversy splitting its ranks and concerned 
primarily with remedial social legislation, expressed no agreed 
policy in 1903-1904. By 1906-7, however, protection was extensively 
accepted by the bulk of organised labour and with some exceptions, 
mutual preference was also approved. 
(11) Report of 1902 Colonial Conference. 
(12) The phrase was Churchill's at the 1907 Colonial Conference. 
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The argument of the Australian preferentialists 
was a threefold argument until 1907, In the first place preference 
was seen to complement the policy of protection. The groups not 
directly considered under Australian protection were the foreign 
trader, the pastoralist and the farmer and to a lesser extent, the 
mine owner. The protectionist did not accept the argument that there 
would be any decline in overall trading as a result of protection 
and argued moreover that a sjfstem of mutual preference would 
considerably increase Australia's trade. In fact the foreign trader 
was of little real concern to the protectionist (13). Nor was the 
pastoralist of great concern. Deakin pointed out at the 1907 Imperial 
Conference that Australian wool and minerals were finding adequate 
markets in Germany and France despite the fact that these countries 
were raising protective barriers against the importing of other 
primary products. It was significant that when Deakin presented a 
balance of trade sheet at the 1907 Imperial Conference to support 
statistically his argument for greater Empire trade he excluded wool 
from the list of commodities (14). Though Australia still rode 
largely on the sheep's back, the protectionists had little fear in 
the increasingly prosperous period from 1903 that Australia would 
lack adequate markets for the sale of its wool or minerals. 
Australia's other primary products, however, were 
in a less secure poi^ion. Deakin pointed out at the 1907 Conference 
that Australian production was increasingly more rapidly than 
population. The home population, he stated, could absorb only a 
fraction of the ever increasing output of primary goods. Expanding 
markets were needed but, except for wool and ores, the great 
consuming markets of Europe were closed to Australian primary 
produce. Foreign meat and other food products were put under great 
(14) Report of 1907 Colonial Conference, p.240 
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restriction; German subsidised steamers were forbidden by charter 
to bring meat, dairy produce or cereals from Australia, and even 
if this ban were removed, German "sanitary" regulations would 
prove sufficient to bar the import of the Australian primary goods 
concerned. The expansion of British imports of -Australian primary 
products would benefit all classes of producers in Australia,Beakin 
stated, since the development of primary industry would produce 
larger home markets for Australian manufacturers as well as British 
manufacturers (15). This fiinal point was, of course, the economic 
interest of the Australian manufacturer and protectionist Labour 
in Empire preference. It was realised by the President of the 
Association of Manufacturers and by protectionist labour that the 
prosperity of Australia's secondary industry and the guarantee of 
employment in this industry depended primarily on adequate overseas 
Biarkets for Australian primary produce (16). 
The second argument of the preferentialists was 
that imperial preference was a policy in keeping with the self 
dignity of the dominions. Deakin put this in his famous 1907 
preference speech at the Imperial Conference. He emphasised that a 
fundamental principle of mutual preference was that it should not 
threaten the liberty of each state to frame its own tariff to suit 
its domestic interests. From this point Deakin went on to state that 
the Australian preferantialists were not asking for aid. 
"We may be youthful, but in this matter we are fairly experienced. 
In our own tariffs we distinctly study our own interests....only 
after that should you undertake to go further and enter upon the 
question of preference viien you see it to be to your advantage 
to do so"(17). 
This was the basis of Jebb's advocacy of imperial preference and 
his agitation for it. He saw it as a policy both realistically 
(15) Ibid 
(16) «^ Cel-^ .-|t ^^ >Q>-|-^  
(17) Ibid p.235-6 
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geared to national self determination, of which he regarded protection 
as the economic component, and also of great importance for Empire 
cohesion (18). 
The third strand in the argument of the preferantial-
ists was that the scheme would benefit Empire organisation and 
growth. Deakin stated his "political gospel" on this point. 
"To us it appears that henceforth the individual will become 
more and more dependent upon the social and national structure 
in Tnhich he finds a place anything that encourages the 
development of Imperial organisation, which,without limiting 
the self-governing powers of the several parts, or unduly 
trespaaiaing in the individual liberty of the citixen shall 
compact them together in cooperative relations for the discharge 
of social duties, political obligations, and industrial efforts, 
every possible increase and cooperation - marks a higher stage 
in civilisation giving great opportunities to the individual 
and greater strength to the nation"(19). 
To the free trader, protectionist arguments for 
mutual preference, based on Empire sentiment, in Reid's phrase.«aase 
"a mean, sneaking, disloyal fraud"(20), an excuse for establishing 
a higher protective tariff under the guise of trade concessions to 
Great Britain. In this the free traders were agreed. They were not 
in agreement, however, in their interpretation of Australian free 
trade nor, consequently in their attitudes to the principle of 
imperial preference. 
At one extreme were the "foreign traders", mainly 
importers such as McMillan and Bruce Smith, supported in their 
attitudes by might a£ the free trade press, the Sydney Morning 
Herald, the Sydney Telegraph, the Argus and the Brisbane Telegraph. 
This group were intensely loyal to the British connection, ti*© fy\C(^^ 
majeiijij- advocating the uncritical acceptance of British control of 
Empire foreign policy and supporting the payment of subsidies to 
an exclusively Admiralty controlled navy (21). They were opposed, 
however^, to any restriction on Australia's overseas trade and so 
(18) Jebb : "The Imperial Conference", VoLlI 
(19) Report of 1907 Colonial Conference, p.238 
(20) The Annual Register, 1903 
(21) See Chapters III and IV. 
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were opposed to all schemes of preference. The Sydney Morning Herald 
quoted McMillan with approval. 
"It cannot be expected that anything like the whole or pefehaps 
even the larger portion of our trade in the years to come 
will be with Europe and the United Kingdom". 
And from this point, the Herald proceeded to criticise the Chamberlain 
proposals as overlooking local colonial interests (22). The Argus 
and the Brisbane Telegraph argued along similar lines, seeking ^o 
win support for their views by interpreting preference as a threat 
to the autonomy of the colonies. The Argus saw Chamberlain's policy 
as being motivated by his need for political support within Britain 
and accused him of exploiting Empire sentiment to this end. It argued 
that , 
"the bond of common race and national sentiment has increased 
in strength between the colonies and the Mother-land in 
proportion as the formal bonds have been reduced and that the 
new proposals of Chamberlain and Balfour meant abandoning a 
policy which experience had shown to be then only safe one"(23). 
Similarly the Brisbane Telegraph, criticising the Chamberlain 
proposals maintained that British policy should be 
"to give to our dependencies the utmost measure of self-
government consistent with Empire unity; trade with the 
world; try to raise all men to the highest levels possible 
to them"(24). 
One argument which this wing of free traders 
advanced consistently was th?ft preferential tariffs must lead to 
French and German retaliation and so endanger the continental 
market for Australian wool. In 1903 the Sydney Morning Herald 
wrote that 
"in an increasing degree we shall look to Continental nations 
for a market for our wool and other produce.,.,We believe that 
the woolgrowers and the wheatgrowers of Australia will give 
no more countenance to the proposals of the British Government 
than the British Chamber of Commerce or the dock labourers of 
Llverpodl"(25). 
And in 1906, the Sydney Daily Telegraph, discussing the proposed new 
tariffs which were to provide some British preference, stated 
(22) Sydney Morning Herald 20/5/1903 
(23) Argus 1/6/1903 
(24) Brisbane Telegraph 19/5/1903 
(25) Sydney Morning Herald 1/6/1903 
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"In threatening this discrimination - not in reality to swell 
the volume of British imports, but to further subsidize Melbourne 
manufaotnners - our Federal Government ^ d Parliament are trifling 
with the future interests of our producers. It happens that one 
of our best customers - we annually sell Germany about £7-| millions 
sterling worth of goods, and import £2-| million worth of goods in 
return, the balance of £5 million going to Great Britain to pay 
interest or purchase commodities - is understood to be rather 
unfriendly to the Mother Country, and the Deakin Government is 
asking Parliament to pass an amendment to the Tariff which can 
hardly fail to aggravate the unfriendliness"(26), 
It appears, however, that in this attitude the 
free trade press was not reflecting the views of the primary 
producers whose case it purported to argue. The initial reaction of 
the Australasian Pastoralists Review was favourable to the Chamberlain 
proposals. 
"The proposal is one which strongly commends itself from a 
sentimental view, and we believe that, taken as a whole, it 
would prove in the interests of Australian and New Zealand 
pastoralists, whose products have to be sold mainly in the 
United Kingdom in open competition against Argentina, the 
United States and Russia. Whilst upholding free trade principles, 
we have always been of the opinion that the carrying out of them 
should be modified by circumstances as occasion may require, 
and that while the rule should never be forgotten, its application 
was a matter of time and place....Mr.Chamberlain is an eminently 
practical mind, and his genius essentially commercial, so that 
when he gives his support to the preferential tariff we may feel 
confident that he sees his way to putting the conception into 
definite shape"(27), 
Between this time and 1907, this journal debated frequently the 
question of preference and remained convinced of its economic and 
sentimental value to Australia and the Empire, It believed that its 
value for Australian meat, butter and wheat was unequivocal, and 
though in one issue it conceded that the wool industry "is as likely 
to be hurt as helped by preferential trade arrangements"(28), it 
soon revised this attitude. Germany and France, it argued, were 
unlikely to retaliate against Australian wool 
"as their manufacturers cannot get the fine wools they want 
in sufficient quantities elsewhere, and if our wools were 
especially taxed abroad the mother countyy will be bound to 
give them a preference too"(29). 
By December,1903 the Review was miaintaining that the preferential 
(26) Sydney Daily Telegraph 2/10/1906 
(27) Aaatgalasian Pastoralists Review 1/6/1903 
(28) Ibid 16/7/1903 
(29) Ibid 17/11/1903 
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trade movement was growing in strength and gave evidence that it was 
being supported actively by leading New South Wales pastoralists(30), 
In 1906 it still strongly favoured preference olJiticising the 
Deakin proposals of that year, not on the Daily Telegraph grounds 
that they would invite retaliation, but on the grounds that they 
were "trifling with a big question"(31). Although nominally a free 
trade journal , the Pastoralists Review was most critical of the 
extreme free trader. In unusually strong language, it attacked the 
"nauseating cant with which the free-trade doctrines are constantly 
being shoved down our throats"(32). 
Nor did the extreme free trader and anti-preferential-
ist have the unequivocal support of the major insurance, banking and 
mercantile journal, the Australasian Insurance and Banking Record. 
Strongly free trade and bitterly anti-labour, it nevertheless 
continued to discuss the Chamberlain proposals dispassionately long 
after the extreme free trade press had condemned them. Initially it 
saw the proposals as being petentially momentous , of vital importance 
to all Australian producing, financial and mercantile interests. It 
appreciated, however, the major difficulties which were to kill the 
schemes, the fact that the colonies would not concede their protect-
ionist tariffs and that Britain could scarcely be expected to buy 
food an a dear market (33). In its only other editorial on the question, 
it repeated these arguments in 1905. 
"Every measure to draw the component parts of the British Empire 
together is to be hailed, provided of course, it is sound and 
of an enduring nature. But the question whether Mr,Chamberlain's 
suggestion of preferential trade is such a measure has not yet 
been decided,....The only way to favour the mother country is to 
reduce duties generally in such a way as will make the Australian 
market more accessible. But this is just what the protectionists 
refuse to do. Their idea of a preferential arrangement is one 
that will give the oyster to Australia and the shells to the 
United Kingdom"(34). 
The more moderate attitude of the Australasian 
Pastoralists Review and the Australasian Insurance and Banking Record 
(30^ Ibid 16/12/1903 
(31) Ibid 15/9/1906 
(32) Ibid 16/10/1903 
(33) Aus t r a l a s i an Insurance and Banking Record 20/6/1903 
(3J>> Ii?1rl go/1/1005 
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was possibly more representative of majority Australian free trade 
opinion than was the extreme visw. It is impossible to be certain 
of this for the victory of protection in Australia meant that the 
free trader was never tested critically regarding his precise attitude 
to imperial preference. There was, however, a considerable body of 
expressed opinion willing to support a scheme of Empire free trade 
if it could have been established. The free trade, but strongly 
nationalist South Australian Register took this stand (35). Robert 
McMillan, editor of an "Australian paper (N.S.W.) interested in 
cattle, sheep, and c61onial produce generally", criticised Britain 
for buying too much meat outside the Empire because it was a little 
cheaper. 
"We spend our money with you, but what profit is that to us 
who belong to the Empire?....Why don't you establish free trade 
in the Empire?"(36) 
G.VJall, a free trader and president of the Sydney Chamber of Commerce 
stated in 1905, that "with strong British inclination, he favoured 
trade within the Empire"(37). And Senator Harney argued for a free 
trade Australia and a protectionist England, meaning by this that 
Australia should reduce its tariff barriers to encourage the 
importing of British goods and that Britain should develop further 
her industries with protection and offer preference on primary 
products to the Empire countries. The result of this policy,he argued, 
would be that: 
"commercial gain to the Mother Country would no longer be confined 
to the elusive one of what could be taken from the foreign importer. 
Her goods would, in accordance with their merits, have the opportun-
ity of supplanting those of spoon-fed local manufacture, to the 
mutual advantage of both nations; and the capital thus taken from 
the exotic industries of cities like Melbourne would fructify an 
hundred-fold in the healthier atmosphere of the open. A manufactur-
ing England and a pastoral,agricultural, and mineral Australia 
would then become attainable. Moreover, the danger of' retaliation 
would sink to a minimum"(38). 
(35) South Australia Register 19/5/1903 
(36) Procs. R,C,I. 1901-2, p,214 
(37) Coloured Labour Question - g§9^^i§5§*^^SS (Mitchell Library) 
(38) Harney :"imperialism from an Australian Standpoint". 
Procs, R.C.I. 1904-5, p.112 
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The return of the British Liberals in 1906 and the 
rejection of the Deakin arguments at the 1907 Imperial Conference 
virtually ended the debate. There was no possibility of resurrecting 
mutual preference while the British Liberals remained in office. 
A postscript was written, however, in Australia's decision to offer 
unilateral preference. 
The 1907-8 tariffs provided for a general tariff 
of 155^  against British goods and a tariff of 20^ against goods 
imported from foreign countries. The discussion of these preference 
provisions hinged about two questions, were the preferences in any 
sense a genuine preference, and should any preference be offered to 
Britain in view of her rejection of mutual preference? This discussion^ 
like the debate on mutual preference, was a revealing indication of 
the relationship in #iich the various groups stood to the Empire. 
Deakin's case was built about the rejection of the 
Australian "offer of a substantial preference" at the Imperial 
Conference, "subject to the condition that we received an equal and 
similar preference from the Mother Country"(39). Asquith's direct 
repudiation of this offer, Deakin stated, was made with "an almost 
anxious desire to avoid trespassing upon the privileges that have 
already been condeded to us". Consequently, Deakin argued, the self-
governing dominions must determine in which ways they intended 
discharging their duties "in regard to the would power under whose 
shadow we have grown up"(40). 
"It seems to me that the relations between the Mother Country 
and the self-governing Dominions are now in preoess of re-
adjustment and this must go on until, on clearly thought-out 
and well-established lines, we have adjusted our relative 
responsibilities to each other. These are incidental to our 
approach towards national manhood and can no longer be put 
aside"(41). 
Australia's movement towards "national manhood" demanded protection 
(39) C.P.D. Vol.XL, p,4995 
(40) Ibid p,5007 
(41) Ibid p,5006 
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of local manufacturers, but on commercial and trade grounds,"invested 
t( 
with spirit, sentiment and aspiration, it was possible to offer 
preference against the foreign manufacturer of substantial worth to 
Britain. The proposed preferences were to be regarded only as 
experimental, 
"In the light of experience we shall be able....to foster trade 
with the Mother Country where it will best suit her development 
and that of the Commonwealth"(42). 
It was a politically astute address, clothed in 
the generalisations which made criticism difficult. Clearly implicit 
in it, however, was Deakin's understanding of the difference to the 
future of the Empire which the victory of the British Liberals meant, 
and his modification of tactics in view of this development. To 
advance Australia nationally and to advance Australia's position 
within the Empire, the tactic when dealing with the Chamberlain 
imperialists was clearly to support positive schemes of closer 
Empire association if they accorded adequate recogriition of dominion 
autonomy. In negotiating with the Liberals the emphasis was placed 
on the Liberals' principle of allowing maximum self-government to 
the Dominions. "Greater and more generous treatment there could not 
possibly be"(43). 
This subtlety did not characterise every govern-
ment speaker but common to many was the emphasis on high protection 
for national development and self-survival, an argument #iich 
precluded the possbility of a preference which might challenge 
Australian industry, Sampson, who represented the agricultural 
electorate of Wimmera, favoured protection to establish national 
industry because he believed that 
"the time has come when we shall have to protect ourselves 
from the teeming nations of the East....Within a short space 
of a quarter of a centary, one of these Eastern nations has 
advanced from a position of comparative obscurity to that 
of one of the foremost naval nations of the earth"(44). 
Though not opposed to preference, Sampson believed Australia's first 
(42) Ibid p.5007 
(43) Ibid 
(44) C.P.D., Vol,XXXVIII p,2966 
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urgent task was to develop herself as a nation (45). Similarly 
G.H.Wise, member for Gippsland, and a member of the Victorian Board 
of Directors of the Australian Natives' Association, related 
protection to the development of nationalism and emphasised that 
Japan had "not hesitated to adopt a protective policy"(46). 
He decided to support preference, although "we cannot be so 
enthusiastic as we should if it were reciprocal". Knox, whose 
private interest and public duty" were in conflict, was also prepared 
to support a duty sufficient "to enable local manufacturers compete 
successfully with importers"(47). Knox had extensive mining interests 
being a director of the Broken Hill Proprietary Co.Ltd., and of the 
Mt.Lyell Mining and Railway Co,Ltd., and his support of tariffs 
meant, he argued, greater costs for his mine equipment. 
Protectionist Labour was even more adamant in its 
insistence on ensuring Australian industry before offering preference, 
and in making no sacrifice which was not reciprocated by Britain, 
"If there is to be sacrifice", said Watson,"it should be mutual"(48), 
Frazer (Kalgoorlie) was "pledged first of all to Australia....Once 
we have secured the position of Australia, I shall be prepared even 
without reciprocal treatment, to grant a preference to British 
imports"(49). Fisher was only willing to offer preference providing 
it was clear that it did not jeopardise establishing Australian 
industry (50), a sentiment which Foster (New England) repeated 
eii^ )kasising that he was "an Australian first and a member of the 
British Empire afterwards"(51), Tudor, probably summed up the 
(45) Ibid p,2966 
(46) Ibid p,3126 
(47) C.P.D, Vol.XL, p,494a 
(48) C,P,D. Vol.XXXVIII, p,2362 
(49) Ibid p,2589 
(50) C.P.D. Vol.XL, p,4561 
(51) Ibid p,4879 
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prevailing protectionist Labour attitude when he said that 
"I will vote for preference if it will give greater protection 
to the workers of -Australia, but if it will mean less protection 
to those workers, I shall vote against the proposal, With me the 
fiscal question is a labour question"(52). 
This battery of dominant protectionist opinion 
made it eminently clear that #iile, as Lyne put it, there was to 
be no retaliation against Britain because she had not offered 
reciprocal tariffs (53), yet such preference as was offered was to 
be "a concession to sentiment which is not allowed to interfere with 
business"(54), There were of course, dissentients from this view. 
Quick, a member of the tariff commission, and previously an ardent 
supporter of Chamberlain's "brilliant scheme of imperial partnership" 
(55) 
doubted whether the government's proposal was 
"consistent with Mr.Chamberlain's ideas. He certainly expected 
a big substantial preference in favour of British goods, and 
not one of 5 per cent. In return, I understand, he was prepared 
to give a substantial concession on colonial productions"(56). 
And Quick proceeded to argue that he "could present a scheme 
of preferential trade, which would be a real one and would not 
imperil Australian manufactures"(57). Hughes, a free trader within 
the Labour Party, was also prepared to give a "decided preference" 
to Britain and was dissatisfied with the proposed scheme (58), 
Both within the House and out, however, the high protectionists 
were in a majority and though slight modifications on individual items 
were possible, there could be no deviation from the policy of ensuring 
more than adequate protection to Australian industry first, and then 
offering Britain preference against the foreigner. Fuller reporting 
(52) Ibid p,5079 
(53) C.P.D. Vol,XXXVIII p,2L50 
(54) Hancock K, : "The Commonwealth", (Cambridge History of the 
British Empire, Vol.7 Pt.I, p,507). 
(55) C.P.D. Vol,XXXVIII, p,2165 
(56) Ibid 
(57) Ibid p,2166 
(58) C.P.D. VolXL, p,4940 
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on the tariff commission, of which he was a member, stated that"in 
nearly every instance the witness clearly indicated that no 
preference should be given by Australia to Great Britain until the 
duty had been fixed at such a rate as to secure to Australian 
manufacturers the Commonwealth market with a substantial margin 
of security, even against the competition of the British manufactur-
ers" (59). The Bulletin had argued in 1903 in reaction to Chamberlairfs 
proposals, that the 
"basis of it must be strictly a business-like one What 
Australia certainly will not do is to admit British Empire 
colored-labor products on preferential terms or give 
preferences to Britain which are not balanced by compensating 
preferences on British side"(60). 
Now in 1907, it believed that "alm6st unconsciously the feeling 
has grown that some sort of preference should be given". It must be, 
however, a preference not at the expense of the Australian manufactur-
er. 
"A very sharp line of difference has developed as to the 
method of preference. It is a gift; it has to come from 
somewhere. The National Party proposes to take it from 
the foreigner, and give it to Britain. The Free-trade, 
anti-Australian, anti-Socialist party proposes to take from 
Australia and give it to Britain The first duty of 
Australia to itself and to the race from which it sprang 
is to bring Australia to the highest pitch of industrial 
and civic development"(61). 
The objective of the Free Trade Party was, in fact, 
to obtain the maximum possible reduction of the tariffs. Reid conceded 
that Australia had decided on a protectionist tariff and consequently 
he did not intend factiously opposing the passing of the Bill (62). 
There was, however, a point of attack in the preference provisions. 
"The tariff contains a sham preference to Britain" said Fuller (63), 
"There is no serious intention on the part of the government"to 
offer preference. Cook argued (64). "The preference proposals are,,,, 
so much humbug" said Wilks (65). And the Australasian Pastoralists 
(59) C.P.D., Vol.XXXVIII, p.2336 
(60) Bulletin 13/6/1903 
(61) Bulletin 
(62) C.P.D., Vol.XXXVIII, p,2124 ff 
(63) Ibid p,2337 
(64) Ibid p,2475 
(65) Ibid p,2669 
i 1 
Review also joined issue denouncing the preferences as a joke and 
arguing now that the new high tariff would force retaliating 
measures by France and Germany (66). In the Reid admission of the 
dominance of protection, however, was the clear explanation of why 
such criticism had to fall largely on deaf ears. 
Between 1908 and 1914 preference did not again 
become a major issue. The Labour Party did not list preference as 
a plank of their election platform in 1910 and were criticised by 
Deakinfor this omission (67). But both because imperial preference 
was not of the same moment to Labour as to Deakin and because there 
was no possibility of opening the door to mutual preference while 
the British Liberals held office, the issue did not become an 
important political one. At the 1911 Imperial Conference, Labour 
did not attempt to raise again the question of reciprocal trade. 
It did propose a resolution "that efforts in favour of British 
manufactured goods and British shipping should be supported as far 
as possible"(68), which was replaced by a Canadian motion recommending^ 
that a Royal Commission be established to investigate the natural 
resources and trade of the Empire. This was unanimously supported 
after the Secretary of State for Colonies had moved an amendment 
empowering the Commission to suggest how inter-Imperial trade could 
be improved "consistent with the existing fiscal policy of each 
part"(69). 
However, though preference did not become a major 
political or public issue between 1908 and 1914, Australia did 
continue to extend its preferences to Britain, and to modify its 
schedules on the basis of experience, the new schedule of December, 
1914 extending very materially the operation of the preferential 
rate. Before 1914 about half of the imports and about 60 per cent 
of imports from the United Kingdom were affected by the preferential 
tariff. Under the 1914 tariff treaty 73^ of all imports and 80^ 
of imports of United Kingdom origin were affected(70). 
"(66) Australasian Pastoralists Review 16/9/1907 
(57) '~' 
(68) Cd 5745, p.11 
(69) Ibid p.340 ff 
(70) Commonwealth Year Book, No.9, p.582 
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To 1914, the Commonwealth statistician sought to 
determine the consequence for Australian-British trade relations 
of the prefernntial tariffs. There was a basis for comparison to this 
stage in that two major classes of goods, "Apparel and Textiles", and 
"Machinery and the Manufactures of Metals", were in part covered by 
preferential tariffs and in part were not. After 1914, preferential 
treatment was extended to cover practically all goods in these 
classes, so v^aaMni^ the basis of comparison. In relation to both 
these fields it was found that the percentage of United Kingdom 
trade, though remaining constant after 1907, was equally maintained 
in both the preferential and non-preferential group. In regard to 
the import of metals and the manufactures of metals which the 
statistician regarded as affording "the most satisfactory data 
available by which to measure the effects of preference", it was 
found that 
"the influences responsible for the fluctuations in the distribut-
ion of the trade have been common to both preferential and non-
preferential divisions, preferential tariff having had no 
differential effect in this important branch of trade"(71), 
Perhaps, then, Australian preferences were of no 
immediate material benefit to the mother country. Yet the sentiment 
which actuated their introduction and their potential importance 
is not to be lightly dismissed. They brought Australia into line 
with New Zealand, South Africa and Canada, all of whom offered 
preferential tariff rates (72), and in this way helped pave the 
way for the introduction of mutual preference in the post-war period. 
More significant, perhaps, was their symbolic value, an indication 
of a positive willingness to seek a method of reconciling national 
and economic self-interest with Empire membership. And,perhaps, 
most revealing was the evidence of the debates on both mutual 
preference and unilateral preference that the Australian economy 
had discarded many of the remnants of its colonial character. 
(71) Commonwealth Year Book, No,7, p,559 
(72) For details see Ibid p,563 ff. Australia and South Africa also 
established mutual preferential arrangements in 1906. For 
details see ibid p,567 
i^ 
The extreme free trader who thought of the cities as commercial 
entrepots for a colonial hinterland was a small minority. He did 
not command the support of the growing industries of butter, wheat 
and meat, nor apparently, of the body of pastoralists. Though the 
Au3trala3ian_P.astoralists Review could not support tariffs of the 
height of the 1907-8 tariffs, it did support the growth of Australian 
manufacture, commending the Australian Natives' Association on its 
1905-6 campaign to sell Australian manufactured goods(73). 
Clearly the free trade party was in a state of 
disintegration, lacking a coherent national policy. This can be 
illustrated most clearly in their attitudes to defence and immigration. 
On the other hand, the Deakin protectionists, reinforced by the 
majority of political Labour, were able to argue, with differences 
of emphasis, a policy which reflected the majority belief in the 
the 
national need for growth of secondary industry and/growth and 
diversification of primary industry, while still offering some 
concession within the Empire. These developments were underwritten 
by the pattern of Australia's trade and finance. 
II. 
In the first decades of the twentieth century, 
British exports should have had a favourable market within Australia. 
Not only had virtually all Australian trade been conducted with or 
through Britain until 1883 (74), thus establishing extensive 
business associations between the two countries and Australian 
familiarity with British Business practice, but to 1913 at least 
it appeared the sentiment of the majority of large Australian 
importers favoured buying British, other things being equal. Of the 
twenty-seven important business and government representatives who 
gave evidence before the Dominions Royal Commission on Empire trade 
on the question of Australian attitudes to British manufactures. 
(73) Australasian Pastoralists Review 15/3/1906 
(74) Coghlan :"The Seven Colonies of Aus t r a l a s i a (1901-2 ) ,p . l 054 
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twenty-five made this point directly or indirectly (75). Yet,although 
the total value of British exports to Australia increased between 
1886 and 1914-15, the percentage of imports from the United Kingdom 
to the total Australian imports declined significantly. 
It is necessary to make the comparison on the basis 
of the principal direct imports from the United Kingdom, since, before 
1905, imports were recorded against the country from which they were 
directly imported and not in terms of country of origin. Of the 
principal direct imports, the United Kingdom's share declined between 
1886 and 1914-E,from 89,31^ to 69,89?^ , The value of these imports 
from the United Kingdom increased from £20,489,513 in 1886 to 
£30,826,905 in 1914-15 or by 50.45^ while the total value of similar 
imports increased from £22,937,818 to £44,104,547 or by 92.23;^.(76) 
This relatively rapid decline in Britain's position in Australian 
trade was due to two major external causes and one emanating from 
within Australia. The two external causes were the search for 
overseas markets by continental countfies,particularly Germany, and 
in certain fields, the United States, and the unwillingness or 
inability of British industry to adapt itself to the demands of the 
new f[orld. The major internal cause was the growth and diversification 
of Australian exports and the increasing tendency for Australia to 
ship directly to the importing countries instead of distributing 
her trade through London. Between 1894-5 and 1909-13, the percentage 
of exports shipped to the United Kingdom declined from 66,82^ to 
45.14^ (77). The decline in Australia's export trade with the 
United Kingdom meant that sfee had to buy less from te«r. "If we sell 
to a country",said Knibbs, "we must indirectly buy from that 
country"(78). Despite the preponderance of Australian tradition and 
(75) Cd 7171, p.251 ff 
(76) Commonwealth Year Book, No.9, p.578 
(77) Ibid p.557 
(78) Cd 7121p.283 
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of sentiment in favour of buying British then, the relative decline 
in Britain's world industrial position brought about some loosening 
of the economic bonds between the two countries. In itself this 
development was not in the least likely to je6pard33B Australia's 
Empire membership, not only because the United Kingdom continued to 
be Australia's ma^or market but also because, in the absence of a 
satisfactory system of mutual preference, an essential corollary to 
Australia's national growth and as such was likely to help keep 
Australia content within the Empire. Nonetheless it was evidence of 
decreasing dependence on Britain and, if Burton's criteria are 
« 
acceptable economically, of "growing maturity" and of a "decline 
in the colonial character of the Australian economy (79). Almost 
unwittingly, Australia's nationalist aspirations were being economic-
ally underwritten by developments in Europe and the United States 
by the growth of Australia's own economy . 
While the decline in the percentage of British 
Imports in the total Australian imports was deplored by the 
representatives of Australian business and governments who gave 
evidence before the Dominions Royal Commission, they made it clear 
that Australian sentiment in favour of British goods did not extend 
to the level of paying higher prices or accepting unsuitable articles. 
Partly, perhaps, this was the consequence of the expansion of AuslmJ-
ian wholesale and retail houses. Hitchman, an importer and the 
president of the Sydney Chamber of Manufacturers, pointed out that 
modern business was depersonalised and that irrespective of the 
individual altitude of senior executives, buyers had to buy on the 
cheapest and most appropriate market(80). More generally, however, 
the witnesses laid the blame squarely at the feet of the British 
manufacturer, 
(79) Burton H. : "The Growth of the Australian Economy (Grattan(edit): 
Australia p.167) 
(80) Cd7171 p.251 ff 
^x 
It was a formidable range of businesses and governments 
which expressed dissatisfaction, inclmding imprters of drapery such 
as T.C.Beirne of Brisbane, Alfred Shaw and Coy., the largest 
igiporters of agricultural implements in Queensland, Perry Bros., 
large scale hardware importers of New South Wales, and major 
importers of machinery and motor cars, Dalgety and Company, and 
Davies and Fehon Motors Ltd., the Australian agents for Ford (81). 
In addition government representatives such as Johnson, the New 
South Wales Chief Commissioner for Railways and Tramways, Trefle*", 
New South Wales Minister for Lands and Agriculture, and Simpson, 
Controller of the Government Stores in Perth complained of the 
cavalier treatment by British manufacturers of Australian orders 
for steel rails and machinery, demonstrated that British manufacturers 
were largely ignoring buyers' specifications, and pointed out that 
(82) 
British goods were being priced out of the market despite preference. 
As the evidence accumulated it built up a picture 
of British industry, unwilling or unable, to adapt itself to 
Australian needs. It was telling evidence, coming as it did in 1913, 
since both the British Board of Trade and the Manufacturers' Associat-
ion of Great Britain had been disturbed by the loss of Australian 
trade and had taken steps to halt the decline. In 1905 R.S.Jaffray 
had been sent to Australia by the British Board of Trade to investigate 
and report on trade prospects. In 1908 B.H.Morgan, the representative 
of. the Manufacturers' Association of Great Britain arrived. 
In December,1908 a permanent Commissioner of the 
British Board eg Trade was appointed to Australia for the purpose 
of advising British manufacturers of the requirements of the Austral-
ian market in an effort to improve trade between the Commonwealth 
and the United Kingdom. 
(81) Ibid 
(82) Ibid 
^3 
Jaffray in his report made basically the same 
criticisms of British manufacturers and exporters as the Australian 
critics. He stated that the increase in the success of foreign 
manufactures in the Australian market was due to "i.greater promptit-
ude and attention to orders; ii. greater readiness to adapt their 
goods to requirements of customers; ill.more efficient representation 
in Australia; iv.better package of goods; v.more attractive appear-
ance of goods; vi.lower freights."(83) And Morgan considered 
"that the most important reason for the growth of foreign trade 
in Australia is that the foreign manufacturer is able to quote 
lower prices than the British manufacturer for goods of equal 
value". 
He thought this was due, first, to the protection afforded manufact-
urers of foreign countries in their home markets which he believed 
assured them the definite domestic parkets that allowed large scale 
cheaper production, and secondly to the development of direct 
shipping services with foreign countries who "carry goods generally 
at lower rates than British shipping companies carry British 
goods"(84). 
The appointment of Wickes, as first British Trade 
Commissioner in Australia did result in more intensive efforts to 
increase the Australian imports from the United Kingdom. He induced 
the British manufacturers to expand their representation in Australia 
and in 1911 he formed the Australian Association of British 
Manufacturers and their Representatives, an organisation whose aim 
was "to advance the mutual interest of such manufacturers and the 
trade of Great Britain with Australia"(85). He tried also, to 
encourage the British manufacturers to co-operate more closely for 
"the more economical distribution of their manufactures", to offset 
the higher British freight rates (86). In the opinion of H.Johnson, 
(83) Commonwealth Year Book, No,6, p.623 
(8a) Ibid 
(85) Cd 7171 p.230 
(86) Commonwealth Year Book, No,6, p.624 
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a representative of the Australian Association of British Manufact-
urers, the appointment of a Trade Commissioner did greatly benefit 
Australian-British trade (87). Oakley, who represented the Depart-
ment of Trade and Customs before the Dominions' Royal Commission, 
also believed that this appointment had assisted British exports to 
Australia (88). By 1913, however, there still existed a weight of 
influential, interested opinion critical of the British manufacturer 
and extolling the virtue of German and United States industry. 
In long r^nge terms the broad significance of these 
criticisms for the future of the Empire and the Commonwealth was 
the way the Empire's perimeter was already reflecting something of 
the consequences for the Empire of the challenge to British industrial 
supremacy by Germany and the United States. It was not the type of 
challenge which endangered Empire attachment but when combined with 
the growth of the dominion economies, it did indicate the very 
gradual redressing of the balance of the old Empire, by an equally 
gradual increasing economic autonomy and importance of the self-
governing dominions, both within the Empire and within the world. 
Despite the preponderance of primary producing interest in British 
markets and despite the sentimental willingness of Importers to buy 
British and of preferentialists to buy British second to Australian, 
Australia was in fact being caught up increasingly in an extending 
mesh of direct trade relations which were helping force it beyond 
colonial status. 
The multiplication of Australia's direct trade 
relations was Inevitably paralleled in the decline in Britain's 
monopoly of the shipping of Australian trade. The challenge became 
marked from 1883. In that year the French established direct commercial 
relations with Australia, the ships of the subsidised line Messageries 
Maritimes making their appearance in Australian waters. In 1887 the 
vessels of the Nord Deutscher Lloyd Company of Bremen commenced 
(87) Cd 7171 p.280 
(88) Ibid p.270 ff 
^r. 
trading and in 1888 a line of German cargo boats opened up direct 
contact between the wool exporting cities of Sydney, Melbourne and 
Adelaide and the ports of Antwerp, Hamburg and Dunkirk. Belgium 
established a line of steamships, the Nippon Yussen Kaisha Steamers 
began running regularly between Japanese ports and Sydney, and a 
line of steamers began regular runs between San Franoisco and 
Sydney (89). Until the war British shipping continued to occupy 
the predominant position in the carrying of Australian trade, about 
75^ of the tonnage entering and clearing Commonwealth ports still 
being British in 1912. At the same time, however, the percentage 
of foreign tonnage increased between 1881 and 1914 from about 6% 
(90) 
to 25^. This increase, noted the Commonwealth Year Book, was 
"the corollary of the extension of the trade of the Commonwealth 
with foreign countries. This is particularly patent in regard to 
Germany and France. Both of these countries desire to increase 
their mercantile marine, and it is therefore natural that the 
increased direct trade between themselves and Australia should 
be carried by their own vessels rather than by the vessels of 
a third country"($1). 
The growth of foreign shipping in Australian waters 
was not welcomed by either the Deakin governments e* the Labour 
Party. Partly on grounds of sentiment, partly to encourage the 
development of Australian shipping, partly because of Labour's 
interest in protecting Australian seamen against cheap Asiatic and 
Indian labour, and partly because of the fear of potentially hostile 
shipping in -Australian waters, the Deakin governments and the Fisher 
ministry sought to obtain the agreement of the self-governing section 
of the Empire to a policy of encouragement to British shipping manned 
by British seamen. 
In the 1906 tariff proposals, provision was made 
for a 5% preference to British manufactures providing the goods were 
brought to Australia in British ships manned by white , British 
(89) Coghlan : "the Seven Colonies of Australasia 1901-2", p.1060 
(90) Coghlan : Op. cit p.729; Commonwealth Year Book,No.7, p.579 
(91) Ibid 
ft 
seamen. The white labour clause had been forced on the Deakin ministry 
by Labour (92) but the requirement relating to British shipping 
Deakin stated, "was intoduced in good faith, and was an intentional 
limitation.,., because it appears to us another form of preference 
affecting British trade and fostering British shipping"(93). Assent 
was withheld because the clause relating to British shipping conflicted 
with certain United Kingdom treaties. 
Again at the 1911 Imperial Conference, the Australian 
Labour government proposed a motion favouring British shipping. The 
motion was generally worded but Pearce made the government's motivaticn 
clear. 
"Round the coast of -Australia there are several very powerful 
subsidised lines of foreign steamers - some of them heavily 
subsidised - and, moreover, they are vessels that are under 
an agreement with these foreign governments to be placed at 
their disposal in the time of war; some of them,...being manned 
by trained naval reserve men, and the Government of the 
Commonwealth have thought it their duty, in the interests not 
only of the Commonwealth but of the Empire generally, to 
endeavour to assist British shipping in their competition with 
this subsidised foreign shipping"(94). 
Australia could not assist British shipping by exempting it from 
the provisions of Australia's mercantile law, Pearce continued, 
sine this would give British shipping an unfair advantage over 
Australian shipping. Britain might care to subsidise its shipping 
compatably with the subsidy received by foreign lines but this was 
a matter for the British government. The suggestion which the 
Australian government did wish to press was that, since treaties 
with foreign countries were the obstacle to royal assent for dominion 
legislation favouring British shipping, Britain should denounce those 
treaties which stood in the way. Secondly, reviving the question of 
Lascar labour on British ships, the Australian representatives argued 
that in regard to preferential trade Australia's view that only white 
labour be employed, should be accepted by the British government(95), 
(92) Colonial Conference, 1907, Minutes of Proceedings, p.260 
(93) Ibid 
(94) Cd 5745, p.135 
(95) Ibid pp 135-6 
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But these Australian efforts to increase British 
shipping in Australian waters, as well as to write incidentally into 
the legidlation Labour's social and racial aspirations, failed. 
Buxton, President of the Board of Trade, "cordially agreed"that, as 
far as possible, the British mercantile marine should be manned by 
British crews,and he pointed out that the 1906 Merchant Shipping Act 
had resulted in an increased percentage of British subjects in this 
service. But he "was not touching on what their colour should be"(96). 
The Australian proposal suggesting the denunciation of treaties, had 
to be rejected totally. 
"Out of the 285,000,000 tons of British shipping all the world 
over, no less than 164,000,000 tons goes to foreign ports, and 
a comparatively small proportion goBs to Australian ports, and 
therefore for the advantage, and no doubt the considerable 
advantage, of the trade of the Commonwealth, we do not think 
it would be worth while to risk the possibility of disadvantage 
accruing to the very enormous trade which we have with other 
Poeers"(97). 
Australian support for mutual preference, the 
worried interest of both Labour and Protectionist governments in 
maximising British shipping in Australian waters, and the sentimental 
inclination of major Australian importers to "buy British" if British 
industry would produce reasonably competitive goods, were all ample 
testimony of the interest of dominant, relevant Australian opinion 
in reinforcing and extending Australian-British economic relations. 
The British rejection of mutual preference, the failure of the 
shipping proposals and the decline in British-Australian trade were 
equally ample testimony that Australia's relations with Britain in 
a world context were changing measurably, modifiying the colonial 
character of the Australian economy of the 1880's. This was equally 
observable in Australian-British financial relations. 
(96) Ibid p.137 
(97) Ibid 
ff 
III. 
From being one of the major centres of British 
overseas investment in the 1880's, Australia in the first decade and 
a half of the twentieth century ceased to occupy a significant place 
amongst the borrowers of new capital. 
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(98) H a l l A.R. "The London Capital Market and the Flow of Capital 
to Australia, 1870-1914".(Unpublished thesis, 1951, 
University of London). p.136 
^ ^ , 
Moreover, not only did Australia cease to be a 
significant borrower of English capital over this period, but it 
appears possible that a considerable proportion of the English 
capital privately invested in Australia to 1890 was withdrawn between 
1891 and 1914. It is impossible to estimate precisely the amount of 
capital withdrawn since the statistics of private investment and 
the movements of private investment are not available. The contempor-
ary experts were not in agreement. R.L. Nash, financial editor of 
the Telegraph and editor of the Australasian Joint Stock Company 
Year Book, calculated that between 1902 and 1912 there was a with-
drawal of seventeen million pounds in the total amount of British 
capital invested in Australia, a decline from £387,000,000 to 
£370,000,000. Since Government public debts floated in London 
over this period had increased from £181,500,000 to £193,800,000 
this decrease meant a decline of £30,000,000 in ten years of privately 
invested British capital in Australia. Knibbs, the Commonwealth 
Statistician, was unable to agree with these statistics. Arguing 
from the movement of trade, he could not see how more than £5,000,000 
could have been withdrawn. Knibbs did state, however, that there 
were so many unknowns in relation to private investment that it was 
impossible to obtain a precise figure of the amount of British 
capital withdrawn (99). 
A.R. Hall has made the most recent analysis of the 
flow of British capital to Australia over this period (100). He does 
not provide statistics of private British withdrawals, such figures 
being largely unavailable. He does describe, however, the pattern of 
British investment in Australia and since Hall's work opens new 
territory and since his study is not yet published , it seems both 
necessary and advisable to summarise his analysis. 
(99) Cd 7171 pp.292-299 
(100) Hall A.R. : Op cit 
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British investment in Australia between 1870 and 
1914, Hall illustrates, falls into two periods roughly divided by 
1890 . The first period, of rising and heavy investment, reached 
its peak in the middle eighties when Australia probably became the 
leading outlet for British funds. The second period saw a number 
of years when there was net dis-investment and, even when investment 
took place, it was not on a comparable scale with the 1880's. This 
contrast was partly concealed by the gold boom of the 1890's in 
Western Australia. More specifically. Hall has traced the pattern 
of British investment in Australia from 1890 in the following manner. 
1891 witnessed the first substantial rebuff of new Australian issues 
Including Government loans by th e London market. They remained 
unpopular in 1392, and in 1893 the Australian bank crash occurred. 
Even so Government issues made a surprisingly good recovery from 
1893 to 1895. The quotations were maintained in 1896, falling in 
1897, not because of any developments in Australia, but because a 
general improvement in interest rates offered by private companies 
outside Australia meant a loss of interest in Government securities. 
1899 and 1900 were expensive borrowing years as a result of British 
expenditure on the Boer War. 1901 was a good year for Australian 
Government loans partly because the Colonial Stock Act of 1900 made 
colonial securities available to trustees as investments. 
Government loans excluded, British investment in 
Australia in the late 1880's maintained a surprisingly high figure 
largely because of the discoveries of the Coolgardie-Kalgoorlie 
fields in 1892-3, the effects of which became very pronounced in 
the British Stock Exchange in 1894. Investment in these new 
companies and in the companies which sprang up in West Australia to 
meet other demands of the population influx - electricity companies, 
land mortgage companies and coalmines in particular - account for 
most of the new investment over this period. Little money was 
/(7/. 
invested in companies in Eastern Australia which were still suspect. 
The second half of 1902 saw the bottom of the 
trough in British investment in Australia. This was partly due to 
the scandals associated with the West Australia mining companies 
which had been established mainly by British speculators in London. 
1903 to 1907 was the period of Australian unpopularity in England 
as an investment market. Gradually popularity was regained and in 
1909 substantial issues of new capital were made to Australia. 
1910 to 1911 saw a decline once again in British investment but 
from 1912 to 1914 there were once more substantial borrowings though 
they were not comparable with the new issues to Canada and South 
America. 
The initial hardening of the British market against 
Australian investments appeared to be caused by the excessive specul-
ation of the 1880's, by the British investors' suspicion of the 
"socialist"policie3 of the colonial governments, and by the increasing 
power of organised labour in Australia. The influential -Lnvestors' 
Review ran a series of articles in 1893 attacking "Spendthrift New 
South Wales", "Gold Bewitched Victoria" and "Braggart Queensland". 
Typical of its polemics was the statement 
"Anything more nauseous than the bulk of the effusions of the 
Australian press, anything more criminal than the lying of the 
Australian politicians, in power and out, about the existing 
state of affairs, we have never beheld. But they have an excuse 
in the ready gullibility of capitalists here. All of them 
together are engaged, morning, noon and night, in sustaining 
a monstrous sham by might and main"(101). 
And there was constant criticism, in British financial journals of 
the Australian governments "foolish pandering to the working classes" 
(102) 
by using loan money for public works to offset seasonal unemployment. 
These .criticisms carried over into the Commonwealth period. In 1903, 
the Investors' Monthly Manual wrote that: 
(101) Quoted in Hall A.R. : Op cit p.252 
(102) Ibid 
/C72.. 
"The belief has spread among investors here that the colonies 
are too largely dependent on borrowed money and that the 
governments concerned are unfortunately greatly under the 
domination of labour parties whose policy is to spend lavishly 
and make work"(103). 
The Economist quoted its Melbourne correspondent as reporting that 
"the increased strength of the Laboujj Party constitutes a menace 
to the public credit....there is reason to fear that the extreme 
wing of the Labour Party might advocate partial or complete 
repudiation"(104), 
And Butterwctth, a solicitor, stated at the Royal Colonial Institute, 
that he always advised his clients 
"who have trust funds to invest,.,that in my opinion the danger 
is the Australian working man - the Australian democracy - and 
the action of Australian governments and the trend of Australian 
legislation"(105). 
It was the Economises opinion in 1902, an opinion which it did not 
substantially alter until late in the decade, that 
"It would be an act of sound policy, as well as of kindness to 
the Australian people, to absolutely refuse to lend them for 
the present. Nothing could better promote the laudable aim of 
throwing Australia upon its resources"(106). 
To 1905-6 Australia accepted these grounds of 
criticism as the reason why Australian stocks stood low on the 
London exchange. To a minority, intensely anti-Labour and dubious 
about social reform, they were not entirely unpalatable criticisms. 
The Patriotic League of Queensland was formed in 1891, opposed to 
socialism and with one of its objectives, the regaining of British 
investor confidence (107). In South Australia, the Hon.J.Baker, 
ft 
founded the National Defence League, early in 1891, "in correspondence 
with the National Associations of yictoria and New South Wales and 
the Patriotic League of Queensland. The object of the National Defence' 
(103) Investors' Monthly Manual,1903,p.506. Quoted in A.Hall : Op cit 
p,267 
(104) Economist, 1903, p.688 
(105) Procs, Royal Colonial Institute, 1905-6, p,24 
(106) Economist, 1902, p,567. Quoted in A,Hall : Op cit p,270 
(107) Brisbane Courier 
I am indebted to Mr, A. Morrison for drawing my attention to 
this reference. 
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League was to combat 
"experimental legislation ..,, to prevent all undue class 
influences in Parliament, and to promote in all ways agreement, 
security, and general confidence, so that the public credit 
may be maintained, the producing interests protected, the 
investment of capital encouraged, and a continuance of employment 
provided, thus ensuring that all interests may share in the 
common prosperity" (108). 
The growing power of organised labour and the extension of social 
remedial legislation, however, made it clear that these groups did 
not express the pulse of majority Australian sentiment. 
Yet in relation to the susceptibilities of the 
British investor, many, including some of the more radical national-
ists, felt the need to tread warily. The Queensland Government was 
smartly pulled into line in 1891. It had accused the Bank of England 
of being responsible for the failure of the Queensland loan floated 
that year. The threat of the Bank to float no further Queensland 
loans forced the government to retract its charge(109). In 1893, 
Hall states, the Colonial Treasurers agreed to abandon the policy 
of using loan money for public relief works. 
"The investing public apparently accepted the protestations of 
the Colonial Treasurers that such policies would not be pursued, 
and the new issues and conversions of the last quarter of the 
year were reasonably successful, surprisingly so in the 
circumstances"(110). 
Reference has loeen made to Martin's analysis of the interest of 
commercial,land and banking groups in federation as a method of 
re-establishing British investor confidence, and the extensive 
range of such organisations intent on retaining the maximum right 
of appeal to the Privy Council so as not to jeopardise further, 
Australian credit in Britain, has also been listed (111), Federal 
political iabour, too, displayed a sensitivity to the British 
investor. When it took office for a short period in 1904, Watson 
immediately issued a message 
"which he asked might be cabled to London. This was intended to 
reassure timorous persons there who might have been perturbed 
by the advent of the Labour Party. It stated that the Government 
would undertake no wild cat financing"(112). 
(108) Coghlan :"Labour and Industry in Australia",Vol.IV, p.1922 
(109) Clapham J.H.:"The Bank of England",Vol.II, p.400 
(110) Hall A. : Op cit p,253 
(111) See page ^ B 
(112) Smith A,N.:"Thirty Years, the Commonwealth of Australia 
1901-1931"(1933) p,86 
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The Bulletin, strongly opposed to the extent ofBritish economic 
interest in Australia, was constantly critical of the inadequate 
stand, in its opinion, being taken by political labour against this 
form of "sweating Australia". 
"Australia is overrun by English owned banks, fire insurance 
companies, land companies, mortgage companies, etc., and in 
N.S.W,, at all , the Labor Party has made no serious effort 
to shift any of them by an absentee tax or other legislation "(113)y 
The Australian reaction to British criticism was, 
in fact, by no means servile and in Parliament (114), in sections of 
the press (115), and in the rooms of the Royal Colonial Institute(116), 
it was argued, with varying degrees of acerbity, not only that 
Australia was a sound centre for investment but, also, that because 
of Australia's heavy interest bill, she was in fact subsidising 
British national policies such as defence. Certainly in the 
legislative record of the early years of the Commonwealth at least, 
there is no evidence that national policies of immigration restrict-
ion or social legislation were to be withheld, however distasteful 
they might be to the British investor. But withal, there was still 
some substance to 1905-6 in Jebb's remark that 
"The course of self-respect could not escape the pressure, subtle 
but unraistakeable, with which the mortgagee knows how to check 
the independence of his victim. A whisper from the City, and 
Australian patriots sorrowfully weigh the prospects of the 
investment loan or the intending conversion against the behests of 
the national conscience"(117). 
From about 1905-6, there is a noticeable change in 
the relationship in which Australia stbod to the British investor. 
There was a ring of independence in Sowden's claim that the low 
rates offered Australian securities were repulsing Australian loans 
from the London market and had led to 
"the prospect of Australians....securing better treatment in New 
(113) Bull&tln 19/7/1902 
(114) e.g. C.P.D.,1905, p.1565; p.2381. 
(115) Sydney Morning Herald 22/6/1902;South Australia Register 19/5/03 
(116) e.g. Procs. R.C.I., 1905-6, p.10 
(117) Jebb R, : "Studies in Colonial Nationalism" 
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York, I will not enlarge upon this many-sided subject, but will 
content myself with adding that the alternative mentioned, which 
would inevitably lead to a partial diversion of Australian 
business from London to America - for trade often follows the 
money lender - has been and is being seriously discussed in 
Australian parliaments"(118). 
More generally however, the note of independence was expressed in 
terms of Australia's increasing ability to finance its own develop-
ment. Bent, Premier of Victoria, stated in 1907, that Victoria was 
(119) 
borrowing only from within Australia, except for redemption purposes. 
Carruthers, ex-Premier of N.S.W., reported in 1908 that it was hoped 
to finance the extensive water and irrigation scheme of N.S.W. from 
within Australia (120), Griffith, Minister for Public Works in 
New South Wales in 1913, said that all money borrowed for railway 
development for the previous five years had been raised on the local 
market. The government was turning temporarily to London now because 
the recent boom had created a heavy private industry demand for 
local capital (121). The Fisher Labour ministry, in accordance with 
the decision of the 1905 Interstate Conference of the Political 
Labour Party to restrict public borrowing (122), repealed Deakin's 
Naval Loan Bill and determined to finance naval development from 
revenue. 
The immediate consequence of the recovery of 
Australian prosperity was to help re-establish British investor 
confidence in Australia. As early as November, 1906 French, General 
Manager of the Bank of N.S.W., reported that 
"Australia is much better regarded on the other side now than has 
been the case for some time past. They all know about that 
money held by the Australian banks in London and this, together 
with the repayment of several loans and the probable repayment 
of others, has led them to come to the conclusion that this is 
not the pauper country they believed it was"(123). 
(118) Procs. R.CI. 1905-6, p.17 
(119) Ibid 1906-7, p.337 
(120) Ibid 1907-8, p,319 
(121) Cd 7171, p.288ff 
(122) Sutcliffe J.T. "Trade Unionism in Australia"(1921) p.146 
(123) Sydney Morning Herald, 2/11/1906 
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From this time the ill-will tended to dwindle away except for a 
temporary new spasm of criticism in 1911 against the federal land 
tax of the Labour government (124). 
But the deeper and more permanent significance 
for Australian-British relations of the pattern of Australian -
British attitudes to British investment in Australia is not to be 
found in the malevolence or benevolence of expressed attitudes. 
It is to be found in the comparison between the prosperity of the 
late 1870's 1880's, which was financed by an almost fabulous 
invasion of British money, and the prosperity from 1906 when 
proportionately much less new capital was called for, and a substant-
ial proportion of the new capital required was able to be raised 
locally. In the 1880's virtually the whole of government loan 
money was raised in London. By 1913 when approximately 70^ of the 
London issued capital outstanding in Australia was in government 
loans, the proportion of the national debt floated in Australia 
had risen to 30.59^(125). Of the aggregate of loan and company 
(124) Ibid 29/11/1910 
(125) Hall A.R.rOp cit. p.200 
Public Debt in Australia. 
1904-13. 
Floated in London Floated in Aust. Total Public Debt. 
Date 
30th,June 
£000 
Amount 
% of 
Total 
Amount 
£000 
% of 
Total. Amount (£000) 
1904 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
188,165 
189,919 
190,887 
185,579 
183,321 
189,410 
191,972 
189,068 
192,191 
204,395 
82.62 
81.88 
80.06 
77.28 
75.18 
75.23 
74.52 
70.78 
69,35 
69,41 
39,582 
41,820 
47,541 
54,570 
60,514 
62,363 
65,651 
78,061 
84,933 
90,077 
17,38 
18.12 
19.94 
22.72 
24.82 
24.77 
25.48 
29,20 
30.65 
30,59 
227,748 
230,729 
238,428 
240,150 
243,835 
251,774 
257,624 
267,127 
277,124 
294,472 
lo 1 
capital in Australasia, Nash estimated that the percentage which was 
Australasian capital had increased between 1902-1912 from about 
to 43^ (126). Though there must be some reserve felt about Nash's 
figures. Hall's estimate appears to be valid. While Australia was 
still heavily dependent on overseas capital, then, there is no 
dispute, that after 1906 she was prosperous, more financially 
independent and more financially self-sufficient (127), Again if 
Burton's criteria are acceptable economically, in the field of 
finance as in the field of trade, Australia was "reaching toward 
maturity"(128), 
IV, 
Perhaps the most striking feature of Australian 
attitudes to Australian-British economic relations from 1900-1914 
is the weight of interested opinion which favoured closer economic 
relations than those which existed. In itself this was a striking 
illustration, not only of the belief in the economic value of the 
United Kingdom to Australia, but also of the substantial satisfaction 
of the body of Australian nationalists with the economic and social 
evolution of the self-governing section of the Empire. There was no 
influential political opinion, either Labour or non-Labour, which 
saw Australia as a colony being exploited by British economic interests,, 
despite the very significant amount of British capital invested in ' 
Australia. In the early years of the Commonwealth, the Bulletin 
sporadically made this accusation but even then it did not address its 
(126) Cd 7171, p,305. Nash found it impossible to separate New Zealand 
from Australian capital since so many businesses operated in 
both countries. Note that Knibbs questioned these figures. 
(127) Ibid p.293. These statements were made by Vincent, Chairman of 
the Dominions Royal Commission on Trade. 
(128) Burton : Op cit p,167 
lo^ 
complaint against Britain. The cure,it believed,was in the Labour 
Party's own hands. It is significant that at the very time when the 
left wing in Britain was marshalling for its attack on economic 
imperialism, spearheaded by Hohson's brilliant study, the majority 
of Australian political Labour were not opposed to an Bmpire policy 
of mutual preference which, the Australian free trader did not hesitate 
to point out, was designed to return the Tory Imperialists to power 
in Britain. But with growing Australian prosperity, with econoi^ iic 
protection assured, and with the growing promise of political office, 
political labour in Australia was not concerned with doctrinaire 
political theory. It wrote left-wing anti-imperialism back into its 
platform only under the tension of war and the conscription conflict. 
It is idle to speculate on the possible consequences 
for Empire evolution had the campaign for mutual preference been 
successful. Pyrah, who is sympathetic to the British Liberals, appears 
to think that the British government might have been mistaken in 
1907 in arguing that "a free-trade policy still served British 
interests best"(129). On the other hand, it is difficult to see 
what type of "substantial concession", despite the expressed opinions 
in favour of mutual preference, Deakin could have forced through an 
Australian parliament intent as the 1907 Australian parliament was 
on providing more than adequate protection for Australian industry. 
Between the ideal of closer Empire organisation 
and the reality, fell the fact that 
"from whatever angle we view the trend of dominion development, 
we see that it was tending towards effective national independence,' 
According to the logic of sovereignty and the teaching of the 
imperial federationists, this meant - failing the one appropriate 
remedy - imperial disintegration. But, in practice, common sense 
seemed to be finding a middle way between dependence and 
disruption"(130), 
(129) Pyrah G.B. :"Imperial Policy and South Africa,1902-10", p.21 
(130) Hancock W.K, :"Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs", 
Vol.1, p.44 
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III. IM^aGEATION. 
Australia's restrictive and positive immigration 
policies from 1901-1914 were both inextricably interwoven into 
Australia's Empire membership. This was clearly so in relation to 
Asiatic and Indian Immigration restriction touching as it did 
Britain's Far Eastern interests and policies as well as indicating 
the development of a nationalist Australian ideal of racial homogeneity 
which conflicted with British responsibilities at the hub of a 
multi-racial Empire. But the extent of the Empire ramifications of 
Australia's immigration policies went considerably beyond this. In 
arguing for racial homogeneity, the weight of Australian opinion, fa? 
all that its motivation was due to an awareness of separate national-
ity, was also conscious of Australia as an Anglo-Saxpn outpost in 
an Asian world and saw a White Australia as "preserving the British 
character in an Important and loyal part of this Empire"(1). Its 
positive immigration policies were designed, without question, to 
retain the essentially British character of the Australian population. 
In Australia's attitudes to immigration, then, as in the questions 
of trade and finance, a middle road was being sought between 
independent nationalism and Empire membership. 
r. 
It appears that by 1901 Australian opinion was 
substantially unanimous in its determination that Australia should 
remain white. Within Parliament a very small section, consisting of 
Bruce Smith and Cameron in the House and fulsford in the Senate, 
continued to oppose the policy and A.N.Smith asserts that these 
views were representative of "some of the m.ore fashionable suburbs 
of Sydney"(2). A rather larger group were prepared to do battle on 
(1) Wlllard J.M.:"Hlstory of the White Australia Policy"(Melbourne 
University Press,1923) p.206 
(2) Smith A.N.: "Thirty Years - The Commonwealth of Australia, 1900-1S5L"' 
(1933) p.58 
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the more limited question of Kanaka labour. The sugar interests 
fought the Pacific Island Labourers' Act of 1901 and the successful 
attempt by the Labour Party to write into the Inmiigration Restriction 
Act a clause preventing the importing of labour under contract. 
They were supported by the Brisbane Courier and by the Queensland 
Government which fruitlessly sought a royal commission into tropical 
agriculture, complaining that the legislation was "unnecessarily 
hasty"(3). The Australasian Insurance and Banking Record continued 
to criticise the 
"strenuous efforts of a semi-aespotic character.... 
being made to keep coloured people,out of Australia, although 
they alone are adapted by nature to develop the great resources 
of the tropical portion of the great island-continent"(4). 
And in the Royal Colonial Institute, men such as Hodgson, an 
ex-Colonial Secretary of Queensland and a large absentee land-ovmer, 
condemned White Australia as a "political cry" designed to "curry 
favour with the labour party, who, I am sorry to say, are so powerful 
in the Antipodes. I say ^ive us a piebald Queensland"(5). 
Neither on the question of Kanaka labour, however, 
and even less in relation to the general question of Asiatic 
immigration, was there any likelihood of preventing the exclusion 
legislation. Ian der Velde assessed the position when addressing the 
Victorian Chamber of Manufactures in 1901. 
"The Australian people have made up their mind to preserve this 
continent as a home for the white people. The determination is 
a strong one. It may take a little time but coloured people will 
disappear from Australia. I am afraid that whether vi/e like it or 
not, the Kanakas employed Dn the Queensland sugar plantations 
will be sent back to their islands and the traffic will cease 
regardless of miaterial consequences" (6) . 
Indicative of the insubstantial support for the attitude of the 
Smith bloc towards the Immigration Restriction Bill, was the fact 
that neither he nor Cameron attempted to argue that their view 
carried any considerable support. 
(3) Willard : Op cit pp 182-3 
(4) The Australasian Insurance and Banking Record Vol.XXVIII,1904,p.5 
(5) Procs. Royal Colonial Institute 1901-2,p.185 
(6) Van der Velde C.:"Kanaka Labour and the Goiniiionwealth Sugar Supply", 
'(Address to Victorian Ohamber of Manufaatures, 
18/4/1901. iViitchell Library.) 
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The strength of Australian belief in White Australia 
had, of course, been manifest for some decades, and in 1597 Chamberlain 
had assured the Colonial premiers that the British Government 
sympathised with the fears of the oolonies and would "not offer any 
opposition" to proposals designed to prevent a mass Influx of Asiatics. 
He asked, however, for co-operation to the extent that the legislation 
should be framed along the lines of the Natal Act which was considered 
to be the least offensive form in which it could be expressed (7). 
As well as the question of the probable efi'ectlveness of such legislat-
ion, the proolem which this request raised was whether or not such 
a concession to an imperial request was consonant with Australia's 
national dignity. The debate was a revealing indication of a range 
of Australian conceptions of the imperial connection and of the 
relationship in which the various political groupings stood towards 
the Empire. 
r 
The Bruce Smith attitude can virtually be excluded 
from the discussion. Advocating the "open door" to immigrants, he 
argued that since Australia was dependent on the British Government 
this policy would prevent any ambarassment to Britain in its dealings 
with Japan, China and India (8). But this was an attitude which the 
bulk of his own party expressly repudiated. Instead a section of the 
Free Trade Party argued that the Natal compromise was a hypocritical 
measure which should be replaced by an unambiguous statement of 
Asiatic and African exclusion. 
Such a stand by an important minority of the Free 
Trade Party appeared highly suspect to many. The Bulletin opposed 
to the Natal compromise in principle, nonetheless saw the Free Trade 
criticism as an effort to delay or defeat the legislation by 
translating it to a form which would not receive Imperial assent (9). 
(7) Report of 1897 Colonial Conference, p.14 
(8) Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates,1901-2, p.5153 ff 
(9) Bulletin 14/9/1901 
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Barton, Quick and other Protectionists claimed that it was a political 
tactic designed to defeat the government by wooing Labour support. 
At the same time, it is to be noted that the case as presented by 
McMillan, who led the opposition debate, wrung praise from men like 
O'Malley and was not inconsistent with the McMillan concept of 
Empire. Although in the tradition of the Manchester School, he had 
never been emptionally opposed to Empire membership but had merely 
accepted the inevitability of the eventual break away of the colonies, 
Conceding now that this need not happen, he still maintained the 
British Liberal view that 
"if it had not been for the slack hand, 
and the desire that the same self-government which Englishmen 
enjoy might be enjoyed by us within our own domain, if there 
had been any attempt to interfere with it, Australia might not 
to-day be united with the British Empire". 
From this premise, he argued that 
"we should tell the British 
Government that although we desire to cling to the British 
connection for all time we are not to be hampered by those 
conditions which arise out of our union with the Empire"(10). 
The speech was an interesting example of Australian Manchester 
School of thinking brought up to date. 
Political Labour,too, was opposed to the Natal 
compromise. Vtfatson moved an amendment expressly excluding "any 
aborii^ inal native of Asia, Africa or the islands thereof" and in 
the division on this amendment the full Labour strength of sixteen 
members supported it (11). However, in favouring the amendment. 
Labour speakers went to some pains to emphasise their loyalty to 
the Empire. The amendment, they argued, was simply a more effective 
method of assuring a White Australia than the language test since 
it was feared that the educated Asiatic would be able to gain 
admission under that clause. It was the conviation of the Labour 
speakers that the British Government would accept the unequivocal 
(12) 
exclusion of coloured races if, as Tudor put it, "we mean business". 
(10) Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 1901-2, p.4625 ff 
(11) Ibid p.5288 
(12) Ibid p.4831 
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In the attitude of the Labour Party, as well as in the attitude 
of strong nationalists such as Higgins, there was still that element 
of assertive nationalism which was resentful of any inference of 
Downing Street dictation. "Is the Federal Parliament to be still in 
leading strings as the different state parliaments werev"asked 
Higgins. "Are we to be hampered and told from another part of the 
(13) 
world what is best for us, and what are to be our interests?" But 
even with some Free Trade support, the Watson amendment failed in 
both the House and the Senate and eventually Labour supported the 
original government motion. 
The case of the executive was most ably put by 
Deakin. To him the compromise was " a perfectly reasonable request 
providing that it can be proved that the means suggested will prove 
effective". Convinced that this was so, Deakin went on to argue that 
particularly in view of the generosity of the British government 
ahd people in accepting the Federal Constitution, 
"we should ill begin our career by repudiating our incalculable 
obligations to the mother country. Until we are challenged 
by some act of the British Government which calls for resentment, 
it is in the highest degree unstatesmanlike and mischievous to 
set up such a bogie to obscure the issue"(14). 
The debate was an illuminating illustration, at 
the Ijery beginning of the Commonwealth period, of the willingness 
of the parliamentary majority to find a middle road between national-
ist demands and Empire responsibility. There was still a remnant 
of modified Manchester School thinkers, and there was still an 
assertive group of nationalists ultra-sensitive to any suggestion 
of dictation from the British Government. The effective view,however, 
was that provided it seemed certain that the White -Australia policy 
would be adequately enforced, Australia must act with a sense of 
responsibility to its imperial commitments. 
The passage of the Immigration Restriction Bill 
virtually concluded this problem of Australian-Imperial relations 
(la) Ibid p.4655 
(14) Ibid p.4816 
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which had created such bitterness in the late 1880's. Despite the 
Japanese opi^osition to the wording of the bill, a protest which 
Japan carried to Britain, the British Got^ernment refused to ask 
Australia to alter the Act (15). There were further problems for 
Australian-British relations generated by the efforts of Labour 
to extend the meaning of White Australia by attempting to write into 
legislation dealing with mail contracts, imperial preference and 
merchant shipping in Australian waters, provisions designed either 
to prevent Asiatic labour being employed on vessels engaged in 
these trades or to require a minimum set of wages and conditions for 
all seamen employed on such vessels. But these questions were not 
directly problems of iirimigration control. From the time of the 
passage of the Immigration Restriction Act there was no likelihood 
of the British Government again interfering with the right of the 
self-governing colonies to control the composition of their own 
population. 
But if the British Government were unlikely to 
intervene, this did not mean that British unofficial opinion was 
silenced and from 1902-1907, Australia's immigration restriction 
provisions were subjected to substantial criticism from the British 
(16) 
financial journals, and from conservative papers such as the Times . 
This criticism was directed not only against the anti-Asiatic 
legislation but also against the alleged Australian exclusiveness in 
regard to European immigrants. The criticism was a reminder that 
Australia was still a member of the British Empire and it was,also, 
an assertion that,at least, in the eyes of the "ascendancy" school 
of British conservatives, Australia was adopting undesirable colonial 
policies (17). Equally,however, it was evidence that Australia was 
(15) Willard : Op cit p.l24ff 
(16) Procs.Royal Colonial Institute,1905-6.;p.26; 
See Coghlan :"Labour and Industry in Australia",Vol,IV,p,307; 
Economist, 1902, p,162 
(17) The phrase was Jebb's. He used it to desribe the group of 
Conservatives who believed "a tight hand should be kept on the 
'colonies' if the Empire is to be saved". 
See Miller J.D.B.:"RiGhard Jebb and the Problem of Empire", 
(Athlone Press,1956]. 
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shaping its own national ideals and in the pursuit of these ideals 
it moved towards greater autonomy within the Empire structure. 
II. 
The complement of the Asiatic immigration restrict-
ion legislation was the Contract Labourers' Clause, included in the 
Imraigration Restriction Bill as a result of Labour pressure with 
the intention of preventing employers importing low wage manual 
labour. While the ideal of a White Australia commanded virtually 
unanimous national support, the Contract Labourers' Clause was 
subjected to much more extensive Australian criticism. Yet much 
of this criticism was directed against the rigidity of the rule 
and its application rather than against the principle implicit 
•within it. The belief that labour should share directly in the 
national wealth was obviously not an ideal peculiar to organised 
labour. It was a non-Labour government which introduced the 
"new protection" legislation designed to ensure that labour as well 
as capital should benefit directly from economic protection; it 
was Mr, Justice Higgins, an ex-Protectionist, although on its left 
flank, who delivered the famous Harvester Judgment defining a 
fair wage. NO±J was it left only to labour to argue the case against 
per^iitting the influx of low-wage workers. Hackett has al±?eady been 
quoted as defining this type of employee protection as a national 
aspiration, a view which Deakin supported. Similarly Sir John Cockburn^ 
in an article addressed to the English Celtics of Australian attitudes 
to immigration asked "what does it profit the nation that life has 
joy for the privileged few if the masses are not well-housed, fed 
and clad"(18). And Beale, Chairman of the Federal Council of 
Australian Manufactures from 1905 to 1913, 'iiiiuiiawi n.'d the Royal Colonial 
(18) Cockburn J.:"Imperialism and Labour in Australia", 
("The Empire and the Country", Murray,1905),p.458, 
Cockburn had been a Chairman of the Australian Chamber of 
Commerce in London; a director of the English, Scottish and 
Australian Bank etc. 
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Institute that he and his colleagues, not only admired "the determ-
ination, energy and courage that have been displayed (oy Australians) 
in order to do the work that they might have asked inferior races to 
do for them", but also insisted that "there is not that antagonism 
between employers and employed of which we have heard so much 
in the London newspapers"(19). It is sufficiently clear that 
although there were pronounced differences of emphasis in regard to 
the degree of protection which should be afforded the Australian 
worker against immigration competition, the weight of Australian 
opinion accepted that he should be given some protection. 
Not only was the egalitarian nationalism implicit 
in these views incomprehensible to the brand of British Conservative 
most opposed to Australia's immigration restriction laws, but it 
was equally incomprehensible to those British humanitarians like 
General Booth who saw emigration as a method of assisting Britain's 
unemployed, unskilled workers. By 1906, the Salvation Army had 
acquired a tract of land in Western Australia on which 300 people 
had been settled but further development. Booth objected, was being 
"hampered by the minimum wage question". An offer by Booth to the 
Australian Government in 1905 to arrange for 5,000 emigrant families 
to come to Australia was accepted but only_ with such provisos tnat 
the offer was withdrawn. It was not without bitterness that Booth 
observed in 1906 that 
"we do not expect to have an opportunity of 
sending emigrants to Australia at the moment. We are waiting 
until thev come to their senses and understand what their 
needs are" (20), 
But given the Australian national determination 
to maintain a "fair and reasonable" standard of living and the 
acceptance of eoonomic protection as a settled policy, there could 
be only one interpretation of Australia's immigration needs while 
the cities continued to have unemployed woricers (21). Increasingly 
(19) Procs. Royal Colonial Institute 1905-6, pp 131-2 
(20) Ibid p.153 
(21) e.g. Ibid - see exchange betv^ een Outhwaite (Victoria) and Booth, 
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from 1904, it was argued that Australia's great want was migrants 
for small land settlement and agricultural labourers to help populate 
Australia's sparsely occupied spaces (22). Even after 1909, when 
prosperity and expansion were resulting in mastercraftsmen agitating 
for skilled immigrants for city employment (23), the High Commission-
er's report stated that Australia's "greatest need externally is that 
sort of emigrant who will embark for her shores, not to add to our 
overgrown city population, but to reinforce the ranks of rural 
labour"(24). And as late as 1913 the representative of the Adelaide 
Chamber of Commerce laid before the Dominions' Royal Commission 
the Australian immigration equation which had become widely accepted. 
The industrial workers, he pointed out, were principally employed in 
industries artificially fostered by tariffs. The markets for the 
products of these industries were limited to the Commonwealth and 
the output was dependep.t on the spending power of the people. This 
rested on primary production so that the demand for labour, generally, 
was regulated by primary production, "We want useful and employed 
immigrants but we cannot maintain them without land settlement"(25). 
The idea of closer land settlement was as attractive 
to Australian liberals and Australian Labour in the early years of 
the Commonwealth as it had been to the democrats of the 1860's. 
Men such as Cockburn and papers like the Worker argued for the 
breaking up of large holdings and for immigration to settle the 
poorly populated country (26). But the queztion of land alienation 
and tenure continued to be politically explosive and closer settle-
ment difficult to implement. James, Agent-General for Western 
Australia tersely remarked in 1906 that that "the land legislation 
e. s 
(22) Australasian Pastoralists' Review 16/5/1904; 15/2/1905 
(23) e.g. Sydney Morning Herald 21/7/1910 
(24) Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers,1911, Vol.11. 
First Annual Report of High Commissioner of Australia in 
the United Kingdom, p.966-68. 
(25) Cd 7171, pp 67-8 
(26) The Worker 29/3/1906 
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proved to be the real immigration restriction act"(27). This was a 
correct appraisal given the Australian determination to protect its 
urban industries and its urban workers. And once again it reflected 
a widespread belief which differed basically from the attitude of 
the British critic of Australian development. ThoscBrltish journals 
and institutions most scathing about Australia's immigration 
restrictions were equally condemnatory of efforts to foster closer 
settlement by resumption and subdivision or by heavy land taxation. 
Cockburn's reaction to this criticism was not untypical of more 
moderate liberal Australian opinion. 
"It may be noted that, while critics impress on Australians the 
necessity of attracting population, they vehemently denounce 
measures for facilitating land settlement, which must form the 
basis for an increase of population. The resumption.... of portions 
of vast pastoral leases for permanent agricultural settlement 
has often been stigmatised as land robbery, and laws providing 
for the repurchase of large and sparsely peopled estates for 
closer settlement have been condemned by some enlightened and 
right-thinking English journals, and yet these measures were 
Indispensable means towards the simultaneously advocated ends"(28). 
(27) James W, :"Australlan Imiaigration", (Procs.Royal Colonial Institute 
1905-6), pp 227-55. 
m-The land question occupied, perhaps, the leading role in all state 
legislatures from 1901 to 1910. It lead to the "Great Land Scandals" 
in New South Wales from 1904 to 1906. In Queensland, it lead to a 
constitutional crisis. There in 1905 land legislation had been 
introduced directed at "taxing the squatter out of the land". It was 
thrown out by the Upper House. Then in 1907 the moderate Kidston 
government introduced a Factory Act to which was tacked a clause 
designed to prevent "sweating"of farm workers. It, also, was thrown 
out of the Council. Kidston's request to the governor to swamp 
the Council was refused and the government resigned, Therd was an 
outcry against the continued appointment of Governors by the Colonial 
Office which was supported by the governments of South Australia and 
V^ estern Australia . In Victoria there was dissatisfaction with the 
land legislation of Bent and he was overthrown. The Murray Ministry 
which replaced the Bent government, introduced in 1909 a more severe 
land tax. It was thrown out by the Upper House. Thsre were similar 
difficulties in the smaller states. 
(28) Cockburn : Op clt p.460 
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It was only when continued prosperity, accompanied by 
large scale state developmental projects, created an undeniable 
shortage of unskilled labourers and of skilled workers in certain 
industries that Australia'.s lm3:iiigration programme effectively got 
under way. But even theh the vision of filling the "empty spaces^ 
with yeoman farmers and the determination to protect the standard 
of living of the Australian worker were not jettisoned. These 
aspirations continued basic to the dominant Australian attitude 
t 
towards irmiiigration, evidence of the growth of a national conception 
anathema to a segment of British Conservative thought, but already 
firmly entrenched as an integral feature of the distinctive and 
prevailing Australian idealology. 
If th i s Vi/ere the negative side of Australian -
Bri t ish re la t ions about iim-nigration, the posi t ive aspect was the 
unquestioned Australian preference for the Bri t ish migrant, not only 
to r e t a i n the Anglo-Saxon character of the Australian population but 
also to preserve jealously for the British Empire the full strength 
of the British race. It was Deakin who moved at the 1907 Colonial 
Conference that British emigrants should be encouraged to proceed 
to British Colonies rather than foreign countries and that the 
"Imperial Government be requested to co-operate with any colonies 
desiring immigrants in assisting suitable persons to emigrate". 
Deakin explained the purpose of his plea as being that 
"for aLl our sakes the stream of emigration from the Mother 
Country ought to be directed as much'^ as possible towards some 
portion of the King's Dominions, and it ought not to be assisted 
in any way towards the Dominions of any other Power"(29). 
At the 1911 Imperial Conference, it was the Australian Labour- Prime 
Minister, Fisher, Vi;ho moved the resolution to re-affirm the decision 
of the 1907 Colonial Conference, and added to it a clause requesting 
the Secretary of State for Colonies to nominate representatives of 
(30) . 
the dominions to the Committee of the Emigrants' Information Office. 
(29) Colonial Conference 1907, Minutes of Proceedings, p.155 
(30) Minutes ^ f the Proceedings of the Imperial Conference,1911, 
Ccd 5745] p,198 
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Not only within the State and Federal Parliaments 
but, also, in the non-government organisations, which had been 
created to encourage immigration, the search was directed towards 
attracting the British. It was a formidable list of organisations 
which had been established by 1913 ranging from the British Immdgrat-
ion League and the Australian Iiranigration League through a group 
of miscellaneous organisations like the New South Wales Dreadnought 
Trustee Fund, instituted to use the money raised in Hew South Wales 
to buy a Dreadnought for donation to England in the crisis days of 
1909, for the purpose of establishing migrants on the land. There were 
the charitable organisations such as the Anglican Church's Lads' 
Imiriigration Bureau, the Girls'. Friendly Society and the Salvation 
Army. And there were the direct profit making land settlement 
companies, Australian Farms Ltd. and the land-grant Midland Railway 
Company of Perth. With the exception of the last group, all of these 
institutions worked along similar lines. They recruited migrants by 
working in association with their opposite number or some other 
immigration body in London. On arrival the newcomers were given 
various forms of assistance ranging from employment to training and 
employment (31). 
This body of organisations, substantial as it was, 
was only a section of the oodles within Australia interested by 1913 
in attracting emigrants. All of the Associated "Chambers of GoiiUiierce 
and Manufactures and the various country producers organisations 
urged equally as strongly on the Dominions Royal Commission of 1913 
Australia's need for migrants from the United Kingdom, while from 
1910 employer groups like the Master Builders had been sending 
reports to British journals of the dearth of labour within their 
trade (32), There could be no doubt of the strength of the Australian 
attachment to its Anglo-Saxon origins, nor could there be any doubt 
that majority interested opinion saw Australian national development 
(31) For a comprehensive list of organisations and details of their 
procedures see Cd 7171 and Cd 7172. 
(32) Cd 7171 pp 1-96; Sydney Morning Herald 21/7/1910 
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through immigration as development within the Ei.ip^.re framework. 
There was not, of course, unanimous Australian 
approval for encouragement to immigration even in the years after 1910. 
The issue was one on #iich organised labour was split and already 
the conflict which was to develop between sectional union interests 
and the Federal Labour Party's conception of its national respon^il-
ities was being foreshadowed. The Fisher Labour Administration of 
1910 pressed an active iimmgration policy. It was supported by the 
McGowen-Holman Labour Government, an«iln principle, it also had the 
backing of the Victorian Parliamentary Labour Party and the 
Melbourne Trades Kail (33). But the militant Barrier miners, the 
coalminers of Newcastle, Maitland and Bulli, and, in certain fields 
of immigration, the Australian Workers' Union, were opposed to 
government policy. J^ rom 1908 there had been industrial unrest in 
the mining centres due to wage reductions and intermitency of 
employment. The discontent was aggravated by the Industrial Disputes 
Act (1909) under which several strike leaders were arrested and 
sentenced to twelve months gaol (34). In the case of the Austfalian 
Workers' Union, busily extending its boundaries to embrace a 
miscellaneous group of rural unions, the interest of the Holman 
Government and the Victorian Government in introducing youths for 
agricultural work was regarded most critically. The General Secretary, 
Grayndler, described it "as an attempt to nullify the efforts of the 
A.W.U. to establish a proper standard of wages and conditions in the 
farming industry; that it was an assistance to the farmers and strile 
breakers, and a menace to the workers in industry"(35). But these 
conflicts, iiii. ortant as their later extension was to be for Labour's 
attitude to external relatio;ns, did not mean uh©»Australian unions 
were antagonistic to the British workj-ng class. Their policy was to 
attempt to offset government propaganda and correct the "misleading 
impression" given by official statements. So, for example, when ^ 
(33) Cd 7171 p.62 
(34) Sutcliffe J.T. :"Trade Unionism in Australia"(McMillan,1921). 
(35) Sydney Morning Herald 23/5/1914 
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Fisher was reported as having told the miners of Tonzy-Pandy that 
there "was plenty of room in Australia for miners", the Colliery 
Employees Federation cabled denying the truth of the statement (36). 
The attitude of the British Government to the 
Australian search for inmiigrants and to the Australian Government's 
request that emigrants be encouraged to stay within the Smpire was 
syiapathetic . But the authorities did not accept the need for 
State aided emigration, nor was it requested by the representatives 
of the dominions at the 1911 Conference, particularly in the light 
of the statistics put forward by Burns, President of the Local 
Government Board. He pointed out that in 1900 33^ of the total 
emigration went to the British Empire and 67^ to foreign countries; 
in 1910, 68^ went to the British Empire and 32^ to foreign countries; 
in 1911, it was estimated, 80^ would go to the dominions and 20;^  
to foreign countries. This was eminently satisfactory to all dominion 
representatives. But Burns,also, sounded a note of warning regarding 
future British emigration. It was anticipated that in 1911, 300,000 
Britishers would migrate. This woula be dO% of the natural Increase 
of births over deaths in the United Kingdom. In ten years Ireland's 
population had decreased by 76,000. Scotland's population had 
increased by 6% but this was against 11/a in the previous decade. 
"With a diminishing birth rate and with an increasing emigration 
of fertile people, the Mother Country cannot safely go beyond 
300,000 a year, and we think if we send you, as we intend to 
from 80 to 90 per cent of that 300,000 a year, we are giving all 
that you reasonably and consistently should require"(37). 
The Dominions Royal Commission, appointed as a 
result of this Conference, confirmed Burns' foreoodings. Particularly 
(36) Ibid 23/7/1911; and e.g. lS/6/1914 
(37) Cd 5745 p.200 
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in relation to agriculturalists, which were most in demand from 
all countries including Australia, the Commission emphasised that 
by 1914 "it was generally recognised (and the view is one in which 
we fully concur) that the purely rural population of the Mother 
Country was not in excess of her own necessities". The Coim'iiisslon 
believed that Irish emigration should, if possible, be diverted from 
the U.S.A.,to where they continued to flow in substantial numbers. 
The Irish authorities, however, were simply interested in discourag-
ing all emigration since it continued to be in excess of the natural 
population increase (38). 
The broadest iiuplicatlon of these develoxjments for 
dominion-imperial relations was the way immigration, like trade and 
finance, was reflecting the redressing of the balance of the Old 
Empire as dominion national development advanced. Both Canada and 
Australia had to look to different fields to supplement their intake 
from the United Kingdom. This had in fact been apparent even before 
these reports, and from 1910 Victorian leaders had visited the 
United States seeking immigrants for their irrigation projects, 
McC-owen had proposed a scheme to attract Americans to settle in the 
area to be watered by the Burrinjuck dam, and the Commonwealth High 
Commissioner had advertised in America and Northern Europe. The 
efforts did meet with some limited success, the annual intake of 
North Americans, Scandinavians and Germans each increasing by about 
100^ ^ between 1908 and 1913. Even so in the peak year of 1912, when 
the total gross iniuigration was 163,990 only 3,501 were Germans, 
(39) 
1,303 Scandinavians and 1,713 North Americans. 146,602 were British. 
It was to be another generation before Australia was to receive a 
substantial Influx of non-British migrants. 
The implications for Australian-Imperial relations 
of the actual receipt of imiidgrants over these years cannot be 
precisely assessed. Certainly the preponderance of British citizens 
did nothing to dint the essentially Anglo-Saxon cultural origins 
(38) Cd 8462 p.87 
(39) Commonwealth Year Bo^k No,9, p.106 
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of the community and neither does there appear to be any evidence 
that it modified the prevailing national ideology already establish-
ed (40) . This is perhaps not surprj.sing since, although the net 
immigration from 1911-1914 reached 36.9/o of the net increase of 
population, the total net number of irmnigrants received between 1906 
and 1914 was 247,724 while the Australian population in 1914 was 
4,490,952 (41). 
One interesting feature of the immigration wave 
was the small percentage of Irish in the British contingent. In 1901 
of the 220,401 residents of Australia born in the United Kingdom 
59,945 or 27,2;^  had been born in Ireland. Of the migrants from the 
United Kingdom between 1908-1910 only 1,2/^  were Irish and, although 
statistics are not available, it seems probable that no higher 
proportion of Irish was received between 1910 and 1913 (42), Whatever 
the role of the Australian Irish in the conscription conflict vote, 
they had not been reinforced by large numbers in the years Immediately 
preceding the war. 
(40) 
Proportion of Persons of British Nationality to Aggregrate 
of Persons Admitted 1908-1915. 
Year 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
Source ; 
Total 
75,670 
83,324 
94,543 
139,020 
163,990 
140,251 
110,701 
70,436 
British 
64,374 
71,201 
81,457 
124,061 
146,602 
122,443 
93,136 
60,505 
: Commonwealth Year Book, No.9, p,1112 
A^ 
85.072 
85,454 
85,949 
89,238 
89,396 
87,303 
84.133 
85.9 
(41) Ibid p,106; 91 
(42) CoFipiled from Coghlan : "The Seven Colonies of Australasia 1901-S 
p.545; Commonwealth Year Book, No.9, p.1112; Cd 5746-1,p.220. 
And see Cd 8416 p.87 
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There was one further Important significance for 
Australian-Imperial relations in the immigration question. This was 
tne implications of the growing fear of Japan. The Agents-General in 
1905 argued that the "teeming millions of Asia" made immigration 
"a vital question, an assurance against aggression"(43). Arthur, 
President of the Immigration League of Australia, built his arguments 
for immigration about his belief in a White Australia and his fear of 
Japanese Imperialism (44). The Imperial Federation League, the 
Australian Natives' Association and the British Empire Association 
all favoured ira^ rdgration and associated it with defence (45). 
There had been a marked stiffening in the Japanese 
attitude to immigration restriction policies after 1904. In 1894, 
after protracted negotiations, the Japanese Government had agreed 
in relation to commercial treaties involving the self-governing 
colonies that the treaty should not affect "the law, ordinances, 
and regulations with regard to trade, the iminigration of labourers 
and artisans, police and public security which are in force or 
which may hereafter be enacted". The purpose of this clause was 
to qualify the customary clause in commercial treaties which gave to 
each party entering into the treaty full liberty to enter, travel, 
or reside "in any part of the dominions or possessions of the other". 
By 1906, however, when Canada wished to negotiate a commercial treaty 
with Japan, Japan refused to discuss the idea of allowing the 
dominions the rights to exclude her labourers and artisans (46). 
The rise of Japanese power, vividly demonstrated 
in the Russo-Japanese War, and the hardening of the Japanese 
attitude towards discriminatory imrrdgratlon legislation, had stimulat-
ed Australian fears and Increased the Australian awareness of the 
needs for greater population. But this question of the developing 
fear of Japan and its impact on Australian-Imperial relations is so 
Interlocked with the subject of defence that it can be more suitably 
considered in that context. 
(43) Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers, 10/11/1905 
(44) New South Wales Parliamentary Debates,Leg..slative Assembly, 
22/10/1907 
(45) e.g.Sydney Morning Herald 20/4/1911: 9/7/1917 
(46) The Round Table 1910-11, p.135 
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III. D E F E N C E , 
The importance for the gradual evolution of the 
Empire into the Commonwealth of the security afforded the self-
governing colonies by Jhe British Navy can probably not be overestimat-
ed. Even where the colony was not likely to be directly challenged 
by imperialist minded powers, as in the case of Canada resting in the 
shadow of the United States' Monroe Doctrine, British naval power 
gave the armour to British diplomacy which allowed the nationalism 
of the self-governing colonies breed in incubator protection.Energies 
and money did not have to be diverted from the sufficient task of 
developing new countries to the problem of ensuring national survival 
and growth by complex diplomatic strategies backed by armed might. 
As late as 1911, Laurier was firmly convinced that questions of high 
Empire policy were "eminently in the domain of the United Kingdom", 
"By this he meant", writes Hancock,"that they o^ ught to remain within 
the domain of the United Kingdom, for he hoped that by escaping 
consultation Canada would escape liability"(1), 
Australasia, in Pacific isolation, owed probably a 
greater debt to the reputation of the British Navy than Canada, When 
Australian nationalism was being most strident the Pacific was a 
centre of international rivalry. Yet, though Australia did advance 
unchallenged towards national status due to its membership of the 
Empire, control of its own armed services became an essential condit-
ion, in the opinion of the effective majority, for national self-
respect. This raised a critical problem in the history of the 
evolution of the Empire. In conceding to the self-governing dominions 
their own navies the British government was admitting the dominions, 
if they wished to use the opportunity, to a voice in high policy. 
(1) Hancock : Op oit p.50 
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At the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1911 Sir Edward Grey pointed 
out that 
"what really determines the Foreign Policy of the country is the 
?hr«H^?«°nf^^^ ^r®""- ^^ i^ ^^^ ^ ^^^^ question which underlines 
the whole of our European Foreign Policy, and more than the 
European Foreign Policy"(2), 
In the same year. Grey wrote to Mr.Rumbold (Tokyo) that 
"I informed the Japanese ambassador to-day that, as it was part 
of our policy, now that the self-governing Dominions had sepa±»ate 
S ! 5? forces, to consult them on matters of foreign policy, 
we had discussed with them the prolongation of the Japanese 
Asquith could assert at the 1911 Imperial Conference, that in relation 
"to the conduct of foreign policy,,, (and) the conclusion of treaties 
....the responsibility of the Imperial Parliament....could not be 
shared"(4) but in the eyes of the Foreign Office the existence of 
independent dominion forces particularly navies, had radically 
altered this situation. As a Round Table contributor noted in 1914 
in a discussion on British naval policy in the Pacific "Fleets are 
used in peace as well as in war, and their movements are a well 
organised part of the diplomatic game"(5). 
In general the dominions did not want the internat-
ional authority and responsibility which was now available to them. 
Canada, we have noted, desired that major foreign policy should remain 
under British control. Botha, also, at the 1911 Imperial Conference, 
did not want "to handicap the British Government. I want them to 
undertake the full responsibility"(6). Only Fisher, while again not 
wishing"to handicap" the British government, asked for consultation 
in regard to those questions affecting the dominions' interests "as 
far as possible"(7). This request was written into a resolution of 
(2) 1911 Committee of Imperial Defence (Gooch and Temperley:"British 
Documents on the Origins of the War",Vol.VI,p,782. 
(3) Grey to Rumbold F.0.20654/1827/11/23.No.118 Secret.May 26,1911. 
(Gooch and Temperley : Op cit Vol,VIII p,525) 
(4 ) ^->i*\t^ I- Daw Son •. Op cif p i I 
(5) Round Table V o l , I V , P t , I I , p , 4 0 7 
(6) Cd 5745 p a 3 1 
(7) I b id p.132 
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the Conference relating to international conferences and other 
"International Agreements affecting the Dominions"(8) . It is probable 
than an extension of consultation to this extent could have been 
obtained whether the Dominions had independent navies or not. Yet, 
even if the potential significance for dominion authority of independ-
ent navies went measurably beyond the demands of the self-governing 
dominions, its importance is not to be lightly dismissed. From Grey's 
statements it is clear that it did help bridge the final gap between 
colonial and dominion status and though the Great War was the 
catalyst which embroiled dominion leaders in the making of Empire 
policy, dominion intrusion into the residual dominion of British 
control had been made by 1911. 
Australia played an important part in the movement 
for separate dominion navies. Undoubtedly, the attitude of the 
majority in supporting dominion navies was not decided by any desire 
to load Australia with responsibility for high question of Empire 
foreign policy. To 1905, the motive was almost entirely the satisfact-
ion of national self-respect. Increasingly from 1905, this motive was 
supplemented by a growing fear of Japan and the comfort to be obtained 
from having a navy which could be seen and felt. In 1913-14 it was a 
fear which was aggravated by the failure of the 1909 Defence Conference 
naval proposals to materialise, and by Churchill's plan to concentrate 
the British Navy in the Atlantic, leaving the defence of the Pacific 
largely to the Japanese fleet. Australian and New Zealand dissatis-
faction with these policies gave indications of producing an Empire 
crisis when the war occurred to refocus attention on the European 
theatre. Thoroughly unsympathetic to Australia's "exaggerated fear 
of Japan", Keith still regarded the question raised by these develop-
ments as "one of the highest importance to the future of the Empire, 
though it has no essential relation to its unity"(9). Certainly it did 
(8) Ibid p.131 
(9) Keith A.B. :"Imperial Unity and the Dominions"(1915) p,335 
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not indicate an Australian desire to break with the Empire, but it 
did extend the Australian appreciation of the need for adequate 
regional defence arrangements, which in turn represented a demand 
for a rethinking of imperial defence policy and of the relation of 
the dominions to the mother country. Australia was not content to be 
the geo-political perimeter of an Empire of which Britain was the 
centre, unprotected while Britain was ringed with steel, in a world 
in which the balance of power had been altered by the German challenge 
to Britain, the rise of Japan and the partial emergence from isolation 
of the United States. To 1914, however, the method suggested for 
resolving the difficulties was the calling of an Imperial Conference. 
There was still no strong movement within Australia to take on the 
responsibility of a distinct foreign policy. 
But while such a movement did not exist in any 
proportion, there are some grounds for assuming that Deakin and 
perhaps some members of the Imperial Federation League of which he 
was president from 1905, were actuated in their support for dominion 
navies by a desire to win for the dominions the increased international 
status and the right to a voice in the framing of Empire foreign 
policy which the possession of these navies accorded them. The evidence 
is circumstantial but it leans to the belief that Deakin's strategy 
in his prolonged negotiations with the Admiralty was designed to 
achieve for the dominions the status which Grey conceded to them. 
I. 
In the Commonwealth, the first full dress debate 
on Australian naval defence occurred after Barton returned from 
the 1902 Colonial Conference with a proposal that Australia pay an 
annual subsidy of £200,000 towards the upkeep of a squadron of the 
British Navy. It was a proposal which triggered off extensive 
y^-
criticism both within and without the House, demonstrating that 
majority political opinion, press opinion and probably public opinion 
believed that Australia's national status had advanced beyond the 
stage where the payment of a subsidy to a British controlled and 
British officered naval unit was adequate recognition of that status. 
The debate was largely in these terms. There was little evidence in 
1903 of any considerable belief that Australia was threatened by 
Japan or any other power. 
The Naval Agreement Bill of 1903 was a renewal 
with some alterations, of the original compact between the colonies 
of Australasia and Great Britain framed at the 1887 Colonial Conference 
The original compact provided for an auxiliary squadron, additional 
to the vessels of the Australian Naval Station, to be stationed 
within the limits of the Australasian station and "to be employed 
beyond these limits only with the consent of the Colonial Governments", 
The total annual contribution of the colonies towards the maintenance 
and interest payments on the prime cost of these vessels was not to 
exceed £126,000 (10). Under the 1903 agreement the unit was expanded. 
It was now to consist of one first class armoured cruiser, two second-
class cruisers, four third class cruisers, four sloops, a Royal Naval 
Reserve of twenty-five officers and 700 seamen and stokers. As far 
as possible the drill ships and one other vessel were to be manned by 
Australians but they were to be officered by the Royal Navy. Australia 
was to pay half the annual cost of the maintenance but not more than 
£200,000 a year. The squadron was to be based on the ports of 
Australia and New Zealand and to operate in the waters of the Austral-
ian, China and Far East stations "where the Admiralty believe that 
they can most effectively act against hostile vessels which threaten 
the trade or interests of Australia and New Zealand", The new agreement 
differed from the old compact, then, in placing the control of the 
movement of the squadron in the hands of the Admiralty, abolishing 
the restrictive right previously held by the colonial governments. 
(10) Commonwealth Year Book, No.2, p.1085 
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At the Colonial Conference of 1902 at which this 
agreement was shaped. Barton had been placed in an invidious position. 
"No other Premier at the Conference",wrote Jebb,"found himself 
in so difficult a position. The standpoint and policy of Australian 
nationalism were still unintelligible to the Admiralty who appeared 
to have regarded it as arrant 'disloyalty'. For any Australian 
to explain and defend that standpoint to the London of May,1902 
would have been difficult indeed"(11). 
The Admiralty views were set forth in a "Memorandum on Sea Power" 
and were reinforced by an address by Selborne, First Lord of the 
Admiralty. The basic argument was that the strategy of offensive sea 
power was to destroy enemy ships, wherever they were. This required 
"a single navy under one control". No Australian squadron, said 
Selborne, should be confined to Australian waters but should be free 
to move after the enemy anywhere in the Eastern seas. The strategic 
argument was complemented by a financial statement. Naval expenditure 
per head of the United Kingdom was 15s.Id. and of Australia, lOfd. 
It was the responsibility of the Australian government to increase 
its contribution, since the protection of the trade of the self-
governing colonies within the Empire and with the foreign countries 
was.dependent on the British Navy. It was hoped, however, that it 
would be possible to supplement the naked cash basis of co-operation 
by stimulating a "maritime spirit" in the colonies. 
"I want to see from all parts of the Empire a personal contribution 
to the navy, so that it may not only be an abstract Admiralty 
to govern the navy, but an Admiralty that has won the confidence 
of the Colonies, because the Colonies understand its policy"(12), 
This sentiment was as unacceptable to Australian 
nationalists as Australia's aspirations were incomprehensible to 
the majority of the Admiralty. In 1903, Senator Matheson, one of the 
most ardent advocates of an Australian Navy addressed the Royal 
Colonial Institute. In reply. Admiral Bowden-Smith asked where 
(11) Jebb : "The Imperial Conference",Vol.I, p.376 
(12) Quoted in Jebb : Op cit p.359 
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Australia would get the men to man an Australian fleet. 
"It is true that when I was out there, there were naval brigades 
at Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Adelaide. Very good men - men 
dressed as bluejackets and who drilled very well with rifles and 
with field guns. It was not their fault they didn't go to sea.... 
In the newspapers this morning we read that the Navy Estimates 
proposed for the year amount to £34,450,000. Under the new 
arrangement Australia is to contribute £200,000 towards the 
Australian Squadron in her own waters. If there is going to be 
any bad feeling or bickering over the question , it would really 
be far better to drop the contribution altogether"(13). 
Admiral Freemantle felt that he would sooner depend for defence on 
"the South Atlantic Squadron than on the lecturer's elaborate 
scheme...."(14). Vice-Admiral Fitzgerald, alone, appreciated the 
predominant Australian viewpoint -
"to have a little thing which you can call your own is much 
better than to have a share in a bigger business which you 
cannot call your own the first Australian Navy would be 
a very poor thing but their own. It would come to vigorous 
manhood but if it does not have a beginning I do not see how 
it is going to get on"(15). 
Not only was Admiralty opinion opposed to an 
Australian Navy, but the difficulty of Barton's position at the 
Conference was accentuated by its singularity. He could not fall back 
on the Canadians' racial ground for rejecting the proposals that they 
would be anathema to the French-Canadians and, except for Canada, 
the other self-governing colonies unequivocally supported the 
principle of colonial contributions to the British Navy. Perhaps, 
even more compromising, was the position in which Barton was placed 
as a result of the private submission to Chamberlain by Forrest, 
who had accompanied Barton to the Conference. This memorandum sent 
to Chamberlain with Barton's consent, suggested a naval policy 
practically identical with the scheme which the Admiralty proposed. 
Mansfield has considered the significance of this memorandum and it 
is not necessary to reappraise it in detail. It is probable that 
Barton's views were not in agreement with those of Forrest but in 
(13) Procs. Royal Colonial Institute, 1902-3, p.228 
(14) Ibid p,234 
(15) Ibid p.236 
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letting the memorandum go as far as it did. Barton made himself tjery 
vulnerable to the arguments of the Admiralty and to criticism within 
Australia (16). 
Although the House of Representatives approved the 
Naval Agreement Bill by forty-four votes to twenty-nine this was not 
an accurate reflection of political opinion. It did indicate, of 
course, that feeling was not sufficiently intense to warrant the 
overthrow of the government and in general the debate was not an 
acrimonious one. However, of the forty-five speakers only eight 
favoured the agreement almost without reserve and either opposed 
an Australian navy in principle or thought its establishment was 
unwarranted or impracticable within a reasonable time. This eight 
included the small handful of old patriots and free-trade Anglo-
Australians, Forrest who "did not think it advisable that we should 
have an Australian Navy, and although it may come in the future,I do 
not desire that it should come in my time"(17); the commercial and 
free-trade doyen, McMillan, opposed to an Australian Navy on principle 
but also because financially it was "madness"(18); and Ewing who 
proclaimed that "only for the British flag floating over Australia 
to-day if one, at least of those nations (Japan) saw fit, not a boat 
would leave any of our ports"(19). They had an unusual ally, on this 
occasion, in Isaacs. He, too, believed that talk of an Australian 
navy and of coastal defence was unrealistic (20). The eight were 
reinforced to some extent by another six speakers who favoured the 
agreement and were non-commdttal about an Australian navy. But the 
remaining twelve speakers, who voted for the agreement, favoured an 
Australian navy in some form at a reasonable time in the future. 
(16) See Mansfield B, :"Some Studies in External Relations and the 
Growth of National Sentiment in Australia 1901-12".(Unpublished 
thesis University of Sydney), p.60-2. 
(17) Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol.XIV,1903,p. 
(18) Ibid p.2429 
(19) Ibid p.2048ff 
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This group included men such as Quick who saw the new agreement as a 
(21) 
denial of the national standing conferred on Australia by federation, 
and Reid, producing in customary style a range of cogent arguments 
against the agreement and then voting for it (22). If the sentiments 
of the speakers rather than their votes were counted, the majority 
directly opposed to the agreement or hesitant about accepting it, 
would have been twenty-nine to fourteen. 
The "no" vote was made up of a solid Labour vote 
and a handful of non-tabour. The non-l^ibour speakers against the 
Bill, were almost entirely intense nationalists or lib-labs. Crouch, 
who led the Opposition attack, was a life member of the Australian 
Natives' Association and later became a member of the political 
Labour Party (1929-31). Glynn was Irish, an advocate of Irish rights, 
and anti-Imperial federationist. Mauger, a prominent protectionist, 
had taken a leading part in the anti-sweating movement and in 
establishing the anti-Sweating League in Victoria, Hume-Cook had 
been a president of the Australian Natives' Association in 1896 and 
Higgins was almost notoriously sympathetic to assertive Australian 
nationalist aspirations. 
Outside parliament, the basis of the alignment of 
expressed opinion closely paralleled that within parliament with the 
exception of the Brisbane Courier. Usually at the furthest extreme 
from the Labour Party, on this occasion it found common cause. The 
Naval subsidy, it wrote "was in the worst traditions of the British 
Admiralty; and if adopted, will strike a damaging blow at the very 
independence of Australia"(23). This was a view whiah the Bulletin 
echoed. 
"Australia is asked to sacrifice its money, its claim on British 
protection, its right of organising local forces in naval affairs. 
It could not be asked to sacrifice more if it were a subject 
state at the feet of a victorious foe"(24). 
(21) Ibid p.1907 
(22) Ibid p.l969ff 
(23) Brisbane Courier 22/5/1903 
(24) Bulletin 6/6/1903 
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The strongly nationalist Age and South Australian Register equally 
opposed the agreement and demanded an Australian navy (25). -^ nd to 
the Imperial Federation League, intent as it was on achieving Empire 
unity by some type of federation which would allow the dominions a 
voice in Empire foreign policy, the agreement was an exceptionally 
reactionary step. Mr.Justice Holroyd, the president of the League, 
refused to accept the economic arguments of the Admiralty that the 
self-governing colonies should contribute a greater sum. "When Great 
Britain is protecting Australian commerce with her navy she is 
protecting a very important part of her commerce as well". But the 
main theme of his complaint was that the new agreement was a 
retrograde step in the movement towards Imperial Federation, 
"a blow to its colonial advocates...,a discouragement to those 
who are striving to convert it into a vital force, to be told that 
the Imperial Navy, in which they are invited to feel henceforth a 
proprietary interest, must still be governed entirely from the 
Admiralty"(26). 
The conservative wing of free trade press, usually 
less assertively nationalistj^ than the protectionist press^tenied 
to support the agreement but with some diffidence. The Argus, though 
not strenuously opposed to an Australian Navy, was opposed to the 
atomising of the British Navy and continued to argue from this stage 
until 1909 for the "essential feature" of co-operation (27). Again, 
the Sydney Morning Herald was not opposed in principle to an Australiar 
Navy but in 1903 thought the conception premature. 
"There is, of course, something flattering to the new federation 
about the idea of its possessing and directing a fleet of its 
own; but the very circumstances that make it so reduce the 
imnature Navy for all practical purposes to a nullity..,,Our 
security lies in so co-operating with the British Navy as to 
make such ships as we have on the station an integral part of it". 
(28) 
At the same time, the Sydney Morning Herald was not loathe to make 
use of a standard Bulletin argument when considering the extent of 
(25) South Australian Register 29/5/1903 
(26) Imperial •'federation League of Victoria,Presidential Address, 
July,1903, p,6 (Victoria Public Library) 
(27) Argus 18/8/1909 
(28) Sydney Morning Herald 12/11/1902 
Australia's contribution to imperial defence. It considered that a 
just calculation of Australia's contribution should include the 
interest of 5% paid on many loans in comparison with the ruling rate 
of 3%, 
"'fhe sum of £32,000,000 gained by the Mother Country at the 
expense of this State through measured increment cannot but 
be regarded as a contribution to the defence of the Empire"(29). 
Beyond these expressions of opinion, it is difficult 
to gauge the attitude of the public. Harney, an astute observer, 
believed that the feeling for an independent Australian army and navy 
was intense, partly as a consequence of the Boer War. 
"Australia has never been louder in her cry for an independent 
army and navy and never more clamorous in the assertion of her 
distinctive nationality, than at the very period when the 
patriotic fervour of the South African war blazed hottest"(30). 
And he felt that if the Admiralty had had its way totally and made 
the Australian based squadron an indistinct unit of the British Navy, 
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and not one to be stationed,primarily, in Australian waters,"there is 
not the least doubt but Sir Edmund Barton's Ministry would have been 
defeated"(31). Jebb drew an inference from the 1904 election results. 
"The striking feature...was the large accession to the strength of 
the Labour Party, which had led the attack upon the Naval Agree-
ment Bill, and had included in its electoral programme the 
project of an Australian Navy"(32). 
But the extent to which dissatisfaction with the agreement was an 
important factor in an election in which there was bitter controversy 
over conciliation and arbitration, held at a time when the consequences 
of the depression and the 1902 drought were still being felt, must 
remain uncertain. Yet, in total, it is probably reasonable to assume 
that on this question the weight of political and press opinion was 
reflecting a majority desire for an Australian navy. 
There was no note of urgency in the debate on the 
Naval Agreement Bill for no immediate threat to Australia was thought 
to exist. The speakers who did mention possible potential enemies 
(29) Ibid 22/6/1902 
(30) Procs. Royal Colonial Institute 1904-5,p,96 
(31) Ibid p,93 
(32) Jebb :"Studies in Colonial Nationalism",p,168 
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were in disagreement as to who the enemy might be. Russia was favoured, 
Hughes, referred to the 1885 war scare and continued 
"To my mind, there is no room on earth for two such powers as 
Great Britain and Russia ... Russia knows no landmark, and the 
only thing that will stop her advance is an armed force"(33). 
Cameron saw Russia as an "octupus"(34) and T.Brown (Labour) agreed 
that Russia rather than China or Japan was the danger(35). Willis 
feared Germany, primarily because of her interests in New Guinea(36), 
and Barton referred to the recent strengthening of French naval forces 
in the Far Eastern seas (37). It was the strong advocates of the 
agreement, not its antagonists, who referred to Japan. Ewing and 
McColl argued that the British Navy kept Australia white not the 
immigration restriction legislation. Without the British Navy "We 
could not have stood alone against Japan"(38). There is no evidence 
either in this debate or in the press discussion, nor in the debate 
on the Immigration Restriction Bill, to indicate an extensive fear 
or suspicion of Japan in either labour or non-labour ranks. This 
development occurred after the Russo-Japanese war and was a powerful 
impetus in advancing Australian national consciousness and in making 
more urgent the demand for Australian controlled defence forces. 
It contributed to advancing Australian national independence within 
the Empire and to increasing the pressure on the Admiralty for a 
policy of Empire naval strategy more consonant with the fears and 
aspirations of the self-governing dominions. 
II, 
With the exception of the Bulletin, Australian 
press opinion was sympathetic to Japan throughout the course of the 
Russo-Japanese war. It was the resounding defeat of Russia which 
mtEidified this .attitude provoking a response which ranged from 
thanksgiving for the British Navy and the Anglo-Japanese aHahoe 
(33) Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates Vol.XIV,1903,p,2319 
(34) Ibid p.2330ff 
(35) Ibid p,2419 
(36) Ibid p,2151 
(37) Ibid p,1777 
(38) Ibid p.2179 
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through varying degrees of uneasiness to the outright insistence of 
the Bulletin, the Worker,the Australian Natives'Association, the 
Imperial Federation League and the National Defence League that 
Australia must gird its loins. There was to be the closest co-operation 
with Great Britain but Australia must accept increasing responsibility 
for its military and naval defence. 
Until the peace, the picture which the Australian 
press painted of Japan was of a near idyllic country harshly treated 
in the past by the great powers, Russia was a depraved monster. 
Comparing the lot of the Japanese coolie with the Russian peasant, 
the Sydney Morning Herald wrote that "the one is happy and content, 
while the other is not, ©ne has political aspirations while the other 
has not"(39). "The present war", said the Brisbane Courier, "was 
due to the previous wanton interference with the rights of Japan"(40) 
and spoke of "the inspiration of national enthusiasm in a just cause". 
(41) 
Japan on this occasion, the Herald stated, should get the fruits of 
her victory (42), "There can be little doubt", wrote the Argus, 
"that Japan needs the indemnity in order to arm itself effectively 
against any possible policy of revenge on Russia's part"(43), The 
free trade and anti-immigration restriction press, welcomed the 
signfof Japanese strength. The Courier,consistently opposed to 
policies of immigration restriction, believed that 
"there was truth and dignity in what the Japanese Consul-General 
in Sydney said 'We think we are entitled to recognition as a 
first class power, and to be treated with proper respect....yet, 
Australia, which is but a part of the British Empire, affects to 
regard us as inferiors"(44). 
The free trade, Sydney Morning Herald, Argus and even the nationalist 
^South Australia Register welcomed the opportunity of expanding trade 
with Japan. Quoting the statistics of the increase of trade with * 
Japan, the Sydney Morning ^ erald. believed that some arrangements 
should be made to overcome the obstacle to the further expansion 
of trade produced by Australia's exclusiveness (45). Reiterating its 
(39) Sydney Morning Herald 21/8/1905 
(40) Brisbane Courier 1276/1905 
(41) Ibid 19/8/1905 
(42) Sydney Morning Herald 29/8/1905 
(43) Argus 29/871905 
(44) Brisbane Courier 22/6/1905 
(45) Sydney Morning_H^rald 31/7/1905 
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emphasis on the importance of this trade, it stated that "we have 
repeatedly urged the advisableness of dealing within Japan in the 
broadest possible terms"(46). 
The Japanese victory did not affect the trade 
arguments but, as its implications sank home, soul-searching commenced, 
b^nost overnight, the Sydney Morning Herald's thinking changed. On the 
31st,August,1905, Japan's acknowledged victory over one of the great 
powers of Europe was seen as significant for Australia but not of 
immediate moment (47). On the Ist.September, Australia was thought 
to "lie open to be profoundly affected by the development of events 
in the Far East"(48). The next day, the Herald argued for a system 
of national defence. "The yellow man has taught the white races a 
lesson that Australians can neglect only at their peril"(49)* 
The more ardently nationalist South Australia 
Register, though respecting Japan, had become uneasy a little earlier. 
"It will be to Australia's advantage that the rapidly Increasing 
Japanese nation should find scope for growth and enterprise in 
Manchuria, Siberia and North China, instead of being compelled 
to expand am.ongst the islands of the South Pacific" (50) . 
And the Age more racially conscious, already foreshadowed the 
Australian criticism of British naval policy which was to become 
substantial in 1913-14. 
"Practically Japan is to be left as the naval guardian of the 
Pacific. It is, of course, fortunate that Japan is England's 
ally; but Australian statesmen would make a very great mistake if 
they relied on the probability of Japan lending her naval force 
to assist Australia in a pinch. There are too many reasons for 
mistrust altogether apart from the question whether it would be 
honourable for Australia to look to an Asiatic poviev for its 
naval defence"(51) , 
The Argus, which was possibly the least nationalist 
minded of the metropolitan dailies of the Eastern states, does not 
appear to have had any forebodings, and the Courier, while being 
conscious of the significance of Japan's victory, was almost self-
righteously complacent. Until the war it did not recover from the 
(46) Ibid 24/8/1905; see South Australia j,egister 29/7/1905. 
(47) Ibid 31/8/1905 
(48) Ibid 1/9/1905 
(49) Ibid 2/9/1905 
(50) SouthJ^ustraliaJie£i£ter 7/7/1905 
(51) A^e 24/8/1905" '"' 
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shock of the immigration restriction legislation, continuing to see 
the Japanese threat as the^neme^sis earnt in the early years of the 
Commonwealth. 
It is an inaccuracy to argue that Australia in the 
years before the first World War, was isolationist wishing to with-
draw from embroilment in world affairs. This was a common British 
criticism (52) and there has been a strong tendency to perpetuate 
it in Australian histories. There was a movement of this kind of 
some dimensions in the 1870's-1880's, particularly in the ranks of 
radical and republican labour, and it did have some carry over into 
the new century. Until the Russo-Japanese War, the Bulletin continued 
to trumpet against Australia's "flash pSlicy of imperialism" in 
the Pacific (53).and in the Naval Agreement debate, McDonald revived 
some of the old republican fears. "What I am afraid of is that we 
may be drawn into war, not through our own actions, but because of 
our connection with Great Britain"(54). But it was only one or two, 
even of the Labour members, who still clung to this stand. Majority 
expressed opinion, and on the evidence of the Boer War majority 
public opinion, accepted that Australia's Empire membership involved 
her in major Empire commitments. It was not being isolationist to 
accept Britain as the senior partner of an alliance and to leave to 
her the responsibility for the day to day diplomacy of that alliance. 
This was in substance the view of the political Labour Party. 
But if not isolationist, Australia after the scares 
of the 1880's, had felt iSairly remote from the world's storm centres. 
The Russo-Japanese War did much to undermine that feeling. The 
Australasian Pastoralists' Review wrote that 
"a generation ago it was possible for a sensible man to think 
that Australia might be left alone by the rest of the world 
if she cut herself off from the Mother Country, but the 
international situation has developed a good deal since then, 
and every educated man now knows that Germany would pounce down 
upon us at once if we left the British Empire to-day, and that a 
Chinese or Japanese invasion is a reasonable probability of the 
future under such conditions"(55), 
(52) e ,g . Tim<> orr^ tuv <». a . > u u - 5 ^ ^ *-^ v »^-r*^ *^^^ 
(53) Bulletin 19/7/1902 
(54) Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol.XIV,p.2158 
(55) Australasian Pastoralists' Review 16/3/1904 
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Australia's geographical protection evaporated for the Bulletin as 
soon as the Russo-Japanese war commenced. "A victorious Japan would 
bring within measurable distance the choice to Australia of abandoning 
its national aspirations or fighting for its very existence"(56). And 
as Japanese victories accumulated, it wrote: 
"The rout of the Russians at Mukden is an event of history more 
important than any since the fall of Constantinople..,.Australia 
is a lonely outpost on the very borders of Asia"(57). 
In 1904, Advance Australia, the Journal of the Australian Natives' 
Association,"Commenced a series of articles built about the theme 
that Australia was no longer in the geographical backwaters of the 
world. "It was fashionable to say that as Australia was far removed 
from Europe her duty was to hold aloof from old-world strife". Now 
the feeling is that "Australia is one of the most meanly insured 
countries on earth and the riches we own are tremendous"(58). 
Under the impact of this growing disquiet, the 
movement for more adequate national defence took on weight. The 
National Defence League was established in Sydney in 1904 with 
branches in various country towns. It had in its front rank leading 
members of all political parties, Watson and Hughes, Ewing (Protect-
ionist) ,McMillan and, in 1905, Deakin gave his support (59). The 
Bulletin swung behind the movement discarding its anti-militarism. 
Political labour and the labour press, too, temporarily abandoned 
their opposition to compulsory military training. "Militarism is a 
curse of the greatest", said the Worker,"but it is less a curse than 
the armed occupation of your country by invaders - possibly by 
invaders of an inferior race"(60). And Labour fought the 1906 election 
campaign partly in terms of the "Yellow Peril" and the need for a 
satisfactory system of Australian military defence. The 1908 Conferoxe 
of the Australian Labour Party carried by 24 votes to 7 Watson's 
(56) Bulletin 18/2/1904 
(57 Ibid 23/3/1905 
(58) Advance Australia 15/11/04;15/2/05;15/3/05 
(59) Htjghes W,M, ;"Def ence" (Lone Hand,Vol.IV,p,250) 
Bulletin 2/11/1905 
(60) The Worker 15/3/1905 
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motion "approving the principle of compulsory military training". 
By 1909 when the first Bill providing for compulsory 
military training was introduced there was little organised opposition 
to the proposal. The Sydney Daily Telegraph was occasionally critical, 
repeating the anti-militarist arguments, and the Barrier Truth was 
outspoken against compulsion. More extensive criticism did develop 
after the scheme was introduced but much of this was directed against 
administrative inefficiency, alleged social discrimination, and cruel 
discipline rather than against the principle in itself (61), 
The introduction of compulsory military training 
created no constitutional Empire problems. The right of the self-
governing colonies to control their own military defence had long 
been conceded and Britain had withdrawn her last garrison*forces 
from Australia in 1870. At the 1902 Colonial Conference, Seddon did 
revive the question of an imperial,military force by suggesting that 
a reserve be created out of Colonial military forces at the joint 
expense of the British and Colonial Governments for service overseas 
in case of ' emergency'." (62) The proposal was immediately thrown out 
of court by Australia and Canada as "objectionable in principle, 
(and) a derogation from the powers of self-government employed by 
them"(63). 
The jealous preservation of the right of the self-
governing colonies to control their own military forces did not 
mean, of course, the abandonment of close military association 
between the colonies and the Mother Country. Australia constantly 
called on British military experts for advice - Edwards in 1889, 
Hutton in 1901 to take over the command of the Australian forces 
united under the Commonwealth, and Kitchener in 1909-10, In military 
matters there was no problem of compatability of Australia's Empire 
(61) See Jauncey L.E,:"The Story of Conscription in Australia"(1935). 
(62) Jebb : "The Imperial Conference", Vol.1, p.344 
(63) Report of the 1902 Colonial Conference, p.31-2, 
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membership and Australian national independence. Yet, undoubtedly, 
in the growing acceptance within Australia from 1904-5 of the need 
for compulsory military training there was evidence of increasing 
national cohesion, in no small part the result of geographically 
determined fears. The underlying problem for Australian-British 
relations inherent in this development came to the surface in the 
more vital problem of naval defence. 
III. 
Between 1905 and 1909 the Australian naval question 
was settled. The Imperial Defence Conference of 1909 approved the 
creation of separate navies in the self-governing dominions. These 
navies were to be more than the coastal defence forces envisaged by 
the Admiralty at the 1907 Imperial Conference. They were to be 
distinct Fleet units capable of being used as such in time of war. 
Each unit should consist of one armoured cruiser, three unarmed 
cruisers, six destroyers and three submarines with the necessary 
auxiliaries. As far as possible, the ships should be officered and 
manned by colonial officers and men. While at its station, the unit 
"would be under the exclusive control of the Dominion Government" 
in regard to Movements and general administration. "It has been 
recognised by the Colonial Governments that in time of war the local 
(64) 
naval forces should come under the general direction of the Admiralty", 
Though the final stages in the negotiations resulting 
in this decision were conducted by the Fisher government and the 
Cook ministry, it was Deakin who bore the heat of the battle from 
1905 to 1908, And within the Empire he bore it alone. At the 1907 
Imperial Conference, Laurier, aware of the French-Canadian opposition 
to expenditure on naval defence and aware that, the United States 
had entered on a policy of naval expansion, could only refuse to 
(64) Cd 4948 pp 20-23 
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make a cash contribution and be negative about the possibility of 
establishing a local navy. In 1909 Canada emerged as one of the 
dominions favouring an independent fleet unit but it had played no 
positive role in budging the Admiralty from its 1902 position, 
"New Zealand in 1907 'subscribed absolutely' to the maxim 'Trust the 
Admiralty', and to the postulate 'One sea, one Empire, one Navy' "(65). 
In 1909, New Zealand still "preferred to adhere to her present policy 
of contributions"(66). Cape Colony and Natal in 1907 favoured a 
local defence unit, while Transvaal was almost an inland state. But 
South African energies were taken up with the possibilities of 
federation or union. 
Was Deakin, then, singularly responsible for the 
almost revolutionary change in British naval policy towards the 
dominions and the Far East which occurred between 1905 and 1909? 
It was a change which went beyond conceding to the dominions control 
of independent fleet units for more broadly it envisaged re-organising 
Far Eastern naval deployment by establishing a Pacific fleet to 
consist of three units in the East Indies, Australia and China (67). 
It, also, went beyond according recognition to an unsophisticated 
conception of national self-respect for it admitted dominions to the 
right of consultation on questions of high policy involving them, if 
they cared to use the right. And what was Deakin's motive in his 
negotiations with the Admiralty? 
On the basis of the available evidence it is not 
possible to answer either of these questions definitively. The 
success of the strong armament group in the House of Commons, coupled 
with the bitter dispute in the Admiralty high command in 1909, may 
well have been of decisive importance in deciding the liberal 
concessions agreed to at the Imperial Defence Conference, Not only 
(65) Jebb :"The Imperial Conference",Vol.II, p.158 
(66) Cd 4948 p.19 
(67) Ibid 
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was the British ministry under substantial attack for allowing 
German naval strength reach such close parity to British naval 
strength, but Beresford, Cormnander of the Channel Squadron, and 
Fisher, First Sea Lord, were in public conflict from March 1909 
to December. A committee of inquiry, consisting of the Premier, 
Grey, Haldane and Morley, was set up to Investigate the dispute 
and it reported at the very time that the Imperial Defence Conference 
was proceeding. It was Fishet, Halevy states, who dictated Admiralty 
policy from 1902, when he became Second Sea Lord having spellbound 
Selborne, until 1909 (68). It is reasonable to assume that it was 
Fisher's policy which Selborne expounded at the 1902 Colonial 
Conference. Perhaps, it is also reasonable to assume that under 
attack in 1909 he decided, in the Interests of expediency, on a 
policy of extreme generosity to the dominions even though it ran 
counter to his naval convictions. The Admiralty memorandum presented 
at the Defence Conference stated that 
if the problem of Imperial naval defence were considered merely 
as a problem of naval strategy it would be found that the greatest 
output of strength for a given expenditure is obtained by the 
maintenance of a single navy with the concomitant unity of 
training and unity of command^... the maximum of power would be 
gained if all parts of the Empire contributed, according to 
their nedds and resources, to the maintenance of the British 
Navy"(69). 
Yet though these factors may have weighed heavily 
in the detail of the final agreement, Deakin, in a campaign of 
attrition, had practically won from the Admiralty by 1908 the concess-
ion contained in the 1909 agreement, at leai in relation to an 
Australian navy. There do seem to be adequate grounds for crediting 
Deakin with much of the success of the fight to establish independentj 
dominion navies or it is ImprDbable that the Admiralty would have 
(68) Halevy : "The Rule of Jjemocracy", Vol,I, p.196 
(69) Cd 4948, p.21 
M. 
made its 1909 capitulation along the lines that it did but for the 
groundwork already laid. 
Preliminary skirmishes began in 1905. In reply to 
criticisms by the Naval Commander-in-Chief of the amount of Australia's 
contribution, Deakin pointed out that 
"the present agreement is not, and never has been, popular in the 
Commonwealth .... its want of popularity is due to the fact 
that...,none of our grant is applied to any distinctively 
Australian purpose"(70). 
Possible alternatives to the 1903 agreement were suggested. These 
were rejected by the Admiralty. It approved the substance of the 
1903 Agreement (71). In August,1906, in reply to a report submitted 
by Cresswell, the Australian Naval Director, recommending the 
establishment of an Australian Navy, the Committee of Imperial Defence 
reiterated its support for 1903 settlement. And it could see no virtue 
in an Australian Navy. "Unity of training and unity of command can 
alone insure that thorough cooperation which is essential"(72). 
Towards the end of 1906, Deakin began to lengthen 
his stride. With the next Imperial Conference due in 1907,he presented 
to the House a six year plan of naval development. The first three 
years were to be devoted to establishing a system of harbour and 
coastal defence. 
"In the second three years we should be able to pass from merely 
harbour defence to defence....our ocean going destroyers would 
enable our ports to keep in touch with each other along the whole 
line of our seaboard"(73). 
Deakin was already moving beyond the Admiralty's conception of local 
defence. 
But at the Imperial Conference, Deakin appears to 
have been rather vague regarding the detail of his naval plans for 
Australia. In neither of his speeches on naval defence did he make 
specific proposals. He did make clear once again Australia's 
dissatisfaction with the 1903 Agreement and its strong desire for a 
local navy. He expressed appreciation of the "extreme fairness and 
generosity" with which Tweedmouth had met the representatives of the 
Commonwealth (74), for the Admiralty was now more conciliatory than 
(70) Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 1906, Vol.II,p.83 
(71) Ibid 
(72) Ibid p,165 
(73) Ibid p.75 
(74) CalgftiaA Cfi^nfRrence 1907,Minutes of Proceedings p.473 
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it had been in 1906. Perhaps in his unpublished discussions with the 
Admiralty, during the time of the Conference, he did elaborate his 
policy with precision. But the evidence of the lengthy negotiations 
subsequent to the Conference does not support this view. The inference 
which can cautiously be drawn from the evidence is that Deakin intent-
ionally left the precise position ambiguous so that from Australia 
he could attempt to extract greater concessions than the Admiralty 
were prepared to offer in 1907. 
At the Conference, Tweedmouth made a short statement 
of the general principle on which the Admiralty wished to meet the 
dominions. 
"His Majesty's Government recognise the natural desire of the 
self-governing Colonies to have a more particular share in 
providing the naval defence force of the Empire, and, so long 
as the condition of unity of command and direction of the fleet 
is maintained, they are ready to consider a modification of the 
existing arrangements to meet the views of the various Colonies. 
In the opinion of the Government, while the distribution of the 
fleet must be determined by strategical requirements of which 
the Admiralty are the judge, it would be of great assistance 
if the Colonial Governments would undertake to provide for local 
service in the Imperial squadrons the smaller vessels that are 
useful for defence against possible raids or for co-operation 
with a squadron, and also to equip and maintain docks and fitting 
establishments which can be used by His Majesty's ships"(75). 
Deakin did not comment on this proposition but some time after return-
ing to Australia, the delay was caused by Deakin's illness, he cabled 
the Secretary of State for Colonies: 
"In pursuance of my conversation, Tweedmouth and the Admiralty in 
London, and Ewings conversation with Your Excellency, please 
telegtaph to Admiralty inquiring whether following proposals, 
approved for amendment in Naval Agreement, substituting for 
present Commonwealth subsidy offer one thousand men, Australians 
if possible, to be paid by Commonwealth for service in Navy on 
this Station, estimated cost about £100,000 to the Commonwealth 
per annum remainder of subsidy to be applied by the Commonwealth 
submersibles or destroyers, or similar local defences, as suggested 
London Conference. Two cruisers "P" or superior, manned by 400 
of the 1,000 Australians, to be retained Australian coast, peace 
or war. Loan of two "P" cruisers or superior, to be maintained by 
the Commonwealth for training local Naval Militia, at estimated 
cost to Commonwealth of £60,000 per annum. This proposed amend-
ment is in addition to Commonwealth vote this year - £250,000 for 
naval, harbour, and coast defence, and £50,000 for fortification 
and harbours"(76) 
These proposals clearly went beyond the development envisaged in 
(75) Ibid p.130 
(76) Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers 1907-8, p.129 
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Tweedmouth's general statement and they, also, apparently went beyond 
the tentative arrangements decided between Deakin and the Adirdralty. 
The first part of the suggestions, the Admiralty stated, were in 
accordance with the understanding reached at the Imperial Conference 
but 
"no proposal was made for the permanent retention in Australian 
waters, at the cost (with the exception of the crew) of the 
Imperial Government, nor was anything definite put forward as 
to the loan of two other cruisers". 
Beyond the question of costs, the implication of Deakin's proposals 
which worried the Admiralty, were that the scheme possibly involved 
a pledge by the Admiralty to maintain certain vessels permanently 
in Australian waters and that there was some doubt as to who was to 
control the local naval force in time of war (77). 
Deakin defined, more clearly, the lines along which 
he was thinking in his speech of December,18th.1907. Australia had 
two naval lines of defence, the British Navy and her coastal defence. 
The discussions at the Imperial Conference had revealed that Britain 
had new strategic conceptions regarding the defence of the East, 
the implementation of which were prevented by the 1903 Agreement. 
Tweedmouth, he claimed, had intimated that the Admiralty in view of 
its new strategy was willing to take over complete responsibility 
for the first line of defence, Australia's contribution to be diverted 
to assisting the finance of the second line. This involved cancelling 
the 1903 Agreement. Australia would then accept responsibility for 
coastal defence, and the coastal flotilla, in these circumstances, 
would be under the complete control of the Australian government. 
In time of war, the flotilla would probably be placed under the 
control of the Admiralty, but this decision must rest with the 
responsible government, and once placed under the British commander 
the flotilla "would then practically bQ a branch of the British 
fleet though under the Commonwealth so far as political control 
was concerned"(78), 
(77) Ibid p,393 
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Though attenuated negotiations continued between 
the time of this speech and the overthrow of the Deakin ministry in 
Novemeber, 1908, Deakin had almost won his fight. It was now the 
Admiralty's turn to become a little vague regarding the form the 
arrangements should take. "The terms would be etetic and capable 
of adjustment from time to time by intercommunication between the 
two governments"(79). It was Deakin's turn to press for specific 
information. 
"Desire learn whether elastic arrangements approved for future 
relations Royal Navy and local forces is intended to be made 
for any and what period to cover any and what matters contained 
Articles of existing Agreement"(80). 
Before being forced out of office, Deakin had the satisfaction of 
being advised of the Admiralty's almost complete capitulation. The 
despatch of the 20th.August, 1908, contained a fair statement of 
Deakin's proposals referring to the Commonwealth's intention that 
in time of peace the vessels of the flotilla would be "controlled 
and distributed in the waters of the Commonwealth without any 
interference from the Imperial Government", and that, in time of 
war or emergency, the vessels would not be moved out of Australian 
waters or placed under Admiralty control without the approval of 
the Australian government. While the Admiralty still believed in 
the advantage of one navy under one control, and while it saw many 
difficulties in carrying out the scheme, and while their "Lordships 
do not wish it to be inferred that they desire to modify their 
attitude on the subject of the Naval Agreement as previously explained 
yet they did not anticipate "any insuperable difficulties" in carrying 
out the new proposals (81). 
Whit had been Deakin's purpose in these negotiation^ 
Had he been thinking beyond providing a flotilla merely for coastal 
defence, and had he been thinking beyond erasing the smirch on 
Australia's national dignity of the 1903 Agreement? It is not possible 
(79) Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers 1907-8, p.395 
(80) Ibid p,397 
(81) Ibid p,399ff 
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to give a decisive answer to these questions, but on circumstantial 
evidence it does appwar that, though these motives were present, 
his intentions went considerably beyond them. It does appear that 
one of Deakin's aims in these negotiations was to advance the 
dominions towards full imperial status winning for them equality 
of status if not of stature with Britain, This involved being 
admitted to consultation on questions of high foreign policy. 
The long history of Deakin's relations with the 
Colonial Office lend warranty to this thesis. "As far back as 1887", 
writes Murdoch,"he was making war upon the bureaucracy of the old 
Colonial Office; and he had never since sheathed the sword"(82). 
At the 1907 Conference, he stood out as the spokesman of the new 
Imperial ism,"the conception of a partnership of free nations, equal 
in status, organised for their common welfare"(83), It was at this 
Conference, Jebb believed, that 
"the traditional hegemony of the Imperial movement had passed 
from the Dominioni to the Commonwealth, Certainly, Mr,Deakin 
had exemplified in the naval discussion, as in his treatment 
of the constitutional questions, the spii?it of a constructive 
statesmanship both national and Imperial"(84), 
But more specific evidence to support the thesis can also be educed. 
In 1905, Deakin accepted the presidency of the 
Imperial Federation League of Victoria which was reconstituted as 
the Imperial Federation League of Australia. This League had, as 
two of its fundamental resolutions that 
"the permanent Federation can be secured and maintained only by 
a system of common defence, devised and eventually controlled 
by representatives from all parts of the Empire" and that "the 
details of any scheme affecting the common interests of the 
Empire can only be properly considered by conferences of 
representatives from all parts of the Empire." 
But from 1895 when these resolutions were accepted, the conceptions 
"common defence" and "federation" underwent a considerable change in 
definition, "Federation" came to mean something midway between 
(82) Murdoch :"Alfred Deakin", p,255 
(83) Ib id 
(84) Jebb :"The Imperial Conference" ,Vol , I I , p,176 
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Jebb's concept of an "alliance" and the original concept of a 
"federation", and and as part of "common defence", the idea of 
independent colonial navies became increasingly important. The 
Imperial Federation League was demanding equality of status, modified 
by difference in stature. 
D'Esterre Taylor, the Honorary Secretary of the 
League, drew readers' attention to the significance of Deakin's 
presidential address. It was a reply to Chamberlain's request in 
1902 for some proposals, or for a demand from the colonies for closer 
union, and was offered "as a preliminary to the detailed consideration 
of issues momentous to the people of the Empire"(85). In this address 
Deakin argued that 
"Defence....became of the greatest possible importance to the 
development of the modern State. It is the first condition of 
its being. In defence the governing power plays in one sense 
the greatest part....The governing power of the Empire to-day 
is its sovereign.,..We are the unrepresented subordinate states,,. 
We are then subject to a Government which is not ours except by 
tradition and precedent, but which possesses absolute authority 
over us..,,always exercised so far with the greatest consideration 
and caution, and always likely to be. For all that, its power is 
exercised with no direct warrant from us. It is surely unreason-
able to suppose that this state of affairs can continue indefinjte-
ly."(86). 
As well as a general right of consultation, it 
appears that the particular manner in which Deakin thought the state 
of affairs might be altered, would be by the dominions assuming 
greater regional responsibility for Empire policy. This was fore-
shadowed, also, in Deakin's presidential address. 
"the international balance has been redressed most impressively 
of late under our very eyes. Two new powers have entered the 
lists, the United States and Japan, with whom the Empire, as a 
whole, has many interests in common, and with both of whom 
Australia has, and 16 likely to have, very special relations"(87). 
The same point was made in a more spectacular fashion in 1908 when 
Deakin invited the American fleet, wlish had been manoeuvring in the 
South Seas, to visit Australia, This invitation was extended while 
Deakin was negotiating with the British Admiralty. The vehemence 
(85) First Presidential Address of the reconstituted Imperial 
Federation League, June,1905 
(86) Ibid pp.10-11 
(87) Ibid p,6 
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of the Australian welcome to the fleet, the Annual Register reported, 
"excited remark in every part of the world. It would be idle to 
deny that a fecial significance was attached to these Australian 
demonstrations at the visit of the Fleet of a Power which equally 
pJobltms"l88f "" Zealand, feels the pressure of Far Eastern 
In a recent letter to the writer. Professor Morris Miller who was 
a leading figure in the Imperial Federation League, noted that this 
visit was misunderstood in London, whete 
"in some quarters, it was regarded as a lessening of 'home ties'. 
nS^Li® ?^ f ^ S *^® 1'''"^°'' Standard", I pointed out that Australia 
undertook to do m the South Pacific what Great Britain would do 
in European waters. I referred to the 'whole community of States 
of Greater Britain of which they all formed parts'." 
No direct evidence is available but it does seem 
a reasonable assumption that in his negotiations in regard to the 
Navy, Deakin was thinking in larger terms than merely establishing 
a coastal unit under Australian control. Whatever Deakin's motivation, 
it is also a reasonable assumption that in his efforts to establish 
an Australian navy he did advance the dominions closer to the post-
war meaning of dominion status. 
IV. 
The 1909 Naval Agreement was welcomed in Australia, 
Not only did both political parties claim the honour of having 
fathered it but a range of metropolitan dallies, earlier in disagree-
ment about Australian naval policy, each saw it to be the desired 
result of their constant pressure. The less nationalist free trade 
press, the Sydney Morning Herald and the Argjas, saw it as retaining 
imperial co-operation while recognising Australian wishes (89). The 
Brisbane Courier believed that -a* had been responsible for the new 
agreement (90) while the Age , describing it as a "triumph for 
(88) Annual Register 1908, p.470-1 
(89) Sydney Morning Herald 21/8/1909; Argus 18/8/1909 
(90) Brisbane Courier 19/8/1909 
JSl 
Australia", continued t*»t "the inspiration for an Australian Navy, 
armed and controlled by the Commonwealth found its first public 
expression in the columns of the 'Age' "(91). The Bulletin said 
Australia would now be defended in the Pacific and not in the North 
Sea (92). 
The 1911 Imperial Conference refined the definition 
of the relation of the Australian Navy to the British Navy in a 
manner satisfactory to the Australian government. A routine of 
precedence and national sybolism was fashioned, and to avoid the 
possibility of diplomatic embarassments, it was agreed that no 
dominion ship was to be sent out of its station without advising the 
Admiralty. If naval vessels were to be sent to foreign ports the 
agreement of the Imperial Government must be obtained. Imperial 
seniority was admitted but dominion autonomy was also respected. 
In the same year a report was submitted by Admiral Henderson planning 
the development of a great Coimnonwealth Fleet to consist by 1933 of 
eight armoured cruisers, ten protected cruisers, eighteen destroyers, 
twelve submarines, three depot ships, and one fleet repair ship at a 
cost of £23,290,000. An additional £40,000,000 was to be spent on 
docks. The annual cost of the personnel was estimated at £2,226,000 
and six naval bases and eleven sub-bases would be required (93). 
The amicable Australian-British relations,following 
from the agreement of 1909 and still evident in 1911 began to show 
signs of strain by 1912-13. Keith has detailed the course of the 
relations at the government level (94). There had been movements 
in 1911 by the British Government to interest the Dominions in 
greater participation in Empire organised defence schemes. In 1911 
the Committee of Imperial Defence had decided to invite the dominions 
to send representatives to the Imperial Defence Committee when matters 
(91) A^e 19/8/1909 
(92) Bulletin 26/8/1909; See Mansfield :0p cit for a discussion of 
the Dreadnought Contribution proposal. 
(93) Keith : Op cit p,320 
(94) Keith : Op cit Chapter XIV. 
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affecting overseas dominions were under consideration and had 
accepted the proposal that local Defence Committees should be 
established in the dominions. Because of the 1911 Canadian elections, 
and then the visit to Great Britain of Borden in 1912, the invitation 
was not conveyed until December 1912. The reply of the Australian 
Labour Government, which under Fisher and with Pearce as Defence 
Minister, was not enamoured of the idea of permanent Australian 
representatives on the Defence Committee, was that a conference on 
Naval Defence Bhould be held either in Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa or Vancouver in January or February 1913. The British Govern-
ment did not think this possible. "1'he other Dominion Governments 
could not attend a Conference on such short notice, and it was 
doubtful whether they would wish a general conference"(95). 
As an alternative, the British government suggested, 
that after the Australian Commonwealth election in May,1913 the 
Defence Minister should visit England, No reply was sent to this 
message but on the return of the Cook ministry, the Australian 
Government cabled the British Government to the effect that the 
arrangements reached at the 1909 Conference did not seem to be taking 
shape, Australia had forged ahead,with the building of its fleet 
unit and it was nearing completion; the Chinese and East Indies units 
however, did not seem to be in the course of preparation. The British 
Government replied, informing the Commonwealth of the Admiralty's 
views of Britain's ability to conform to the 1909 Agreement. It 
suggested.that, if the Commonwealth wished, a conference could be 
held with the British Government in 1914, The Australian Government 
probably did not answer this invitation, though there was some 
confusion on this point. Th^in February-March, 1914 the British 
Government offered to receive Australian representatives at a 
conference immediately. However, the parliamentary session having 
commenced and the Cook government with a majority of only the Speaker 
(95) Ibid p.325 
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in the Lower House and a minority of twenty-nine in the Senate was 
unable to send a minister. No doubt Keith is correct in arguing 
that the local political situation was the reason for the prolonged 
and indecisive negotiations. 
In March these deteriorating relations were brought 
to a crisis by Churchill's statement on naval policy, ««ft Churchill 
was reported to have said that "a battle-cruiser is not a necessary 
part of a fleet-unit provided by the Dominions" and that "the presence 
(96) 
of such vessels in the Pacific is not necessary to British interests". 
It was a speech which set off a considerable furore. 
Despite the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Australia's 
suspicion of Japan does not appear to have diminished after the 
immediate shock of the Japanese defeat of Russia. Rather was there 
a hardening determination to ensure Australia's naval defence. The 
journals most consistently vocal in drawing attention to the Japanese 
challenge were the Bulletin and its offshoot, the Lone Hand. The 
Lone Hand, from 1908, published an extensive series of articles and 
imaginative stories as intensely anti-Japanese as Lane's Boomerang 
had once been anti-Chinese. 
"Already Korea is throttled, Manchuria devastated and exploited; 
the integrity of China is threatened. Pledges, treaties, 
alliances - all ahve been cynically broken in hep dangerous 
aggression...,the Imperialism of Japan....is so shameless that 
it promises to achieve only ruin. But before that ruin there 
will be many dangers for the white race in the Pacific to 
face"(97). 
On the projected termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1915, 
the Lone Hand believed that Japan would ally herself with Germany, 
that Germany would totally occupy Britain, and that "we must fight 
Japan alone"(98). Even the renewal of the alliance in 1911 was not 
(96) Round Table, Vol,IV, Part II, p,407 
(97) Lone Hand Vol.Ill,p.619 
(98) Ibid VoLVII, p.91 
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completely consoling. 
"It may mean" wrote the Bulletin,"that Australia has ten whole 
years to prepare for the trouble that is surely coming, but it 
certainly means that Japan may have ten years in which to 
become a formidable adversary"(99). 
These fears were by no means limited to these 
journals. The Australian press took a very lively interest in the 
Japanese reaction to the California immigration restriction legislat-
ion. After discussing the Japanese reaction, the South Australia 
Register wrote 
"Japan, whose avowed object is the mastery of the Pacific, is 
building a large fleet and establishing a powerful army.... 
Japan has to find outlets for her surplus population.,..With 
her growing fleet, Japan will be able to speak with power to 
the nations directly interested in the Pacific, she will be 
inclined to dictate her terms,...the Mikado's Government may ; 
• insist as a condition for the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance that there shall be unrestricted freedom of Japanese 
settlement in Australia and other British lands"(100). 
The Sydney Morning Herald, argued realistically that Australia could 
not protect itself,(101). In a significant change of policy it spoke 
of the need of an Australia-New Zealand based fleet(102). The Brisbane 
Courier believed that Japan had been preparing "to assert herself 
amongst the nations, to put off the obloquy that the United States 
and Australia have cast upon her by different immigration laws"(103), 
And the Round Table, intensely sympathetic to the imperial idea, 
nonetheless felt that 
"when vje consider the growing hostility between Japan and the 
United States and the feeling of the nationalist party in 
China, we in Australia feel that the Pacific is not nearly 
so free from danger as the preoccupied statesmen in England 
may care to think"(104). 
It continued while 
"Australia could not have, and do not desire diplomatic relations 
with foreign Powers.,.,the absence of this tends to the ignoring 
of the fact that the responsibility for armaments cannot be 
divorced from the policy which they are intended to enforce"(105). 
(99) Bulletin 20/7/1911 
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Australia was being drawn into the vortex of high Empire policy 
despite its wish to leave these questions to Britain. 
The Australian reaction to Churchill's policy 
statement was most ably expressed in a paper prepared by an Austral-
ian Round Table study group. They began with the proposition that 
"a divergence of interests between Great Britain and the Dominions 
should not be slurred over in the supposed interests of unity. 
It must be faced. It is useless to believe that statesmen or 
populace in England understand the point of view or realise the 
dangers of the Dominions"(106). 
Australia's dangers were regional, specifically the fear of Japan. 
"The assembling preponderance of Japan in the Pacific is not question-
ed, and need not be closely examined*. It is Japan first and everyone 
else nowhere. The instability of the situation in the East must mean 
either Japanese predominance in China, or Japanese frustration. In 
either case the situation w«6 frought with danger e€ other Pacific 
countries since, if Japanese ambitions were achieved, Japan "might 
be inspired to extend her sphere of power; in the other, deterred 
from her immediate object she might turn towards an object to be 
gained with more certainty". The Anglo-Japanese Alliance could not 
be regarded as a sufficient guarantee. The treaty enabled Great 
Britain to do without a fleet in the Pacific but Britain gave Japan 
no quid pro quo for this service. 
"Great Britain has no fleet in the Pacific and, therefore, can 
do no service to Japan there. Japan has no interests in the 
Atlantic, and therefore Great Britain cannot render any service 
to Japan there. Under these circumstances the treaty cannot be 
regarded as a safeguard. If questions arose between the Empire 
and Japan in the Pacific, the Empire would be helpless". 
To retain the treaty Great Britain might have t6 make some sacrifices. 
"Such a sacrifice would probably be at the expense of the outer 
Dominions". 
Are Japanese and Empire interests likely to come 
into conflict, the Round Table asked. The interests of Britain might 
not. They "are primarily commercial. The Interests of the Dominions 
are personal. The White Australia was a settled policy and there 
could be no deviation from it. Japan might,however, use it as a 
(106) Round Table Vol,IV, Pt.II p.403 
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stepping stone to further advances." An Imperial Defence Conference 
should be held and a branch of the Imperial Defence Committee set up 
in the Pacific to deal with Pacific matters. It should consist of 
naval experts and political delegates from the various dominions. 
These views were not peculiar to this study group. 
The article was circulated for criticism to a number of persons in 
different parts of Australia "who devote some portion of their time 
to political questions without taking an active part in politics". 
There were some criticisms. It was argued that the merits of the 
Japanese Alliance had been underrated, that the paper did not do 
justice to the feeling that the security of Asutralasia rested on 
the "integrity and continuance of the British Empire"; that important 
considerations "in the relation of the Pacific to world politics" 
had been overlooked; that the principles of naval strategy coordinat-
ion were debatable, though Hobody queried that there should be an 
Australian Navy, But these qualifications were not put forward as 
a serious detraction of the paper as a statement of Australian views, 
"It may be taken as a just, if forcible, expression of the 
disappointment and bewilderment caused by the present attitude 
of the British Government to its Pacific responsibilities, and 
also as a sign of the direction which the majority of Australians 
would at present like the arrangements of the future to take". 
In this assessment of the significance of the 
document, the Round Table correspondent was probably correct.. Senator 
Millen, Minister for Defence, issued a public statement making 
virtually the same points. The Sydney Morning Herald, in a far cry 
from 1903, wrote 
"The view of the Admiralty is quite frankly expressed - that there 
is as yet no need for a British fleet in the Pacific, and that 
if in the future the need arose, it could by making special 
arrangements, send out a fleet. With all respects we do not 
believe it The Empire will help the Pacific if the Pacific 
helps itself. That is the object towards which lew Zealand and 
Australia are working"(107). 
'^^^ Courier on this occasion did not refer to the imm.igration restrict-
ion legislation. It believed that Australians would be convinced 
that "in providing their own naval establishment they had done the 
right thing"(108). The Brisbane Dally Mail believed that "those who 
have the defence of Australia in their hands will prefer to go on 
(107) Sydney Morning Herald 19/3/1914 
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with the construction of warships and the defence of our ports" than 
accept Churchill's argiunents (109). The Age saw some substance in the 
Churchill view, but it believed that New Zealand's agreement to 
put its cruiser under British control and the movement of that cruiser 
to the North Sea by the Admiralty, was ample evidence of the wiseness 
of Australia's naval policy (110). 
•With this, the New Zealand government agreed. There 
had been between 1911 and 1914 an almost revolutionary change in 
New Zealand's policy. Not only the ordering of the "New Zealand" to 
the North Sea, but also the failure of the British Government to 
provide the other two vessels promised under the 1909 Agreement, 
temporarily reversed New Zealand's policy. Massey believed that the 
Japanese Alliance "is not sufficient protection for New Zealand, and 
New Zealand, therefore, must do something for herself". He proposed 
a scheme for a great Pacific Navy arguing that the Pacific "would 
yet become the battleground of the nations"(111), • 
V. 
Australian attitudes to defence from 1901-1914 
provide, probably, the clearest illustration of the development of 
Australian national consciousness and of the growth of national 
cohesion in the formative years of the Commonwealth. It would be 
just to regard both the major parties as national parties from about 
1906 and if the press was reflecting public opinion, there was also 
a remarkable degree of unanimity in regard to Australian conception 
of its defence responsibility. 
Towards the Erapire, Australia's defence policy 
was almost bi-partisan as early as 1903, and certainly was bi-
partisan from 1907. Deakin did give an emphasis to the Liberal policy 
Which differed in degree from that of Labour..Australia, grounded in 
self-respect, but also to help fashion an Empire of equals. The 
(109) Brisbane Daily Mail 19/3/1914 
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(111) Round Table Vol.IV,p.409 
JL 
significance of his Importance in this movement has not yet been 
adequately appraised. By writers such as Keith, he has been assessed 
too much on the failure of his detailed proposals and not sufficiently 
on his contrioution bota tov/ards tne understanding of vihat the new 
Gormnonwealth was to be and, also, towards the moving of the Smoire 
into this Conmionwealth. Labour, under x'isher, did not display this 
intensity of understanding and was probably more diffident in 
asserting Australia's claim to a voice in high policy. Yet it was 
neither insular nor parochial and, as v/e will see, at the 1911 
Conference, Fisher stood out as an Ziipire realist, willing to accept 
the necessary degree of responslDllity. 
The Australian debate on delence from 1900 to 1914 
coula leave no aoubt of the essential loyalty of Australia to the 
Empire. Equally it could leave no doubt that a conception of Er.ipire 
which thou^ jht of it as in terms of a strategical d:.-.sposition of 
colonies in rela'cion to the m-other country would not be countenanced. 
This had been reasonably clear in tne 1880's. It vjas prominent by 
1902, And as Japan oegan its triumphant march it became undeniable. 
From that time, in tne opinion of the ov^^rwhelming vjeight of 
Australians, there could oe no turning back tne clock as the Admiralty 
appeared to do in the 1903 Naval Agreement, 
Yet, despite the degree of unanimity of Australian 
opinion regarding national defence, tr^ ere vjas still evidence in 
tne very partial degree of compulsory military training which v;as 
introduced and in the objections to these 3Chem.es, that Australians 
regional fears, thougn sufficiently real, were not yet critical. 
The war temporarily subdued them by refocusing attention on the 
European scene. 
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V. AUSTRALIAN OPINION AND TEE CHANGING EMPIRE 
Australia entered the Commonvjealth period strong 
in its Empire loyalty but also with a set of nationalist aspirations 
which had become the predominant values by 1907 at the latest, and 
which determined the concessions demanded of the British Government 
for majority nationalist opinion to be satisfied with Empire 
evolution. The combination of these demands, of British Empire 
traditions, of Australian national growth, and of the shifting balance 
of world economic and political power resulted, it has been seen, in 
the gradual grov*/th of Australian independence within the Empire in 
the fields of economics, defence and Immigration in a manner generally 
satisfactory to nationalist ambitions. But these achievements had 
been won only oy some loosening, if not weakening, of Em^ jire bonds 
and almost completely by the practice of Empire decentralisation. 
While these developments had been occurring, a 
debate had gone on simultaneously about this changing character of 
the Empire. J'/lth the exception of the handful of Anglo-Australians, 
all participants in the debate commenced with the assumption that 
Australian autonomy and national status within the Empire were to be 
safeguarded. They, also, all commenced witn the assumption that the 
continuance of the Empire was to be assured. They disagreed about 
whether the continued accommodation of dominion requests by ad hoc 
concessions and continued Empire co-operation and consultation 
through colonial and Imperial conferences would result in eventual 
Empire disintegration. They disagreed, too, about whether this 
type of Empire evolution gave more, or less, satisfactory recognition 
of dominion status than a more formally organised system of Empire 
co-operation and consultation. It was a singularly interesting debate 
for the division was drawn neither on strict fiscal lines nor was 
it aetermined by the Intensity of nationalist or Empire loyalist 
sentiments. It was partly the result of different'prophesies from • 
identical premises; but more importantly it was decided by differences 
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of interest in obtaining for Australia a voice in the making of 
Empire foreign policy. As such the distinction was primarily one 
of emphasis and generally speaking tne division became less pronounced 
as the Free Trade Party was swallowed up in the Liberal Party, and 
Doth major parties became national and imperial minded under the 
impact of national growth, developing international tensions and 
increasing recognition by Britain of dominion status. 
Yet at the same time as the major political parties 
were becoming increasingly oi-partisan in their imperial policies, 
the split was becoming more pronounced between union and federal 
political Labour as the militant unions, J^ he Australian Workers' Union 
jti'ii iiA4u journal, the Worker, oecame increasingly caught up in a 
pacifist, anti-imperialist internationalism. This new movement was not 
anti-British, as the radical republj.can movements of the 1880's had 
been, out it was opposed to all capitalist groups. It did not agitate 
for separation but it did foreshadow the anti-conscription campaign 
and Labour's post-war attitudes to foreign relations. 
The acknowledged leader of those seeking more formal 
machinery of Empire- co-operation and consultation was Deakin. He was 
supported by the Imperial '?'ederatlon League, the Brisbane Courier 
and by 1907, the Bulletin. Accepting the presidency of the Imperial 
Federation League in 1905, Deakin expounded in his presidential 
address his .theory of the British Empire. This was not inappropriate 
for the League had provided, since the 1880's, the main Australian 
forum for those Interested in obtaining a voice for the self-governing 
colonies in the making of Empire foreign policy and in formalising 
Empire machinery. In 1902 the British Empire League in Australia 
had also been established Jut while it was interested, too, in 
continued Empire unity its free trade leadership, first under Bruce 
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Smith and then under McMillan, made it unlikely to argue for more 
formal machinery of Empire co-operation and consultation. It came 
to emphasise primarily the encouragement of the sentimental bond. 
Since the Imperial Federation League did provide this forum, and 
also becuase it was a much maligned body, it seems apposite to 
consider its character and role in Australian-Imperial relations 
over these years, before examining the Deakin view of Empire. 
Originally an organisation v/nich had appealed to 
the Australian conservative, the Imperial Federation League had 
attracted even in the 1880's a handful of academic and professional 
men thoughtful about the future of the Empire. When Deakin assumed 
the presidency and Morris Miller became secretary in 1907 the 
number of members of this type appears to have increased.Unfortunately^ 
the minute book of the League has been lost, but the published member-
ship of the executive and the General Council, which was reconstituted 
and enlarged in 1907, demonstrates that the leadership was in the 
hands of academics, jurists, politicians, doctors and clergymen (1). 
This particular group was not a body servile to British dominance, 
nor was it a group without strong representation from those advocat-
ing liberal social reform (2). The League was and had been since 1900 
as jealous of the right of Australians to control their own aomestic 
affairs as the most radical nationalist and it had strongly opposed 
the 1903 Naval Agreement. But it was internationally minded and 
accepting ooth that Australia was incapable if defending herself and 
that isolation was impracticable, it believed that a total recognition' 
of dominion status demanded consultation on matters of high policy. 
Perhaps the philosophical basis of the view of the majority is most 
succinctly contained in Morris Miller's statement that he "pleaded 
for the return of the equality of citizenship with the citizens of 
the homeland, which the migrants had lost in settling in overseas 
Territories" (3) , ._ 
(1) See Imperial Federation League, Victoria Branch, Addresses etc. 
1885-1909. Professor Morris Miller advised me of the loss 
of the minute book. 
(2) e.g. Deakin and Quick. 
And see L.U.Biggs : "Imperial Federation and Social Reform'' 
(Imperial Federation League,Melb.,1908). 
(3) In a letter to the writer. 
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The organisation was in no way a doctrinaire league 
arguing a facile plan of Empire unity. Its leading members were 
acutely sensitive to the difficulties. "The stupendous complexity 
of the problem must be recognised,"said Quick, "and it should be 
approached if not with fear and trembling, at any rate with a sense 
of solemn and sacred responsibility, and a due appreciation of its 
vastness and Importance"(4), Men like Deakin and Quick, experienced 
in drafting a constitution for ^^ustralia, were not likely to accept 
glib formulae for Enipire organisation or to imagine that all embrac-
ing plans were likely to receive ready acceptance. Indeed their 
emphasis tended the other way. "A I'ormal and complete constitution 
for the Empire may not come into being for a long time to come", 
said Deakin (5), MoElnin.om, who described himself as "a moderately 
orthodox member" of the League, believed that the obstacles in the 
path to imperial federation were so great that it was necessary to 
work for some time creating "an Empire wide sentiment"(6). Harrison 
Moore, discussing the Importance for Empire development of Jebb's 
understanding of colonial nationalism as argued in his "Studies in 
Colonial Nationalism", concluded 
"that a study of the actual conditions 
and aspirations of the several nations and the frankest expression 
of opinion thereon is the only sound basis of work for those who 
are looking to the future of the Empire; and in this sense I 
think that Mr.Jebb has probably done more for the cause with which 
tne League is identified than could be done by many paper 
constitutions dealing with the mere machinery of government"(7). 
And Quick, although advancing a paper constitution for a limited , 
form of organisational development, also believed that there was 
"no present prospect of establishing an Imperial Federation Union, 
assuming a definite state and performing independent lunctions of 
sovereignty"(8). 
(4) Quick J. :"Imperial Unity and How to Promote it". 
(Imperial Federation League,Melb,,1908) p.l 
(5) Deakin A.:Presldentlal Address,Imperial Federation League, 
Melb.,1905, p.8 
(6) Macklnnon D. :"In the Future oy Some Form of Federation", 
(Melb.1905). 
(7) Harrison Moore W.: "Colonial Eationalism'',(Imperial Federation 
League,Melb,1905) p.7 
(8) Quick : Op cit p.4 
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Not only was there no advocacy of a rigid system 
of imperial federation, but the League also showed its flexibility 
by its readiness to modify its understanding of"federation". To 1907 
it accepted that "some form of federation" was the only way of 
strengthening the existing unity of the British dominions consonant 
with the greater status it wished to see conferred on them, yet 
not interfering with "the existing rights of local Parliaments as 
regards local affairs"(9). But with the advance of dominion status 
at the 1907 Colonial Conference, this view was altered. Morris Miller 
has recently stated that by 1908 
"we had some qualms over the term 
_'_Federation" for we ceased to be enar;.oured"of the idea of an 
Imperial Parliament. Me accepted it as indicating a orinciple 
of union, more suitable than the loose lorm of 'alliance' 
advocated by Richard Jebb"(10). 
It is perhaps not surprising that with this willing-
ness to discuss an unlimited number of schemes and to modify its 
conceptions, one of the more tolerant cri-ticisms should have been to 
describe the League as "based on sentiment and with no more practic-
able object than waiting for something to turn up"(11). Yet even 
this criticism points to one of the values ol the League for 
Australian-Imperial relations. If it had no practical scheme, the 
bulk of the members did accept that 
"there is every possibility, and, 
in fact, every hope of promoting the establishment of some 
organised agency or force, capable of crystallising the idea 
and principle of Imperial Unity, and constituting a centre of (12) 
gravity which will counteract separative and centrifugal tendencies", 
And in the aiscussions stemming from this faith, the League, if it did 
not produce a plan on which a major structural alteration of the 
Siiipire was based, nonetheless did make a contribution of real worth 
by subjecting the problems of Imperial organisation to searching 
analysis, Egerton's assessment of the significance of the Imperial 
(9) D'Esterre Taylor H.:"Imperlal Federation and the Imperial 
Conference of 1902",(Imperial Federation 
League,Melb.,1902) p.2 
(10) In a letter to the writer. 
(11) Quoted in Langton R.:"Imperial Federation and its Aspirations", 
(Imperial x-'ederation League,Melb. ,1908) p.3 
(12) Quick J. : Op cit. p.4 
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Federation League in England might equally be applied to its Austral-
ian counterpart. "Even if, as an ultimate goal, Imperial Federation 
may seem a will of the wisp here, as so often, the chase may still 
prove more profitable than the quarry".(13) 
One other way in which the chase probably was 
profitable, i^ as in the efforts of the League to foster closer and 
more friendly relations with leaamg members of the Dominions branch 
of the Colonial Office, set up as a result of the 1907 Colonial 
Conference. Lucas, the first Permanent Head of the Dominions Branch 
was entertained while in Australia and Deakin, on this occasion, 
spoke of "the wisdom and necessity of enabling those officers at 
the head of the administration of the internal affairs of the Empire 
to come into actual touch with great realms over which they assisted 
His Majesty to rule"(14). This statement was almost certainly more 
than a formality for Deakin had long been convinced that it was the 
insular approach tbf the Colonial Office officials which was one of the, 
real bars to advancing dominion status and the co-operative Empire. 
Lucas was sensitive to the earlier prevalence of this attitude and 
no doubt,also, to the fact that it was not yet entirely dissipated. 
It was probably with gentle irony that he observed that "there had 
been a time when Australians dissembled their love for Downing-street.' 
But they appeared now to have com.e out of the bush and to have found 
in the representatives of the Colonial Office their long lost 
brother"(15). Nonetheless, Lucas appreciated the benefits which 
would result from reciprocal visits and was keen to assist Australians 
obtain a greater appreciation of the -iorking of the Colonial Office. 
He introduced Morris Miller, for example, to Berriedale Keith who 
was then on the staff of the Colonial Office and who was responsible 
for producing the series of annual Mlue Papers aesigned to keep the 
dominions and Britain informed of developments within the Emipire 
countries (16). Something of the importance of the cultivation of this 
(13) Egerton 
(14) "Proceedings of the Dinner in Honour of Sir Charles Lucas, 
May 28th. 1909".(Imperial Federation League,Melb.,1909). 
(15) Ibid p.2 
(16) In a letter to the writBr. 
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type of relationship may emerge from the study of the official 
Colonial Office documents; part of it may always remain Intangible, 
yet important for leaders of the Imperial Federation League, kmown 
to senior officials of the Colonial Office, Kept oefore their 
attention by correspondence, persoaal association and letters to 
the British press the interest of an inform.ed group of Australians 
in obtaining a greater status for the dominions in regard to questions 
of high policy. 
But, not the least significance of the League, 
after 1905, rested in the fact that it provided an instrument attuned 
to the type of Kn^ire organisation which Deakin sought to develop. 
11. 
It is perhaps not an overstatement to argue that 
Deakin was the only imperial statesman of first class calibre who 
led Australia in the years from 1900 to 1914. Barton had been a 
sincere nationalist but without a coherent tneory of Empire evolution 
and he had returned from, the 1902 Colonial Conference without 
laurels, bearing the unpopular Naval agreement. Fisher shaped well 
at tne 1911 Conference, so much so that the strongly ant-Labour 
Brisbane Courier reversed its attitude towards him as the Conference 
proceeded (17). But Fisher attended that Conference without previous 
first hand experience of on-tne-spot negotiation of imperial affairs 
and without a systematic view of Imperial development beyond the 
conviction that Australian interests must be asserted and dominion 
independence retained at least at the level achieved. He rose to the 
challenge of the Conference, displaying a resL-onslble appreciation 
of the Importance of the admission of dominion leaders to the 
secrecies of British diplomacy. But, for all, Fisher at the 1911 
Conference was the acolyte vjnile Deakin at the 1907 Conference had 
been a high priest. He had attended the inaugural 1837 Conference, 
(17) Brisbane Courier 7/6/1911 
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done battle with Chamberlain in 1900 and apparently thought construct-
ively about the EX.ire throughout the span of years to 1907. His• 
performance at the 1907 Conference was lauded by the British press(18). 
While a substantial section of the Australian press could not support • 
Deakin's advocacy of mutual preference, nor accept nis proposal for 
a Secretariat, neither could it, in general, deny Lis statesman's 
quality (19). 
The view of Empire ';.:iC;h Deakin, and his supporters,. 
had come to hold by 1907 was aptly described by the Quarterly Review, 
"the men who cling to the Idea of an organic unity of the Empire, 
and habitually think of it, despite the looseness of its present 
constitution, as a single bony politic, distinct from the rest 
of the world. They believe, quite as firmly as those of the 
opposite school, in the absolute right of each self-governing 
State to manage its own affairs. They also attribute the strength 
and Gohesiveness of the Empire largely, tnough not wnolly, to 
the principle of local independence. But they do not believe 
tnat by merely following the rule of not inter-fering with one 
another we shall attain the maximum of individual strength and 
prosperity, nor do they find in that purely negative principle 
a sufficient basis for the protection of common Interests or for 
the defence of any portion of the En.pire against external dangers, i 
They are deeply impressed alike with the magnitude of the 
interests which all parts of the Entire have in common, and with • 
the dangers to which, in the absence of organized co-operation, s 
they would all be exposed. They are therefore not inclined to 
rely exclusively upon sentxment, nor to regarn the cultivation 
of mutual good feeling as more than an indispensable foundation 
on which to erect the superstructure of a common policy and 
common institutions. And above and beyond all these prudential 
considerations, they are fired by the idea of a great political 
fabric, the like of which the world has never seen, an Empire 
'on which the sun never sets,' not, however, like the Empires 
of the past, controlled from a single centre or held together 
by a despotic authority, out a free union of independent though 
related States, responsible for the peace and good government 
of nearly one-third of mankind, conscious of a common destiny, 
and animated by a common patriotism." (20) 
Holding these views, Deanin could not be satisfied 
with the existing Sruplre and, as we have seen, he sought to modify 
j-t both by plans for mutual preference and by defence proposals, 
the object of which may reasonably be believed to have been to 
obtain for the self-governing colonies a voice in the making of high 
policy. But, with his view of the Enpjire as an organism, neither was 
(18) See Murdohh W, :"Alfred Deakin" (Constable & Co.,London),1923 
(19) S.g. South Australia Register 24/4/1907; Brisbane G£ur;^ i_er 19/4/07 
Bulletin 25/4/1907. 
(20) Quoted In Murdoch : Op cit p.255 
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he satisfied with the existing machinery of consultation and co-
operation. "We are not even an organised Einpire", he said in his 
1905 Imperial Federation League address and proceeded to argue 
Pollock's scheme for connecting the Colonial Conferences "by means 
of a body of permanent representatives".(21) 
Lyttleton, also, had already been thinking along 
these lines. In a despatch to the self-governing colonies, dated 
April 20th. 1905, he had su^ g^ested that a permanent commission be 
appointed on which all the members of the Colonial Conference, to 
be renamed the Imperial Council, could be represented. The coimnission 
would prepare reports and business for the Council and act as a fact-
I'inding body. The return of the British Liberals led to these 
proposals being dropped and Beakin, then, placed on the agenda of the 
1907 Conference his own proposal for an Imperial Council and Secret-
ariat. The resolution was defeated under the combined attack of 
British Liberal Indifference, Colonial Office opposition, and 
Canadian antipathy. Mansfield has considered the Colonial Conference 
debate in detail and there is no need to repeat it (23). What must 
be considered, however, is the Australian reaction to the Deakin 
proposal for about it was focused a considerable discussion which 
brought out the Australian alignment of opinion regarding the 
Changing Empire. 
By the time of the earlier 1902 Colonial Conference, 
Australian press and parliamentary opinion had largely come to accept 
the machinery of the Colonial Conference. The Catholic Advocate (24) 
was still opposed and the Bulletin was doubtful about allowing 
Barton attend the Conference unless nis authority were strictly 
delimited (25) . There was consideraole or-^ ta.cism by all papers of the 
(21) Deakin : Op cit p.19 
(22) Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers,1905, No,60 
(23) Mansfield B. : Op cit p.41 ff 
(24) QuoUid in Hall H-L'. A<» 5T*-^* I ic c,'^<^  t-*^ l»-A , 
(25) Bulletin 5/4/1902 
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secrecy with which the proceedings were being conducted and there 
was suDstantial dissatisfaction with the naval agreement once its 
terms became known. But the consensus ol press opinion generally 
favoured the Conference idea. This was true of the strongly anti-
imperial federation, free trade Sydney Morning Herald, Syaney Daily 
Telegraph, and Melbourne Argus; of the ^^tTiffiffy^i.ni.ili 1 ImjjiKPiml 
i'DiliiUiLljij, strongly nationalist, free trade South Australia Re;_i3te_r 
which occupied a middle-ofrthe-road position in regard to imperial 
federation; and the Brisbane Coui'ler, sympathetic to mifjerlal 
federation, strongly nationalist about an Australian navy, opposed to 
the immigration restriction policies and markedly unsympathetic to 
collectivist social welfare (26), The attitudes of the press towards 
the Conference idea, then, was not determined by the fiscal,natlonaUsb 
or social policies which they argued and this, in itself, was 
considerable evidence of extensive approval for the form which the 
Empire was assuming. At this Conference, however, there were no r 
proposals for more formal Empire machinery. The Sydney Morning Herald 
could be convinced that "the consultative character" of the Conference 
had been established and that nothing would result "to check the 
'inalienable autonomy' of the colonies" (27), while the G_ourier was 
yet prepared to make haste slowly towards imj;..erial federation. 
"The fruition of a political federation may be marred rather than 
furthered by the attempt to stimulate development. The idealism 
that now prevails in the conception of Imperial unity is In 
itself the assurance of its embodiment in tiie nearer or more 
distant future"(28). 
And even tne Imperial Federation League, licking its wounds after 
its 1880's defeat, could see in the results of the Conference the 
clearing of ground which would allow later the construction of a 
federation (29), 
Deakin's 1907 proposals raised the question to a 
different plane for here was a concrete suggestion for more formal 
(26) S^ ydney Morning Herald 10/7/1902; Syaney Daily Telegraph 
Melbourne Argus 14/8/1902; A^e 23/6/l902;Brisbane Courier 
21/6/1902 
(27) Sg;dney Morning Herald 22/7/1902 
(28) Brisbane Courier 24/6/1902 
(29) D'Esterre Taylor : Op clt. 
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Empire organisation. His scheme, in itself, nould have oeesi a modest 
first step in Empire re-organisation compared with the visionary 
plans frequently suggested in the 1880's. It gave the Conference 
no executive or legislative power, and the Secretariat was to be an 
institution for carrying out the unanimous decisions of the Conference, 
preparing for Conferences, and acting as a centre of Intelligence 
and communication for member nations. The machinery was to be placed 
in the Prime Minister's office, removing all aominion affairs from the 
resented Colonial Office. But the reaction of the critical wing of 
the press was not to weigh the proposals in their own terms but to 
appraise them against the press' resistance to imperial federation. 
The most bitter of Deai/:in' s opponents was- his 
erstwhile supporter, the Age. Deakin, it wrote 
"was aivjays bitten more 
or less v'ith the maggot of Imperial Federation,.. .IVnen Deakin 
says that 'we require some voice ±n Imperial counsels before 
we share the responsibilities of Imperial action' he speaks ' 
, without ti:.e smallest warrant from any considerable portion of 
Australian sentiment. There is really no party in the 
Commonwealth that has the least desire to partake of Imperial 
counsels". 
The A^e restated the argument customarily brought against schemes 
for closer union oy formal machinery that tne largest partners would 
dominate. In the Age's view, Jebb was on the correct track in wanting 
an alliance. "Imperial union ought to be contemplated as a closer 
form of International alliance rather than a loose form of national 
unity"(30>. 
The free trade press launched a similar attack. 
Deakin, said the Daily Telegraph, wanted a "united Ei-nire" of the 
type which would take the Empire back to the stage when it had lost 
the American colonies (31) . Tne ^:2£^LJ^^£ni^LJ^:^E^i^ believed that 
from the "Australian point of view....much of Ys/hat has been done, to 
say nothing oi what has been attemr^ted, r.'ould have been better left 
quite alone" (32), And the Argus cr^-ticised strongly the doctrinaires , 
(30) A£e lo/4/l907 
(31) Sydney Daily Telegraph lo/4/1907 
(32) Syjjiey Morning Herald. 16/4-/1907 
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who argued for tigntening the oonds of Empire, "It is well indeed 
that the destiny of the Empire is not committed to their hands"(33), 
vathin parliament, the Free Trade speakers advanced similar 
arguments (34). 
The Worker, itself, did not comment on the proposals 
but it did quote Matson, at length, in a statement which might be 
accepted as the official Labour viewpoint. Having supported the 
idea of periodical Conferences, Vcatson continued that there was a 
tendency to expect too much from these gatherings. 
"A number of people are strongly imbued with the belief in 
Imperial Federation, and before each Imperial Conference are 
hopeful of decisive steps being taken in that direction. So in 
the present instance, the Idealists will be disappointed with 
the rejection of the Imperial Council proposed by the Conference 
now sitting. Yet, that was eniphatically the wise course, 
nebulous ideas about Imperial unity go"to make up a splendid 
sentiment, but when brought under the searchlight of cold reason 
all schemes towards imperial Federation have proved valueless. 
'Liberty In Unity' is more than a phrase under our present 
conditions, and the Empire no¥J rests upon a safer foundation 
than would be possible were we asked to surrender any material 
portion of that liberty which we prize co highly. It is gratifying, 
therefore, that the Conference preferred'the very modified 
scheme eventually carried"(35). 
This moderate statement was a far cry from Labour's o.niiiiiy attitude to 
Imperial Federation and an equally far cry from the attibade which 
the Australian Workers' Union was to express in 1917. But at this 
stage, it did represent federal Political Labour's increasingly 
responsible attitude towards imperial relations and its publication 
without rebuttal by the Australian Mhrkers' Union controlled Worker 
was symbolic of the amicable Australian Workers' Union Federal 
Labour relations at that time. By the 1911 Conference the Woi^ ker_ 
was arguing a much more radical anti-imperialist attitude. 
Deakin had aligned against his proposals, then. 
Labour, the bulk of the free trade press and politicians and the 
protectionist Liberal Age. Supporting him were unusual bedfellows. 
(33) Arsus 16/4/1907 
(34) Coimmonwealth Parliamentary Papers 1G07-8, p.71 
(35) the Worker 25/4/1907 
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the Courier and the Bulletin. For the B^ ull.etMLn, the Cecretariat was 
a way of removing "the last traces of colonialism", while the 
Courier, usually anti-Deakln because or his alliance with Labour, 
believed that "on this occasion he is to be congratulated.... on 
having lit a fire which will never be extinguished"(36). 
On the surface the Deakin proposals had failed 
and on the surface, too, the weight of expressed Australian opinion 
welcomed this failure. But in what did it consist? It was a rejection 
of Deakin's effort to promote the ''organic unity" of the Enic-ire 
and as the louWi^ i^^ tra_lia_j.leg;ist^ r noted "the Iiiij:.erial Federationist 
.....had been repulsed all along the line"(37). But the paradox 
rested in the fact that the advocacy of these schemes had stenmied 
as much from an intense appreciation of dominion nationalism as 
from sentiment for the Empire, and if the machinery resolutions had 
been largely jettisoned the beiief in equality of status and 
correlative duties v^ hich motivated them had partially permeated 
both at the Colonial Office and within Australia, 
The division of the Colonial Office into a 
Dominions Branch and a Crovm Colonies Branch appeared to Deakin a 
thoroughly minor achievement, "The mountain in labour which brought 
forth a mouse". But he felt that "at least the mouse is creeping in 
the right direction"(38). The change of the title of the Conference 
from Colonial to Imperial may again have appeared little more than 
a change in nomenclature given the organisation of the Empire, but 
at least it carried the implication as the South Australia_ Register 
noted that "the self-governing dominions are entitled to be heard 
in connection with the management of the Einpire" (39) . Deakin was 
not singularly responsible for these changes. They had been m.ooted 
before. But at the 1907 Conference, opposed by Canada and Elgin, 
and supported by Jameson, he "led the advanced movement". It was 
(36) Bulletin 25/4/1907; Brisbane Courier 19/4/1907 
(^^) ^ £uth Australia Register 15/4/19C7 
(38) Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers 1907-8, p,6094 
(39) 3outh_A':^ 3tralia Register 24/4/1907 
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Deakin who Impressed on the British Government that brand of doi.iinion 
nationalism which "abhors oificial i.vperialism or Downing Street 
centralisation"(40). And considered in conjunction with his war 
of attrition with the Admiralty over the naval question, it is not 
unreasonable tentatively to credit Deakin with causing some of the 
change in British official sentiment towards the Dominions which 
occurred before the 1911 Conference. 
Equally, it can oe argued that he played a part 
in modifying the Australian understanding of its role within the 
Empire despite, or because of, the substantial opposition to his 
Secretariat proposals. From 1900 and earlier, as has been seen, there 
had been no dearth of Australian nationalists, of varying degrees 
of militancy, willing to assert the equality or superiority of the 
Australian to the British. But what had been lacking was the purpose-
ful drive, emanating from within Australia itself, to convert the 
Empire into a co-operative Institution of equals. Deanin never won 
over the bulk of expressed Australian opinion to the fulness of his 
plans for Erripire re-organisation any more than he won over the 
Colonial Office. But by 1911, while majority expressed opinion still 
opposed "iuperial federation", organisation for closer union ?jas 
no longer as extensively opposed and consultation of the doxuinlons 
in regard to foreign policy questions concerning them had gained 
confidential 
wide approval. The/approach of the British Government, the developing 
fear of Japan, the heightening of international tension and the 
implications of the consolidation of the Two-party system within 
the Commonwealth all contributed to this development but Deakin 
had also played his educative role. Deakin would be missed at the 
1911 Conference, the S.ojath_Ajisjtraliaji Regisjb^ e^ ^ stated because "he 
was the dominant figure in the discussions of 1907 and exerted great 
influence in shaping the constitution of the present conference and 
in developing the Imperial Sentii.ient and policy as far as Australia 
is concerned"(41). And the Argus, totally opposed to Deakin's 
proicosals in 1907, vJas .by 1911 willing to modify its view to the 
(40) Ibid 
(41) Ibid 22/5/1911 
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extent of maintaining that the Conference "would certainly oe well 
advised to go no further than Mr Deakin's plan (of 1907), even if 
it go so far"(42), 
111. 
The atmosphere in which the Imperial Conference 
of 1911 was conducted was almost a revolution from that of the 
1902 Conference and markedly different from 1907. In the work which 
Jebb published in 1911 to place his views on imperial development 
before all interested parties, he stated that 
"there is indeed no 
longer any necessity to urge the standpoint of 'colonial nation-
alism' . After being for years peculiar to the large Dominions, 
it has now become practically the accepted standpoint, not only 
of all the great metropolitan joumaxs, out also of the British 
Government, subject to the limitations imposed by the conservatism 
of permanent officials and the unfortunate exigencies of party 
politics"(43). 
At the Conference the Premiers were admitted to the secrecies of 
British diplomacy. Fisher's objection to the conclusion of the 
Declaration of London without consulting the dominions was met 
sympathetically by the promise of futu±>e consultation "as far as 
possible" in regard to such treaties concerning the Dominions. It 
was not possible for tne British Government to agree for the moment 
that the Imperial Conference should be held anywhere except in 
Great Britain but it did approve of subsidiary Conferences being 
held in the Dominions and implicit in this resolution was the 
possibility of holding future Imperial Conferences outside Great 
Britain, The Conference marked a high tide in amixsable Australian-
British relations. 
At this Conference, with Deakin aosent, the torch 
of the Imperial federation was carried by Mew Zealand. But Sir 
Joseph-Ward's proposal, similar to the 'Round Table' scheme which 
Curtis haa_conspiratorallly launched (44), was more in the tradition 
(42) Argus C/4/1911 
(43) Jebb R. :"The Imperial Conference"(Preface). 
(44) See Miller J.D.B. : "Richard Jebb and the Problem of EmDlre'', 
(Atnlone Press,1956). 
of the visionary proposals of the 1880'sthan of Deakin's resolution 
of 1907. What Ward meant, his speech revealed, was a more sweeping 
re-organisation than his motion suggested for he argued for an 
Imperial Parliament of Defence with its own Legislature and Executive 
to handle Int-vBrial questions and matters for foreign police and 
defence. In this parliament Britain would have the predominating 
influence, Canada and Australia rejected it and the British 
government gave the effective rebuttal by stating that its resuonsibil. 
Ity for foreign affairs could not be shared. 
But even oefore Ward elaborated the full meaning 
of his resolution, the weight of the Australian press had rejected 
it. The Age saw the suggested Council as 
"diametrically opposed to 
the policy of Australian nationalism....national defence is the 
first feature of national development. We want i-mstralian 
soldiers and sailors not hired m.ercenaries trained and naid 
in England"(45). 
The South Australian Register believed that "in practical politics 
the most satisfactory results are obtained uhrough direct coin.imicat-
ions" and not tnrough a Council such as Ward recori:-ended(46) , Only 
the Courier stood behind Ward, but its ecuitv^ rials did not show tnat 
it appreciated, or had been informed, of the full j-mplicaoions of 
Ward's resolution. It made no reference to the predominance of 
British influence which the scheme provided for, nor did it mention 
Ward's criticion of the establishment of separate Australian and 
Canadian navies. The second omission was particularly significant 
in view of the crusade which the Courier had constantly run for 
distinct dominion navies. The G_ourl^ r's interest in t'ne scheme YJas 
its now long term interest in a.n Eiupire re-organisation vjaicii would 
both recognise doi.ij.nion status and also prevent Empire disintegration. 
im) Age 4/4/1911 
(46) South Australian Rgw>j.ter 1Q/5/1911 
m relation to the Ward resolution, it quoted Milner with approval. 
"We have arrived at the present lop-sided condition of things 
which no thinking man, unless he cnerishes the idea of seoaration, 
can regard with anything but profound dissatisfaction. The new 
idea of partnership, of equal union, finds itself confronted 
with a system which makes and was intended to inake for separation 
....the new idea can not be realised with the old macninery"(47), 
Rejection of the Ward proposal, however, by both 
the official representatives and majority of the Australian press 
did not mean that the pendulum of Australian opinion was not 
swinging towards more extensive Empire co-operation and consultation. 
At the Conference, New Zealand recoiimiended the complete separation 
of the Dominions Branch of the Colonial Office from the Grown 
Colonies Branch. The Secretary of State for Colonies suggested altern-
atively that a Staxiding CQ/.iaittee of the Imperial Conference be set 
up. It would include the Secretary of State, senior officers of the 
Colonial Office and the dominions' representatives. It would deal 
with the resolutions of the Conferences and arrange for meetings. 
The scheme bore marked similarities to that rejected in 1907. Fisher 
was at first diffident, worried about endangering Australian 
autonomy. In the second discussion, while continuing to emphasise 
that its functions must be strictly advisory, he saw the Committee 
as essential. Between tne two aiscussions the premiers had been 
oriefed on the international situation. And it was this frank 
admission of dominion nationalism which was the final infxuence in 
inducing Australian Australian federal political and majority press 
opinion to be prepared to consider discarding, virtually, the last 
remnants of their colonial suspiciousness of closer association with 
Downing Street. 
The Brisbane Courier, dissatisfied w..-th the 
failure of the Conference to construct jiore definite .machinery for 
tne administration of Empire foreign policy, still believed that the 
Conference was a marked advance on any previous Conference. The 
admission of the premiers to the confidenEes of the Imperial govern-
ment's inner circle, it considered, meant "that a door has been 
opened wnich can never again be shut"(48). The South Australian 
(47) Brisbane Courier 24/5/1911 
(48) Ibid 29/5/1911 
f-j2 
Register believed that "the admission of the Dominions to the 
councils of the nations has revolutionised the relations between 
tne Dominions and the Mother Country''(49) . cor the Argus the total 
pattern of development was correct. 
"The increasing importance 
given to the Colonial Office in a political sense; the appoint-
ment of High Cormnissloners with the rank of ambassadors;" the 
periodical conferences at which Iiin^ erial mat'oers are freely and 
sympathetically considered; are all evidences of a tendency in 
the right direction"(50). 
Not only was the press in substantial agreement, welcorainu the 
responsibilities implicit in the admission of the dominions to the 
right to consultation and to the confidences of British foreign 
relations, but within the House the earlier P'ree Trade opposition 
to the 1907 Secretariat proposals was converted to an attack on the 
government by the same men for not having brought about closer 
Empire political union. And|accused falsely of Empire disloyalty 
because of a misreport of a statement by Fisher, the Leadership 
of federal political Labour had in fact, accepted that Australia 
could now readily assume imperial responsibilities. 
"All barriers of reserve have been broken down", said Pisher,"and 
mutual confidence has been estaolished. The Dominions are now a 
part of the E.,iplre in all things, and no development, however 
sudden, should now be beyond our understanding"(51). 
As Vi/e have seen these amicable relations deteriorat-
ed between 1911 and 1914 as the fear of Japan increased, international 
tension worsened, and the 1909 naval agreement, confirm.ed and 
extended in 1911, failed to materialise. Met important though these 
developments were, they did not irrmiediately inn'luence Australian 
attitudes to consultation and co-operation, except by intensifying 
tne demand for regionally located Imperial Conferences. A middle 
road seemed to have been found between the centralism of the imperial 
federationist and negativism of the old Manchester School satisfact-
ory to the weight of Australian political and press opinion. 
(49) 3outh Australian Regi_s_t^ er 2/6/1911 
(50) Argus 6/4/1911 
(51) Quoted in South Australia Register 2/6/1911 
m. 
IV. 
If the problems inherent in reconciling colonial 
natlonalis];! with continued Empire membership, which had created 
such bitterness in the 1880's, had largely been resolved by 1912, 
two further problems for Australian-Imperial relations were now 
apparent. One of these was a recurring problem, the iruulicatlons for 
Australian-British relations of the Australian-Irish; tlie other, 
although it had overtones from the past, was largely nevi/, the spread 
of left-wing, pacifist internationalism amongst unionists. Between 
1901 and 1914 neither of these problems vjere of sufficient m-oment 
to affect significantly the natuern of Australian-British relations. 
They did become very meaningful under the tension of war and the 
violence of the conscription conflict. 
lit 
AUSIRAiIAN OPINION MCWAMDS THE EM: IRE DUTlIMG uME MAR. 
The First World War saw the penultimate stage in 
the transition of the self-governing section of the British Empire 
into the British Commonwealth. British reliance on dominion rorces 
and their economies and the real as opposed to the previously nominal 
participation of the dominions in an Empire war brought the dom-inion 
leaders into full membership of tiie Imperial War Cabinet, tne supreme 
body dealing with Empire problem.s of great moment. The liaperlal M'ar 
Conference,a body concerned with Ernuire proolems of a jiore general 
kind than the Imperial War Cabinet, expressed the general si ;;nif Icance 
of the development in its famous Resolution IX of 1917. It proclaimed 
tha t post-war Sxapire re-adjustment , wnile tnorou^nly guaranteeing the 
complete authority oi the dominions in regard to domestic matters, 
shoiM recognise tne dom.inions "as autono.aous nations of an Imperial 
Commonwealth" with "an adequate voice" in foreign policy and foreign 
relations and should provide for "continuous consultation" on all 
important matters of conmion imperial concern to allow efi'ective 
has 
concerted action. The resolution meant, Dawson/pointed out, 
that Imperial Federation , for which Curtis and his Round Table group 
had oeen agitating, had been brushed aside and also that the idea of 
separation had been excluded (1). On the other hand, tne theoretical 
equality oi status of the member nations of the self-governing 
British Empire had almost been recognised. 
The ultimate stage in the conversion of the Empire 
into the Commonwealth, though of course merely the first stage in the 
evolution of tne new Coiuiuonwealth, might be dated at either the 
Balfour Declaration or tne Statute of Westminster of 1931. But these 
statements, ii^ortant formally enough -chey were, a^d little more 
than attempt to bring the theory abreai of tne facts. There continued 
(1) Dawson :"The Development of Dominion Status', p.27 
ni. 
to be instances after 1919 when British statesmen, wittingly or 
unwittingly, failed to show due regard to dominion nationalism and 
when inadequate consultation led to recriminations as in trie cases 
of the Lausanne Treaty and the Chanak inciaent. These, however, were 
occasional affairs vi/nich could not turn back che clock of Empire 
evolution and while Ireland, Canada and South Africa required the 
formal statement of the cnanged relationship to oe convinced that 
their autonomy was complete, Australia showed little interest in 
this constitution making. The Empire as it was by 1919 gave more than 
sufficient recognijjion of freedom and equality for all except a 
handful of Australian Irish republicans. 
" 'We vjant no constitution making' said Mr.Hughes in 1921, 'what 
is there that we cannot do now? What could tne Dominions do 
as independent nations that they cannot ao now?'....'We want no 
written constitution', said Mr.Bruce in 1926. 'We want no formal 
document', declared Mr.Scullln m 1930.' "(2) 
The colonial phase of Australian nationalism, bound-
ed at one extreme by republl-canism. and at the other by demands for 
imperial federation to allow the self-governing colonies a voice in 
Empire foreign policy, had passed. Very largely, in fact, it was 
already over by 1C14 and txie war years can be regarded as the period 
which lused the new and the remnants of the old so as to establish 
the basis of Australian attitudes towards the imperial connection 
in a world context during the period of "equal status". In this 
sense these years ooth conclude tne transition stage of Australian 
status from colonialism to dox.iinlonism and introduce the new phase 
of Australia as an apprentice nation. 
From the time of the Boer War j-t had been apparent 
that Australian attitudes to the imperial connection were of such 
an order that Australia would honour its Empire membership in the 
event of war. August, 1914 confj-rmed tnis when Australia showed 
(2) Hancock :"Survey of British Conmionwealth Aifairs",Vol.II,p.52. 
nx. 
herself "substantially unanimous in her determination to share the 
perils and burdens of war with the rest of the Empire"(3). But tnis 
occasion, unlike the South African conflict, imposed a severe, 
prolonged strain on the economy and people. Witnin two years the 
united fabric of the Australian front had been rent apart and in the 
process tne oi-partisan understanding of Australia's external 
interests and the national character of the Federal Labour Party 
pre-war were ooth snattered. Australia emerged from the war with 
pronounced differences of emphasis and principle distinguishing the 
attj-tudes of its political parties towards e_::ternal relations and so 
towards the role wnich Australia should play in the Empire in a 
world contest. 
To the cause of conscription gathered the metropollt» 
an press, the Country Press Association, the various Cha^ uoers of 
Commerce and Manufactures, the protestant churches except for the 
Society of Friends, tne weight of the University staffs, the Catholic 
Archbishops of Sydney, Adelaide and Perth, and the non-Labour Parties. 
These Interests were reinforced by the strongly nationalist Bulletin, 
the Australian Natives' Association of Victoria, South Australia 
and Western Australia, and by the leadership of the i^ 'ederal Labour 
Party, the Hew South Wales and Western Australia Labour Parties and 
a smattering of other Federal and State Labour members. It was an 
unusual grouping but on this occasion there existed the cormiion thread 
that the future of the Empire was identified with Australia's future 
to such an extent that it was believed that noth-ui;. short of the 
compulsory mobilisation of Australia's manpower for overseas service 
was a sufficient Australian contribution. This characterised ooth 
the less and more assertively nationalist elements amongst the 
concriptionists and it was not insignificant that the more militant 
nationalist elements which were represented should have been drawn 
from the ranks of those who had played a leading role before the 
war In advocating compulsory military training or in bringing before 
the public th© security threats to Australia - Hughes, .Vatson, the 
(3) Scott E. :"Australia During the y^ ar" ["Official History of 
Australia in the War. of 1914-18", Vol,XI, An^ :us 
and Robertson 1936^ p,23 ff 
m 
Australian Natives' Association and the Bulletin, Experlenoed in 
detecting dangers to Australian security, the Bulletin as early as 
August, 1915 agitated for conscription seeing the war as "one of those 
Imperial death struggles which occur only once in a century; the 
sort of war that Carthage waged and lost - it is peculiarly our 
war"(4). And as the campaign got under way, the full range of the 
metropolitan press took up the same cry. "The real issue", wrote the 
Sydney Morning Herald, "is that Britain to-day is fighting for her 
very life, for her very existence as Britain, and the incontrovertible 
(o) 
fact is that Britain is the pivot on which the British Empire turns". 
For the Western Australian "our only protection is the m.otherland" 
so that we must support her to the full (6). And the Argus argued 
that the volunteers were fighting "for the defence of Australia and 
the Empire" (7). For these groups Ei,..;ire loyalty and conscription 
tended to oecome synonymous terms and, although it was not true of -
all conscriptionlsts, there did develop in the heat of the referenda 
campaigns a strong proclivity to condemn the anti-conscriptionists 
as disloyal. The Sydney Morning Herald believed that conscription 
was a "straight question of patriotism" (8) , and Plughes e.Poraced all 
anti-conscriptionists in the ph.rase 'Sinn Feiners,socialists and 
shirkers"* 
Within the anti-co;iscriptionist ranks, groups aid 
exist disloyal to the British cause, Trj.eir presence haci heen partly 
obscured in the early months of the war because of the initial 
united front. But this unanimity had resulted not only from feelings 
of Empire loyalty but also from the almost universal acceptance that 
this was a just war. Only the I.W.W. and its offshoot the Women's 
Political Association continued to "War against war" and a Werman 
minority were op^ josed to the Allied cause (9) . Otherwise "u'ith few 
(4) The Bu.ll£tin 12/8/1915 
(5) Sydney Morning Herald 28/9/1916 
(6) Western Australian 28/10/1915 
(7) Ar;j;-s_ 6/10/1916 
(8) Sydney Morning H^erald 28 /9 /1916 
(9) See Jauncey L .C . : "The S t o r y of Consc r l ^ txon i n A i u j t r a l i a " , 
(Al len and Unwin,1935) . 
Hu~ 
exceptions", Blackburn wrote, 
"Labour supporters. Left and Richt, 
accepted the war as inevitable and believed an willed victory 
to be necessary. The war was, it seeiiied, a war against ImDerialism, 
a war to bring liberation to the subject nationalities and to the 
working class of the German and Austrian Empires, a war to avenge 
the rape of Belgium. Mo difference of race, creed or tradition 
weakened this sacred Union"(10). 
The Melbourne Celtic Club pronounced that sectional attitudes were 
to be put aside and John Gavan Duffy stated that "in this crisis, 
Irlsn nationalists forget all grievances of the past"(11). Most 
Australian Marxists supported participation in the war ranging 
"themselves with the Marxists in other countries, as they believed, 
with the heroic Karl Liebknecht"(12). It only required a revival of 
the Irish question and disillusionment about the idealistic character 
of the war to rpovoke two dissident groups both ccntaining elements 
of disloyalty. 
The Irish Matiunalist cause, with its religious 
overtones,had never been far below the surface in militant Australian 
Catholic Irish circles. It had erupted, for example in 1911 when 
Cardinal Moran proposed that on May 24th. each year the Catholic 
commuinity would celebrate "Australia Day" as a counter demonstration 
to Empire Day. He was repiorted to have said that 
"those who were the 
Champions of Imperialism and Empire Day were many' of them avowed 
enemies of the Catholic Church and were identical with those who 
advocated Primrose Day in England, and tried to ii.ipede the 
progress of the Catholic Church at home and abroad"'(13) . 
The Dean of Newcastle (Dr.Golding Bird) replied that Moran's suggest-
ion"was nothing else than a subtle attack on the connection between 
Australia and the mother land"(14). Snowball (M.L.A.), the principal 
speaker at the Protestant Alliance Empire Day service in Melbourne, 
saw the Roman Catholic Church as "the great standing menace to the 
British people". The Vatican, he asserted, was engineering German 
hostility to Great Britain. "Cardinal Moran said that our fleet 
snould be entirely dissociated from the British Navy. He wanted the 
Irish Roman Catholic regiment"(15). The suppression of the Dublin 
Easter Rebe.l_lioji brought out the full strength of Irish -'^ ationalis^ t ^  
(10) Blackburn M. :"The Conscription Referendiun of 1916", 
lAntl-Conscription Celebration League,MerD,1936jp.8 
(11) Scott : Op clt p.24 
(12) Blackburn : Op cit 
(13) S^2L4^XJ'^°^^°--S ^-^^i'^ 26/1/1911 
(14) Ibid 30/l7l9rr " 
(15) Ibid 29/5/1911 
Jtk". 
movement within Australia. The men and women of Irish extraction 
were stirred by Easter week, said Blackburn. 
"Their dormant distrust 
of Britain awoke .... Catholic men and women who in 1915, would 
have given their last man and their last shilling became, almost 
In an Instant, eager and resolute opponents of conscription"(lo). 
It is impossible to appraise with precision the 
strength of the 'disaffected Catholic Irish group. In the 1911 census 
921,425 were Roman Catholics of the 4,874,414 whose religion was 
stated (17). This figure Included children, and Mannix estimated, 
probably with reasonable accuracy, that Catholic voters in 1916 did 
not number more than 200,000 (18). Mumbers of these would have been 
English Catholics and there is no reason to assume that all Catholics 
of Irish extraction felt eqiially strongly about the Irish question. 
At one extreme stood Mannix and Fihelly virtually openly opposed 
to the Emipire. "The opinion is held by many young Australians", said 
Fihelly, "that every Irish Australian recruit means another soldier 
to assist the British Government to harass the people of Ireland"(19). 
Mannix, during the second conscription campaign stated "You in 
Australia are Sinn Feiners, and more luck to you. Australia is first, 
and the Empire is second"(20), There was an Irish Republican Brother-
hood in Australia with seven members who were found guilty of 
attempting to collaborate with Germany for the defeat of Britain (21), 
and the Sons of -Australia League aimed to establish a Commonwealth 
Republic (22). On the other hand. Archbishop Kelly was a member of 
the Universal Service League and T.J.Ryan, whem the Sons of Australia 
League wanted to make the first Australian President because of his 
stand against conscription, did support recruiting to the extent 
of being patron of the "Ryan Thousand". The problem for the 
Australian-Irish, of course, was that whereas their Australian 
nationalism was satisfied with the position which Australia occupied 
within the Empire, their Irish nationalism was still outraged. And in 
view of this dual loyalty, it is probable, although it cannot be 
(16) Blackburn : Op cit p,13 
(17) £o^om!^l:th_Y£a^_Bo_ok No, 12, p,133 
(18) Jauncey : Op cit. 
(19) League of Loyalty to the Ernpire (Mitchell Library) . 
(20) Quoted in Jauncey : Op cit p.275 
21 Sydney MornlnaJIerald 5/8/1918;7/8/1918; 8/8/1918 
(22) Tbidl77l2/r918 
I8U 
demonstrated, that the average dissatisfied Catholic Irish opinion 
agreed witn that of Senator Lynch who, in 1919, moved a motion for 
self-government m Ireland similar to the motion which had been • 
moved in the Senate on four previous occasions since 1904. Lynch's 
motion stated that "the good name and well-being of the Empire" 
rested on the recognition of national liberty and national aspirat-
ions . The future of the Empire, thereiore, requirea "nothing short 
of the immediate grant of a full and just measure of self-government, 
preferably on Dominion lines" to Ireland (23). And aaoing weight to 
the more moderate view were Archbishop Spence of Adelaide who 
consistently spoke uf the war as a 'just war', and Archbishop Clune 
of Perth who advocated conscription. It was tnis support of 
conscription oy Ciune, coupled with the fact that Western Australia 
was "hermetically sealed" irom the rest of Australia that was 
responsible in Blackourn's opinion for the large ''yes' vote in that 
state (24). But even if these countervailing influences were 
operating unere remained nonetheless a sufficient cross-current of 
anti-British feeling for contemporary opinion to accept tnat it was 
affecting recruiting particularly in the later stages of the war (25), 
The second group of anti-conscriptionists which 
contained disloyal elements was the socialist movement. But their 
disloyalty was of a different order to that of the extreme Australian 
Irish even though in his crusades against conscription Mannix made 
use of their anti-capitalist arguments. The socxalist was not a 
nationalist though he may well have supported the right og national 
self-determination. Ills resistance to the war and conscription was 
no more anti-British than it was anti any other capitalist country. 
He believed that the object of conscription was "to protect and 
further the interests of the employing class"(26) and that peace 
could be assured only by "the general strike of the workers against 
war"(27). 
(23) Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol.LXXXPX p.ll7S3 
(24) Blackburn : Op cit p.13 
(25) The Round Table Vol.8,Pt.2, p.637; and see Archoishop Kelly's 
statement of May, 1918 tnat recruitin,^ in Australia was being 
influenced by the Irish question and t"ne disabilitiea under 
which the Catholic Schools were labouring. {]_ Scott p.462"^ 
(26) Quotea in Jauncey : Op clt p.116.The details of the socialist 
peace movements are traced in this work. 
(27)Sidelights on Two Referendums - Extracts of letters from 
H.E.Boote to his brother from 1911...to 1917, pp25-S. 
^^1. 
Except for the Quakers, Lhese Irlsn nationalists 
and radical socialists were the only two anti-conscriotionist 
interests which were avowedly disloyal. Numerically t^ v»/ould be 
Qoubtful if, at the extreme level, they made up more than 100,000 
of the 1,200,000 who voted against conscription. On tne other hand 
elements of their tiiinKlng were spread tru?ough the industrial and 
intellectual leadership of the Labour movement ana as the war 
progressed anti-capitalist inter.nationallsm came to permeate the 
views of tne residual Australian Laoour Party. The resulting character 
of the movement is difficult to aeflne because, as Hancock has 
pointed out, it was made up of many incompatibilities - Aiiierican 
syndicalist theories, ecLioes of Leninism, echoes of Wilsonianlsm, 
bits of Marx, British pacifism and robust Australian nationalism (28), 
Except for the Irish it was not anti-British nor was 11 opposed to 
the imperial connection so that in tnis sense its opposition to 
conscription was not a symptom of disloyalty. But its sus^ -zicion of ' 
"tne capitalist style of war policy"(29) and tne primacy of the 
sectional doxuestic interests of the industrial element which gained 
control of tne party machine qualified its support for the war, a 
qualification wnich oy 1913 had turned to agitation for peace. 
These developments nad oeen incipient belore the 
war. By j.908 tne -^ ''ederal Laoour Party nad become a national party, 
not only in regard to policies with external implications but also 
in regard to aomestio Issues. It nad ceased to argue "a peculiarly 
working class policy", as Gollan has demonstrated, out had put forward 
"a national-liberal policy capable of appealing to sections of all 
classes as well as the working class". This had led the industrial 
wing, becoming increasingly dissatisfied witn the results of 
arbitration, to turn a sympathetic ear towards tne inuustrial theories 
of the Australian Socialist Party and the I.W.W. (30). Simultaneously 
labour journals had commenced discussing socialist views about 
international affairs. Tne Queensland Da-ly Standard, established in 
1912, was initially a moaerate ,^ aper but it did come out against 
the "man race" for armaments (ol) . In the Syaney Woriier in 1911 there 
T^ Sj^ HamTocl-c : Op citp",^ 35 
(2^) iiustralian Trade Unionism and Conscrijjtion.-Report of the 
Mroceedings uf the Australian Trade Union Congress together 
with the nanifesto of the Natlcnal Executive(19lc). 
plitchell Library*^ p.5 
ng. 
began to appear strongly anti-im^ :;eriall3t feature ana leader articles 
which argued for worla-level working-class co-operation. 
"Tnere is growing up xn Australia a feeling of community of 
Interests with the workers of all countries. We are coming 
to understand that workers, whatever the flag that flies 
over them, can have no cause for quarrel -imperialism and 
this international spirit will not live together"(32). 
It seems quite probable that at this time these 
more radical beliefs did not have a substantial following. Tne 
Worker's articles of 1911 fluctuated between militancy and orthodoxy, 
depending it can be assumed on whether H.E.Boote or Hector Lamond 
was responsible. Boote went onto the staff of the Sydney Worker in 
April,1911 from the editorship of the Queensland Worker. From then 
can be dated its more aggressive tone. Hector Lamond, who was the 
editor-manager, was a much more moderate and conventional Labour 
supporter. The conflict between Boote and Lamond, wnich reached its 
climax over conscription was not unsymbolic of the more widespread 
division which occurred between militant-industrial and national 
labour (33), Until the war, however, the more moderate elements were 
in the political saddle and Boote's more extreme vxews were perhaps 
not widely representative of labour opinion (34). Monetneless they 
were apparently gaining way and before the war the unionist was not 
only becoming dissat^-sfled with the dhi.inishing class character of 
his party but, also, was at least familiar with the left-wing 
internationalist arguments. 
Like the Catholic-Irish dissatisfaction, these 
rifts within the Labour movement vjere temporarily obscured by the 
(30) Gollan R, :"Radicalism and Socialism in Eastern Australia, 
1850-1910", p,334 
(31) Tne Daily Standard 13/5/1914 
(32) The Worker 2o/5/l911 
(33) See "Sidelights on Two Referendums". Boote became the editor 
of the Worker in May,1914. In November,1914 the journal's title 
was changed to the Australian Worker. Boote remained editor 
through the inter-vsar period. 
(34) See Gollan : Op cit; Jauncey : Cp cit. 
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initial response to the war. Patriotism, and Empire sentiment were 
as strongly represented in official Labour circles as non-Labour 
circles. Fisher's "last man and last shilling" speeches were 
underwritten by the Laoour Manifesto which stated that 
"Our interests and our very existence are bound up with those 
of the Empj-re. in time of war half measures are worse than 
none. If returned with a majority we shall pursue with the 
utmost vigour and determination every course necessary for 
tne defence of the Commonwealth and the Empire in any and 
every contingency regarding as we do such a oollcy as the 
first duty of the government"(35). 
And Boote , who was one of tne few at no stage enthusiastic about the 
war, recorded that "Everyone wants to save the Empire"(36). But by 
late 1915-1916, the initial mood of easy confidence and of Allied 
righteousness were wearing thin in certain quarters, while on the 
domestic front tiiere was dissatisfaction oecause of the declining 
purchasing power of wages and a developing industrial distrust of 
Hughes because of his failure to honour his undertaking to jjut to 
the people again tne constitutional amendments rejected in 1911 and 
1913. It was a distrust which was intensified oy the censorship 
administration, and into the situation was projected the events of 
Easter "Week in Ireland. Once again tne united Australian front 
towards the war opened about tne division which had been emerging 
pre-war. 
It vsas significant for Laoour' s future attj-tudes 
to International relations and for the electorate's attitude to 
Labour that th.e anti-conscriiCtlonlst movement swept in from, ihe 
Left instead of originating from within the ranks of iPne mioderate 
parliamentarians for it gave control of the movement to those most 
pre-oGcupied with sectional domestic affairs,and it gave greater 
importance to ohe international idealists within the movement, men 
such as Anstey, Blackburn and Brennan and at the publicist level, 
Boote. Resolutions against conscription began to be passed by 
socialist organisations early m 1915. Tne cry was successively 
(35) Quoted in Jauncey : Op cit p.107 
(3Q) ^'Biaelights on Two Referendums", p.25 
/fp. 
taken up by the Amalgamated Miners' Association in Broken Hill in 
July,1915, the Brisbane Industrial Council in December,i915, the 
Queensland State Labour Conference in March,1916 and the Victorian 
and New South Wales Conferences in April,1916 (37). -^'he Worker 
which had been in difficulties wirfi the censors from the end of 
1914 because of its unenthusiastic attitude towards recruiting, 
commenced its attacks on conscription in September,1915 to counteract 
the inf^ u^ence of the Universal Service League. At this stage, the 
Australian Workers' Union leadership was not decided in its attitude, 
Lamond and Spence favouring conscription. Grayndler, the general 
secretary, however, was already an opponent (38). By May,1916 the 
Australian Workers' Union had decided definitely against conscription 
and it joined tne special Trade Union Congress convened that month, 
representing 280,000 unionists,which issued a manifesto against 
conscription, Tne following wee.tc, the Grand Council of Trade Unions, 
"tne supreme official oody in the Trades Union movement", endorsed 
the attitude of the Trade Union Congress (39). By the time that 
Hu^nes returned to Australia in July,1916 the trade union movement 
was overwhelmxingly agreed in its opposition to conscription and 
many Labour M.P.'s and Senators had also committed themselves in 
writing as a result of the decision of the Victorian, Mew South 
Wales and Queensxand Executives to require a pledge of anti-conscript-
ion from all members. A feature of ohe period had been the victory 
of the industrial wing over the political vjing in tne New South 
Wales Labour Conference, the return of the inL-.ustrlally supported 
Ryan Labour Government in Queensland, and zhe election to the 
executives of the Conferences in all the eastern states of new 
members who were strongly anti-conscriptlonist. Hughes returned to 
a political organisation the leadership of which had undergone a 
considerable change while he had been absent and one which he could 
no longer sway to his views. To use Blackburn's phrase the rule of 
(37) See Jauncey : Op cit p.118 ff 
(38) ''Siaelights on Two Referendums", p,34 
(39) Australian Trade Unionism and Conscription : Report of the 
Proceedings of the Australian Trade Union Congress.(1£16) 
/f/ 
l»4-the elder statesmen" had been oroken (40). Hughes left u'ae party 
taking with nim the outstanding personalities and the body of the 
experienced senior men. Tne Australian Labour Party's new Leader, 
Tudor, clearly did not ap UL-oxJ^ mate to the ca^ -ibre of Hughes ana the 
formulation of the external policy of the party fell increasingxy in-
to the hands of the idealists. 
There is little need to recapitulate the movement 
of the Laoour Party from this time to June,1918. Scott has told 
tne story (41). The resounding electoral defeat in 1917, the 
preoccupation with industrial questions and the great strikes of 
lul7, tne bitterness of the 1917 conscription conflict, the spread 
of peace movements in labour circles overseas, all combined to turn 
executive Laoour opinion Increasingly towards the idea of peace. 
There was an abortive attempt to revive a united front towards 
recruiting in the Governor General's Conference of April,1913. 
"Most of tne members of the Conference", vjrites Scott, "were loyal 
to its intention" (42) . But two m.onths later the Seventh Cumnionwealth 
Conference of the i\ustralian Labour Party unanimously agreed that 
"iimriediate negotiations be initiated for an International Conference , 
for the purpose of arranging eo^ uitable terms of peace". The Conference 
did not openly op;;:jOse further recruiting but it did pass a motion 
to oe submitted to a referendum of Labour members. The resolution 
stated that further participation in recruiting would be subject to 
the conditions 
"(a) that a clear and authorative statement be made on behalf of 
the Allies, asserting their readiness to enter into peace 
negotiations upon the basis of no annexations and no penal 
indemnities. 
(b) th.at Australia's requirements in man power be ascertained 
and met with respect to' -(l) Home Defence (2) Essential 
industries"(43). 
The Ar.,.istice occurred before the referendum was taken. 
At both conscription referenda the electorate 
suonorted the anti-conscriptlonist case. In the 1917 elections, it 
returned to the Hughes, 'Win-the-War', Mationalist Party with a 
formidable _maj_ority. No_Lab_our Senators were returned and within the 
(40) Blackburn : Op cit p.14 
(41) Scott : Op cit (42) Ibid o.458 
f43) "Report of the Seventh Conmionwealth Conference of the Australian 
Labor Party",June 17th.1918. (Perth). 
I^z 
House -ijaDour's representation was reduced to 20 from 42 before the 
split and 25 after it. Both conscriptionist and anti-conGcriptionist 
sympathisers have interpreted this sequence of results as evidence 
that the anti-conscription ii^ ajority was neither, an anti-Brxtish nor 
an anti-war majority. It also meant, as the Round Table reported, 
that "the majority voted for the Nationalist Party because without 
clearly defining the mea.n3 , they believed it more capable of 
expressing tne genuine loyalty of Australia than Mr.Tudor and his 
friends"(44). Because Laoour had again become a sectional pint-, 
because of the "dubious quality" of its bedfellows during the anti-
conscription campaign, and because it had been tarred with the 
brush of disloyalty. Labour was banished to the Opposition benches 
for a decade. Without the leavening influence of leaders experienced 
in international affairs and with no opportunity of gaining direct 
experience, it continued to base its policy towards the Imperial 
connection and towards external relations on the attitudes fused 
in this war period. 
"ft is not too much to say that the Peace proposals epitomised 
the changed emphasis in Labour thougPit which was to be 
characteristic of official Labour's outlook on external relations 
for most of the inter-war period."(45) 
II. 
From 1916, Labour's attitude toward international 
relations was characterised by a mixture of insularity and idealism. 
The mood was not unreminiscent of the republicanism of the 1880's 
but there was this major difference that whereas tr^ e repuolicans 
had seen embroilment in v/orld affairs because of the imperial 
connection as the bar to their Utopia, the Labour Party no longer 
saw the Empire as a threat. The new enemy was international capitalism. 
(44) The Round Table Sept.1917, p.795 
(45) Barbour R.T.H. : "Australian Labour Attitudes to External Relatiais, 
1917-41".(Unpublished thesis, University of 
Sydney? p.17 
and the defence international organisation for collective security 
and worker v;elfare. 
The 1918 Labour Conference defined its attitude 
towards the imperial connection v;?ith some precision (46) . The first 
plank of its fighting platform was "complete Australian self-
government as a British community". By complete Australian self-
government it meant that tnere should be no imperial federation 
and that "policy and administration" should be decided on the advice 
of Australian Ministers only, subject to the control of Australian 
parliaments. All Bills should receive assent on the advice of 
Australian Ministers only and the Australian High Court should be 
the final Court of Appeal. Australian citizens should not be 
recommended for imperial honours and state governors should be 
abolished. More extreme nationalist motions requiring the Australian 
Prime Minister, Ministers of the Crown, and candidates for state 
and federal elections to be Australian born were decisively rejected. 
There was nothing new to Labour's traditions within these resolutions 
but their reassertion as part of Labour's federal platform was 
indicative of the Party's assertive Australianism. Except in regard 
to Ireland, for which it demanded self-government, the Labour Party 
was generally satisfied with Empire evolution. But it still wished 
to slough off tb.e reimiants of Australia's colonial past even if, 
in this sense, they were little more than vestigial remains. 
Where the greater importance for Australian -
Imperial relations now rested vi/as not in Labour' s attitude specifical-
ly to the Imperial connection but in the emphasis which it gave the 
imperial connection within the general scheme of its conception of 
Australia's foreign policy. TPiis established tpie priorities of 
Labour's external policies not only after the First World War but 
carried over in Dr,Evatt's policy when Australia did assume complete 
responsibility for its own foreign policy during the Second World 
War. 
(46) Report of the Seventh Commionwealth Conference of the Australian 
Labour Party, 1918 
1^1-
The peace proposals which the 1918 Labour Conference 
laid down indicated that Labour's prime faith was to be placed in 
international organisations. This did not mean overtly aishonourinf^ 
Australia's Empire alliance, although that could have been 
foreshadowed in the recruiting proposals, but it did mean that 
collective international machinery and not the a Ctfn.istic machinery 
of power diplomacy should be used for resolving national conflicts. 
The type of machinery which the Labour Party wished to see established 
was " a world-wide Parliament as advocated by President Wilson". The 
Labour Conference also formulated tne principles which it oelleved 
should be followed by the International Peace Conference Labour 
demanded. Many of tnese principles were more than j*»t 'jDeace proposals 
however, and became tenets of Laoour's creed. Anti-imperialism was 
present in the Insistence of the right of small nations to political 
independence and in the demand for national self-determination in the 
case of disputed territories. Humanitarianism emerged in the 
requirement that devastated territories should be restored at the 
expense of the invading powers but there was an inconsistent (although 
an anti-militarist) note in the demand for compensation for v\/idows 
and dependents of only non-combatants and seamen who had lost their 
L^ives as a result of hostilities. Anti-militarism was,also, obvious 
in the resolution that conscription be abolished in all countries 
simultaneously. And a faith in the democratic process in irfernatlonal 
affairs showed itself in the call for "the control of foreign policy 
under a democratic system, based upon publicity in lieu of the 
present methods of secret diplomacy". 
While the Labour Party reached these conclusions 
tnrough the traumatic experience which it had undergone, the non-
Labour party shaped its policies by more conventional methods. The 
influx of Labour men did give it a more assertively Australian 
flavour than might otherwise have been the case but in principles 
and emphasis there had not been a pronounced difference in the 
attitudes of Liberal and Federal Labour pre-war. And since non-Laoour 
was both the government and was uncoiixpromised in its loyalty to the 
Empire, the leadership of the Nationalist Party, vjhile not eschewing 
international organisations, tended to place its greater emphasis 
/fr-
on the tested forces in international relations. Of these the head and 
cornerstone was Australia's membership of the British EMrpire. Huuhes' 
war and peace methods followed the now well-established lines of 
seeking more efficient Empire co-operation and consultation short 
of establishing rigid machinery; of asserting the dominions' right 
to equality of status with Britain; ana when Australia's specific 
interests were involved of attempting to act nationally but from 
the vantage point of Empire membership. So far had the Empire advanced 
by 1919 in relation to tnese principles tnat it was possible for 
Hughes to oelieve that 
"the signing of the Treaty of Versailles by 
the Dominions on behalf of the King marks the final stage in 
the new order of Empire relations. For it does not appear 
that there are any more worlds left for the Dominions to 
conquer"(47), 
As Prime Minister, Hughes made his first essay 
a t the question of Imperial relations while still within the Laoour 
Party. At the invitation of the British Government, he reached 
England in March, 1916 to take part in the Imperial Cabinet. This 
was as yet merely the embryo of the Imperial War Cabinet which was 
to function from 1917. With some diffidence Asquith had invited 
tne dominions to participate in the deliberations of the British 
Cabinet but his cautious reserve made him fearful of allov^ ing the 
revolutionary in:.ovation to get out of hand, a possibility which 
showed every likelihood of happening under the combined pressure 
of Hughes' personality and the overwhelming reception which fhrnbes' 
well-publicised, aggressive war policy received. Asquith did not 
wish, wrote Hughes, 
"To crystallise into an institution that wnich 
he could only regard as a most unfortunate experiment. But his 
custom was to do everything in the grand manner. So other 
invitations came along - at spacious intervals intended to 
make it clear that one must regard what he had done as an act 
of courtesy rather than an established practice"(48). 
Hughes made full use of the "spacious intervals" oy stumping the 
country making speeches against "the deoilitating policy of 'wait 
and see'." He advocated "the prosecution of the war to an absolute 
finish;.,..the Immediate destruction of German trade within the 
Empire, and when the struggle is over, the vigorous prosecution of 
a tariff war against Jjermany;...a closer and more effective bond 
(47) Hue^ lies W.M.;"The Splendid Adventure" (1929) p.115 
(48) Ibid p.41 
^^L. 
of Ir^ verial union; and.... the imsistence of the vital interest of 
labour in the present struggle''(49) . 
The reception given to these policies within 
Australia was mixed but was not generally speaking entnusiastic. 
Tnis was partly the result of vendettas against Hughes. Tne Meloourne 
^?£Our_Ga_ll and the Au^str^iianjyork^, already suspicious of Hughes, 
accused him of forgetting Laoour and Australia and of supporting 
English Toryism and ca:,.itallsm. Partly tne cautious reaction resulted 
from tne fear that Hughes was sailing close to the dangerous shoals 
of imperial federation, and the reaction or the press to this 
possibility illustrated that their views haa not modified since 
before the war. The A ^ ^ still argued that tne only possibility 
of strengthening tne Emuire rested in commercial union so it welcomed 
Huehes economic proposals aj.tnough xt still doubted the sincerity 
of his conversion to ..u'otection. "On tne basis of trade the British 
Eiupire may quite easily be fused xnto a powerful economic, naval 
and military identity". In regard to any politica]. scneme of 
closer association, however, the Age continued to hold that the 
Empire "can never become more solidly or ^ jermanently united than it 
is now". Tlj.e Sydney Dally Telegraph reiterated tne view that any 
scheme of Federation must "evolve" and could not "oe fasnioned 
precipitately or oy artificial pressure". The Argus neld that 
"both remote ana recent experience are against Mr.nughes' in his 
opinion "that the Empire can be strengthened by organic union". 
The Brisbane Courier clung to its faith in imperial federation 
but it now questioned whetner tne dominions would be prepared to 
give up tne degree of deiuocratic self-control rMiich would be 
necessary if they were to have an effective voice in imperial 
affairs (50)-. Laoour, as we have seen, was adamantly opposed to 
imperial federation and their utterances had ceased to Si.ow the 
moderation nhich had been a feature of Watson's statement in 1907. 
(49) The Round Table Vol._6,Pt.2 p.752. For a comprenensive survey 
" o f Hu^:hes' wartime economic policy see 
Scott : Op cit Book III. 
(50) Ibid 
Mr 
The Worker wanted closer in^ -iustrial unionism not imperial federation, 
and in 1917 the Australian forkers Union put on record "its stoutest 
opposition to this Dominion of the Em,.ire oeing governed by the 
plutocrats of En,_^ land which the proposed scheme would involve" (of). 
The array of opinion was an illuminating illustration 
of extensive satisfaction with the constitutional form of the Emipire 
even if the outburst had been provoked by a misunderstanding. Hu^nes 
was never an imi^ erial federationist in any formal sense of the term. 
^^ '^Mfg. Splendid Adventure ne noted that of the two dangers which 
threatened the Empire, its enemies wno want to destroy it and its 
friends who want to save it, tne second was the more dangerous. 
"Against attack from its enemies it is m some measure prepared; 
but the advice of well-meaning enthusiasts, inflamed by a 
burning passion to improve tne Emuire, and the suggestions 
of those restless spirits who think that because its Constitution 
is elastic it can be stretched in any direction and to any 
extent, are more subtle dangers against which it is almost 
defenceless"(52). 
Although tnis view was expressed in 1929 it did not differ from the 
opinion which he held in 1916. But although not a formal imperial 
federationist, Hughes did not speak a markedly different language, 
in practice, to Deakin. Hughes,also, saw the Ei.gjire as an "organic 
growth" and he did seek when he returned to England in 1918 political 
machinery and constitutional conventions v/nich would bridge "that 
apparently impassable chasm which divides comg-lete autonomy of the 
several parts of the Empire from united action on matters affecting 
us all'tSS) . 
Between Hughes' 1916 and 1913 visits to London, 
his main energies were occupied on the domestic front in the 
conscription campaigns, the election, party re-alignments and the 
effort to whip the economy into the pattern of total war. He ?jas 
unable to attend the 1917 Imperial War Cabinet and Imperial Conference 
and so missed those historical meetings which are generally accepted 
as landmarks in the constitutional evolution of the British. Empire. 
(51) Quoted in Hancock : "Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs", 
Vol.1, p,83 
(52) Hughes : Op cit p,141 
(53) Quoted In Hancock : Op cit p,84 
/ff. 
He approved, however, the pattern which was being shaped. 
"The 1917 Caoinet and Conference did good woric. I^he ^xneriment 
as it was called, had fully justified itself.'ine methods and' 
scope of the War Cabinet's operations were similar to tbose 
of an ordinary Cabinet. It was free to develop alon-- any 
lines its members thought best. Whatever action tney cons-'dered 
necessary for the preservation and development of the Empire 
was open to them; no legal or constitutional restrictions stood 
m their way. Tnere was, however, no llKelihood that tfey 
would atteiapt anythi.ng wnich the peoole of Britain or the 
Dominions mieht regard as action beyond the scooe of their 
authority"(54). ^ 
And Hughes confirmed this impression when he attended the 1918 
Mar Cabinet which adopted the same procedures as those of 1917. 
Els criticism of tne organisation of the Empire was restricted to 
the coioplaint that when the Imperial War Cabinet was not meeting 
tne intelligence system of the Empire was thoroughly inadequate. 
Many of tne war time blunders could have been avoided, he argued, 
had the dominions been kept fully informed of the truth of the 
situation. 
It was tne 1918 var Caoinet which saw the tide of 
battle turn. Hughes and Cook stayed on in England to act as 
Australia's representatives at tne Peace Conference and to sign 
the Peace Treaty lor the Dominion of Australia on behalf of the Ming 
"stooping from her proud position of the Paramount Pov.'er", wrote 
Hugnes, "Britain had become m.erely primus inter pares. The 
iiiost advanced of the Dominion representatives could not have 
asked for more''(55). 
The narrative of Hughes' contribution to the 
Imperial War Cabinet, and of h.is part in winning for the ao-miinions 
separate representation at the Peace Conference has been told by 
Scott as well as the story can be told until the official documents 
are opened to access. Hughes' stand went, in fact, beyond the 
demands of his own government. Watt's caole that the Cabinet coul 
to a 
not approve tn.e "claim for representation of the loiainions as 
lominions" was a clear indication tu.at Empire evolution was advanc-
ing beyond t:L..e level demanded by their natioiiaiismi. Cn the other 
hand, the Australian Laoour Party in their p'=ace proposals of 1913 
ri^ a_d__demand_e_d_s_ep_ara_t^  for the I-ominions and Ireland 
(54) Hughes : Ou cit p.53 
(55) Ibid p,114 
I ^ ' l . 
at tne peace conference which they proposed (56). And during the 
parliamentary debate on tne Peace Treaty government members 
emphasised that "Australia has taken a step forward in her associat-
ion, not only with the Empire, out with thp other nations of the 
world"(57). These expressions of opinion would seem to substantiate 
Scott's statement that "on examination of the evidence affecting 
Australian public opinion at the time does not disclose that there 
was any uirect opposition to partioipation"(58). While there may ' 
have been some dispute, "nowever, as to whether the call for separate 
representation went oeyond reasonable dominion aspirations, there 
was no demand for greater independence and equality than already 
achieved. The form of the Empire had come well abreast of the 
requirements of Australian nationaBsts of all complexions. The 
questxon now was v.nat attitudes were Australians to adopt towards 
international affairs m the light of their new status within the 
Empire. And in the attitudes of the parties can be detected the 
differences of emphasis already outlined. 
Mhe goverimient's policy lowards the League of 
Nations as an instrument of collective security varied but there 
was a tendency for the goverm-ient speakers to be rather cautious 
aoout its potentialities and to emphasise the continuing significance 
of tne Britisn connection. At the extreme stood Hughes, inerciless 
in his atcitude towards feiinany, disgusted tnat the Treaty had 
to be based on Vvllson's Fourteen Points, and cynical about hioman 
nature. 
"Men passionately denounce war, but YJIII not pay the price of 
peace; they cry aloud for redress for their oi'vn grievances 
but they contemptuously refuse redress to otn.ers. They tall^  
loudly and long about justice, out what they really mean 
by justice is the advancemenij of their own interests"(59). 
Pnu.fhes did not, im 1919, condepi tne League but he preferred to 
place his trust in tne more traditional methods of security, buffer 
states in the Pacii'ic and the British alliance. Almost at tlie opposite 
extreme to Plughes vms Cook, v/no had aslo attended tne peace 
negotiations. Of a more ccuipasslonate nature, he was able to feel 
"CBIT'R"epor"t of the Seventh'wr;!^ .F."C"onf¥?enc"e'~Tl9ISj p."8 ' ~~^  
(57) Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates,Vol.LXXXIX p.12585 
(58) Scott : Op clt p,752 
(59) Hughes : Op cit p.103 
^ Oo 
the bottomless despair visited on a defeated people. Ee hoped that 
the League of Nations was the "Magna Charta of a new world"(60). 
The boay of the government speakers inclined towards Cook's attitude 
rather tnan that of Hughes but many of M..e,i re-emphasised Australians 
basic continuing dependence on Britain, i^ 'leming was perturbed that 
naval supremacy had passed from Great Britain to the United States. 
"W ith all due respect to the United States of America, and desoite 
my strong belief in that other great branch of our family, 
I think it is a serious matter that the iritish Navv, wnich 
has held Australia as an integral part of the Empire^ and has 
stood for our racial pride against the whole world should even 
for one moment sink into second place''(bl). 
Ana Best emphasised that Australia could place its real trust in 
tne --ritish statesmen, "assured that tne interests of tne Empire 
will oe safe in tneir hands"(62), 
Labour opinion, also, varied but in this case there 
was no criticism of the principle of collective security on which 
Labour based its faith for the future. The criticism stemmed from 
the view that the proposals did not go far enough, in particular 
that they did not ensure disarmament and the abolition of conscript-
ion (63). There was, also, amon.^ st the Labour members a considerable 
concern with domestic matters. Tudor and Maloney believed that 90% 
of Auacralians were concerned with the cost of living, not with the 
Peace Treaty (64). Tnis combination of international idealism and 
of pre-ocGupation with local affairs was to be representative of 
Labour's post-war attitudes. Towards the Imperial conneotion there 
was a general approval but only .Plnlayson, while supporting the 
in 
League, emphasised that Australia should not ignore/its support for 
the League , its connection with, the British Empire in relation to 
Australia's special foreign policy interests (65), 
(00) Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates,Vol.L^GCXIX p.12400 
(01) Ibid p.12535 
(u2) Ibid p.12550 
(oo) Ibid p.12394 
(04) loid p.12553 
(05) Ibid p.12538 
^ol 
Beyond the problem of collective seci.irity, the 
three issues of specific Interest to Australia for which Hughes had 
fought at Versailles were the right to restrict Asiatic irmiiigration, 
"just reparations", and Australian C:_.ntrol of former German Pacific 
possessions south of the equator. In his conviction that a fihite 
Australia must be maintained Eumies nad overwnelming Australian 
support. In 1917 when the question of post-war Indian migration was 
under discussion, an anti White Australia note had been struck by 
the Pastoralists' Review. 
"After peace is decided the color line will become more and 
more indefinable, and we shall be compelled to recognise the 
fact for Britain will say to us 'Renounce your white policy 
or suffer the consequences. Your blood will be upon your own 
head^ "(66). 
But this was a minority sentiment. There was no federal parliamentar-
ian in 1919 who even implied that Hughes should not have made every 
effort to ensure that the White Australia policy was adequately 
safeguarded. The maintenance of a White Australia was the unctebated 
first principle of ooth political parties. The question of obtaining 
"just reparations" was more contentious. Labour generally opposed 
reparations if they were extorted on the "vindictlve"Basis of 
"making Germany pay"(67). But it was the third issue, the control 
of the former German Pacjfic islands, wnich provoked the most extensive 
discussion for this question was closely associated with Australia's 
security, 
Tlie fear of Japan which had been manifest before 
1914 was teumorarily allayed with the outbreak of war. when attention 
was refocused on the European scene. During the war, security 
censorship and censorship designed to prevent defamatory crxt^cisms 
of the Empire's Allies, concealed from the general public the extent 
to which Japan was capitalising on its abnormal influence in the 
Pacific to further its imperialist ambitions. It was at this time 
(06) Daily Herald, AdeMde, 2/6/1917 
(07) Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates,Vol.LXXXIX p.12598 ff 
-^oZ. 
that tue British Government, dependent on the Japanese lacific 
Navy, agreed to the Japanese demand for the German possessions north 
of the equator. The Fisher Government felt obliged to become party 
to the secret treaty and in 1G17 Hughes confirmed Australia's 
acceptance. In fact Hughes appears to iiave been indifferent to the 
future of the islands north of the _equat.or.. But he was determined 
that Australia should occupy the former German territories south of 
the line. Supported on this occasion by nis government he fought the 
case through to the position where he obtained these islands for 
Australia as C class mandates (c8). 
The significance of the Australian reaction to 
these developments rested In the absence of a feeling of immediate 
danger. Scott's survey of press opinion shows that "ti.Le principal 
papers were not encouraging either as to Australia's obtaining 
sovereignty over the islands, which entailed resp^nsiollity and 
expense, or as to accepting a mandate from the League of Mations"(o9). 
And Laoour placed its hope for world security on no annexations 
and intprnationallsm. Tne lul5 naoour Conference caoled to London 
that "it expressed the earnest hope that in negotiating for peace, 
Britain vjill not oe delayed or embaraased oy the statement that 
(70) 
Australia insists on tne retention of the captured Pacific possessic& 
Even Catts was true to this trust. He had become perturbed in 1916^ 
when, through reading Japanese Hansard and Japanese journals, he 
learnt of the extent of Japanese intrusion into China. It had been 
because of his wish to puoj-icise tni-s information that h.e had broken 
with HuuAes(71). From this time, in Catt's ovm words, Japanese 
Pacific poli&y had become an obsession with him, and j.n the Peace 
Treaty debate he took Hughes to task for having sold out Aaatralian 
security by allowing the Japanese to occupy the former German islands 
(68) Scott : Op cit p.765 ff; p.772 ff 
(o9j Ibid p.788 
(70) Renort of the Seventh Com-onwealth Conference of Wie Australian 
Laoour Party,p.47 
(71) "Sidelights on Two Ref erendumis" , p.42 
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aoove the equator. But Catts d^ .d not believe either that Australia 
. snould control those south of the equator. He sought an International 
commission (72). Whxle an in^p-amed fear of Japan lingered then 
in tne imraediate post-war years tnere was not as yet a sufficient 
iiimiediate fear of regional dangers and interests peculiar to Australia 
to force Australia into formulating an independent foreign oollcy. 
III. ' • 
By 1900 it had becom.e almost universally accented 
that Australian mtionalism was compatible with continued Empire 
meuibership. From tnis time a form of Empire imperialism became a 
component of the nationalism of the majority of Australians. The 
proolem was to find a way of satisfying tne implications of this 
dual loyalty. The majority placed their trust in haphazard growth; 
a minority sou=;-ht some niore formal organisation to offset the 
disintegrating centrilugal forces. In this they were ecnoing the 
debate going on throughout the Empire. The snifting balance of world 
economic and political power and the growth of the dominions' 
economies appeared to favour the case of the pragmatist. Devolution 
became the. Gharaoteristic of Empire evolution. Yet the balance was not 
all on one side. The course being found between com.plete disintegrat-
ion and imperial federation, biased away from imperial federation 
though it was, owed as much, if not more, to trie constructive thought 
of men like Deakin as it did to the negativism of the haphazard 
school. Through Deakin and to a lesser extent Hughes, Australia 
mad e a valuable contribution to this development, easing the 
passage, both natlonalistica^-ly and imperialistically, towards the 
post-war Cormionwealth. 
Over these years Australian nationalism altered 
considerably. From being aggressively colonial in the 1880's it 
became measurably more responsible between 1900 and 1914. This was 
partly the result of wide agreement about nation.al aspirations. 
(72) Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates,Vol.LiCfXIX p.12419 ff 
c^»t/-. 
underwritten by a prosperity which helped reduce the feelings of 
financial dependence on outside assistance. The strain of the war 
proved too much for this as yet untempered nationalism and, the 
Irish issue aside, the country divided about the basic question of 
whether or not it should a.jandon, if only temporarily, its established 
freedoms and Labour's socio-economic ambitions for the sake of 
maximum military participation on the side of the Emolre. The 
performance of Australian troops did strengthen Australia's national 
pride. Gallipoli, it was said,"has given Australia tradition"(73). 
But one pride did not offset the other. In the upshot the Labour 
Party lost its national character and so, it could be argued, did 
the non-Labour Party particularly from the end of the war. Neither 
major party spoke on international questions with an assured national 
voice in the between war years. Both parties favoured the ivaperial 
connection out the non-Labour Party placed a b.eavy reliance on 
British control of Empire foreign policy while the Labour Part^r^ 
generally speaking, clung to its belief in international machinery 
until the League of Nations showed itself baniQ'upt. 
The changing British Empire had been able to 
accom/xodate tPie range of -^ -ustralian nationalisms. But Empire and 
Coraimonwealth decentralisation continued in the post-war world and 
confronted after 1939 with a drastic change of world power balance 
Australia had eventually to accept the logic of the oha.nge within 
the Commonwealth and assume responsiDility for its own foreign policy. 
However as contemporary Australian foreign policy, itself, acquires 
a history it is becoming increasin^^ly apparent that, although it 
inevitably contains much ohat is new, its principles are grounded in 
much that is old and, not least, the understanding of Australian 
ideals and regional fears as they were expressed in the fonrnative 
Years of the Comuonwealth when the f Wire was uecoming the British 
Commonwealth. 
(73) Rqund_Ta:Dl£ Vol.6 Pt.I p,354 
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